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INTRODUCTION
Like every other subject in American history, Populism
has seen major changes in historiography as historians from
different perspectives have examined the farmers' movement
that disrupted the politics of the Great Plains, South, and
Rocky Mountain states during the 1890s.

Each generation of

scholars has added its questions, techniques, and talent to
the work of its predecessors in assessing the origins, significance, and contributions of the Populists.

Some of this

scholarship entailed criticizing the weaknesses and oversights of earlier historians.

Some has been devoted to ask-

ing new questions that have arisen in light of developments
in the interpretation of American history.

Some has con~en-

trated on applying new methods to the study of old problems
to determine what else can be learned about the past.

The

result of all this effort is an extensive.body of literature
that reveals how historians have thought about the Populist
movement and each other for the last half ~entury.
In 1 ·:1J1 John D. Hicks published his The Populist Re·rol t,
what would soon become the standard--though not definitive,
as one of his conte~poraries was quick to point out--w~rk o~
the Populist party.

Still under the influence of Frederick

Jackson Turner's frontier thesis, Hicks saw the agrarian radicals as farmers oppressed by corporations, heavy.debt,
an unmerciful environment.

and

Lacking the choice that farmers

2
had been afforded earlier in American history--that of moving
on to the next frontier to escape--men resorted to a political solution to their problems.

The Populist demands went

back to the democratic heritage of the nation and foreshadowed many of the reforms of the twentieth century, particularly of the Progressive era.1
This benign interpretation of Populism held the historiographical field for two decades.

Then in the postwar

years opinion on the Populists began to shift to a more critical stance.

Stinging from attacks during the McCarthy era,

intellectuals sought to trace the roots of such demagogery in
American history.

One of their targets was the Populist

movement, a force that had also shown anti-intellectual tendencies, provincialism,

and distrust of the cities.

Some went

so far as to see the Populists as the forerunners of fascists.2
The major statement of the revisionist school is that of
Richard Hofstadter.

In his Age of Reform Hofstadter saw the

real problem of the American farmer not in the dominance of
corporations,

but the agrarians' participation in an interna-

tional market for which they were not prepared.

Though in

prosperity the farmer considered himself a commercial operator, hard times forced him to retreat into an agrarian myth
in which he saw himself as a yeoman farmer seeking to hold
onto what was his.

As industrialization and urbanization

wrought sweeping changes in American society, American farmers

J
saw themselves left behind and turned to independent political action for help.
Hofstadter probed what has been termed the darker side
of Populism.

In analyzing the Populist character he iso-

lated five traits that he felt were important strains in
the agrarian radical mind.

Populists looked back to a gold-

en age of agriculture when the yeoman ruled society.

They

saw an essential unity of interests among all producers,
farmers and laborers alike, Populists looked at things in
terms of black and white, good and evil.

History was the

product of conspiracies against the common man, generally
directed by a vast international money power.

Money was of

primary importance to the Populists and many of their reform
ideas reflected their desires to boost the money supply.
Such characteristics have led critics of the Populists to
label them provincial nativists,
whose nationalism

fundamentally irrational,

directed them into jingoism.J

Hofstadter's indictment of a political movement that
had errt e r ta i.ned the public's sympa t hy for d e cad e s spawned no
small discussion.

Hofstadter incited new interest in a

field that had not received major scholarly attention since
Hick's book was published.

The result was reaction, recon-

sideration, and reinterpretation as historians poured through
the evidence another time and sought out new information on
the Populists.
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The most persistent of these critics to Hofstadter's
interpretation has been Norman Pollack.

In a 1960 article

Pollack challenged Hofstadter's contention that much of Populist thought and action was irrational, attacked his methodology and evidence, and offered explanations for the character traits Hofstadter examined.

Two years later Pollack

presented his full-scale defense of Populists in The Populist
Response to Industrial America.

The agrarian radicals were

far from irrational, backward-looking men who wanted to turn
back the clock.

Rather, they represented a "progressive

social force" that was willing to accept industrialism if it
could be controlled to eliminate oppression.
ideology resembled Marxism.

Much of their

Indeed, the Populists met a

major defeat when organized labor repudiated the movement as
being too radical.

Three years later he again took up his

pen to defend the Populists and the radical strain in American history as a whole.

The consensus approach to history,

according to Pollack, threatened to distort our view of the
past. 4
The critics have had their critics.

In 1965 Agricul-

tural History published a series of major articles on the
problems ,of interpreting Populism.

Irwin Unger defended

Hofstadter ag8inst Pollack by pointing out the Populists'
readiness to seize on simple and naive solutions to the complex problems of American society.

J. Rogers Hollingsworth

cautioned historians about accepting Populist rhetoric too

5
freely and urged them to seek further data about the social
.bases of Populism.

Oscar Handlin was critical of both the

defenders and detractors of Populism, feeling that they had
wasted too much time haggling over minor points.5

The next

year Theodore Saloutos, sympathetic to Hick's interpretation,
questioned the commitment of farmers to labor and tried to
place attitudes of the Populist movement into an historical
background. 6
One historian has taken a tack exactly opposite of
Pollack.

Karel Bicha has suggested that, far from being

early representatives of the leftist movement in America, the
Populists were ideologically conservative.
was deeply rooted in the rightist tradition;

Their philosophy
their occasional

reforms that might seem radical were merely a means to restore an earlier balance of power.7
Other historians have focused their efforts on particular aspects of Hofstadter's thesis rather than attacking the
whole.

In a study of Kansas '··Jal ter T. K. Nugent examined

charges that Populi~ts were nativistic and concluded that
Populists made every effort to attract immigrants to their
cause.

Accusations of anti-Semitism had little basis in fact

other than Populist condemnations of Jews in financial circles.
Agrarian jingoism in 1898 came not from a desire to conquer
territory, but from humanitarian motives to free Cuba.
failed to perceive that, despite Populist entreaties,

Nugent
some

groups like Germans viewed the Populists with suspicion be-

6
cause many of the movement's leaders had been involved with
cultural reforms.8

A number of historians have exerted con-

siderable effort in discussing the nature of Populists' attitudes toward the Jews, with some being ardent defenders
against charges of anti-Semitism and others taking the more
realistic approach of acknowledging that Populists felt much
the same way as did other sectors of American society.9
Some historians have pointed out similarities between
Populists and other groups and have called for a more
searching analysis of Populism, particularly of its lowerlevel leaders and the rank and file, and comparisons with
.
10
.
members of the old par t ies.
Their colleagues have responded
with a number of studies that attempt to assess the Populist
party on the local level and to compare the traits of the
agrarian reformers with those of their political foes.
Stanley B. Parsons took up this call in 1963 with an
article that dealt with Populists in Nebraska.

He found an-

tagonisms between farmers and townsmen over local leadership
which the latter were reluctant to surrender.

The Populists

drew much of their strength from the wheat belt where farmers
were so dependent on wheat for a crop that they left themselves open for disaster.

Protestants favored and Catholics

opposed the new third party.

He emphasized these points

again in his book a decade later.11
·:alter T. K. Nugent found similar results in·Kansas in
that Republicans tended to have a far higher proportion of

7
urbanites among their local leaders than Populists did.

Com-

parisons of rates of mortgaging and other transactions involving land showed that Populists were less speculative with
their resources, preferring to invest their capital in farms.
Populists did, however, have a higher involvement in corn and
12
hogs than did their opponents.
A recent study of the Farmers'

Alliance in South Dakota

confirms some of Nugent's findings.

There the Allianceman--

a member of the group most likely to join the Populists--was
a farmer who was recently upwardly mobile.

He had often in-

vested heavily in his farm and could not afford to lose it.13

In a recent extensive study of Nebraska politicia~s
during the Populist era Robert W. Cherny found that Republicans were most likely to come from urban occupaticr.s and
from Protestant bodies, Democrats came from ritualistic backgrounds, might be professionals,
of immigrant stock.

and were more likely to be

The Populists were far more likely than

either of the other groups to be farmers and tended to be a
composite of the other parties for other sociolcgical var. bl es.
ia

14

In the last decade and a half historians have applied
the methods of the social sciences to the study of political
behavior in the Populist era.

Frederick C. Luebke, one of

the first scholars using these techniques,found
Germans of Nebraska shunned the

P'JPLt~

that the

is-Cs wheri they asuoc i-

ated that party with cultural issues like prohibition, but

8
could show a bit more sympathy for it when they could react
to the movement without such cultural values having a high
saliency.

Robert Cherny's more sophisticated study of voting

trends in Nebraska revealed that during the first part

of

the 1890s a Populist's political choice was likely to be
governed by economic factors while a Democrat was more likely
to be motivated by cultural.issues.

During the latter por-

tion of the Populist era when fusion was in effect, both
cultural and economic factors can be isolated as sources of
anti-Republican sentiment.15
One historian has recently attempted a major new interpretation of Populism.

Lawrence GoodwYn has suggested that

true Populism had its origins in the cooperative ventures of
the Alliance and similar farm organizations and that it drew
its ideology from the Greenback movement.

Without the expe-

rience of cooperative economic ventures, no real Populist
movement could exist in a state, for only that experience
could radicalize agrarians sufficiently to create .Populism.
Any state party without such a genesis was nothing more than
a "shadow movement," a term that he applies to Nebraska Populism.

Goodwyn's expertise lies in the field of Texas Pop-

ulism, where the scenario he paints holds true.

He errs in

believing that the entire Populist movement was nothing more
than the Texas example written large.

Indeed, the Alliance

in South Da~ota had already begun its political demands before its cooperative enterprises had a chance to fail.

9
Serious questions have been raised concerning Goodwyn's methodology and the quality of his research for Nebraska.

He

is also guilty of sloppy work in his documentation of the
South Dakota Populists.16
Works specifically dealing with South Dakota Populism
have generally followed in Hicks's trail in applying a progressive interpretation to the movement.

Foremost among

these historians have been Herbert S. Schell and his student
Jr.17

Kenneth E. Hendrickson,

Brian Jason Need, taking

Pollack's approach, has viewed the state's Populism as a
progressive social force that grappled with problems and
questions raised by industrialization,

even though the

Populists exhibited the traits Hofstadter discerns.18
Two historians have applied statisti~al techniques to
South Dakota's agrarian radicals.

Michael P. Rogin, in a

study of the connec:ions between McCarthy and earlier political movements in a number of midwestern states, including
South Dakota, analyzed a variety of f'ac to r s influencing politics.

Although he fourd no ties between the Populists anj

the Senator from .lisconsin, he deter~ined that the weaith of
the counties was the best indicator of Populist stre~gt~,
with the proportion of Populist votes going ~p with wealtt1
until the top levels are reached, where~pon the support for
the farmers fell off.

Crop patterro were the sec end most Im-

portant factor, according to Rogin, wi t h Popu Li sru c cnc ent r a ted in the wheat ~ounties.

His third indicator was ethnicity,
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which was sometimes
tions

in wheat

strong

analyzing

been because
Scandinavians
He lists

problems

the primary

implies
likely

they were

settl~d

of certain
emphasis

should

suggests
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opposed

in at least

have thrown

groups

level

within

Populism,

tiers

of many

patterns

due to

that one wonders

rather

trends

when

off his data.

not be on immigrant

to be due to the presence

His

than by precinct
counties.

of Russian-Germans
county.

was

rather
He also
county

at a time when the county with the highest

of Austrian-born

of its population in that

immigrants

in 1900

so

Thus he

but that result

one South Dakota

if

groups.

that there was such a thing as an Austrian

in the state
portion

important

patterns

presence

to his dominant
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He gives
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study.
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the correla-

settlement
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with Rogin's

considered

so many exceptions

the presence

study
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the wealth

of counties

to displace

areas.

There are several
no indication

enough

pro-

had only 1.94

%

group, most of whom were Slavs.19

Jchn D. Dibber.n's recent dissertation is a significant
contribution to our understanding of the Farmers' Alliance in
South Dakota, the organization that provided a good share of
the earliest Pcpu Li.s t strength.

Using the membe:cship roles

of the l'r.arshall County Alliance, Dibbern was able to·produce
a composite sketch cf Alliance members in the 1880s.

He

11

found them to be men who were recently upwardly mobile and
who were heavily in debt, usually to improve their holdings.
They were attracted to the Populist party, Dibbern suggests,
in order to defend themselves against foreclosures and loss
of status, although he can offer no proof that the Alliance
men did join the third party.

His study also showed that im-

migrants were disproportionately represented among Alliance
ranks.20
Like Joseph's coat, Populism was a thing of many colors.
Elements within it can be taken as evidence for many interpretations.

Some Populist editorials in the mining districts

of the Black Hills warned of wage slavery and local Alliances
expressed support for the Knights of Labor in strikes, but
the movement as a whole seems to have been conservative in
the state.

There were occasional mentions of Jewish ban~ers

that might be taken as anti-Semitism,

but the condemnation

was never hurled at the average Jew and the party made successful overtures to many of the state's immigrant groups.
The Populists of the state called for war asainst Spain in
1898 but jingoism was not the motive, for less than two years
latter the same Populists were agitating to have the state's
contingent of troops returned from the Philippines.
South Dakota's Populist movement resembles Hicks' interpretation more than Hofstadter's.

The Populists were com-

mercial farmers, or soon hoped to be when rail lines· came
through, but the problems the state's agrarians faced with
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drought

and corporations

onto the Plains
would
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meet there during

hard
value
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crops
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th~ 1890s
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its rise,
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CHAPTER I

DAKOTA BOOM AND BUST
The background for South Dakota's Populist era was
the Great Dakota Boom, a period in the territory's history
stretching from 1878 to 1887.

These were years of tremen-

dous growth in the area as speculators and settlers flocked
in from the East and foreign countries.
grew at fantaRtic rates.

The population

For the first time large scale

settlement edged away from the southeastern quarter and
eastern border of what would become South Dakota.
an era of high hopes, great speculation,

It was

and, as the diffi-

cult years of the 1890s would prove, overextension of agricultural techniques designed for a more humid climate.

It

is in this context that the magnitude of the bust and the
severity of the problems farmers faced can be understood.
Many of the grievances and conditions that ignited the agrarian revolt of the 1890s had their origins in this earlier,
more optimistic time.
Census figures give an indication of the extent of the
boom.

South Dakota's exact population on the eve of the

Dakota Boom is not known.
had been 7,919.

The area's population in 1870

By 18EO, two years after the boom began,

Dakota's southern half claimed 64,708 residents.

A decade

later the new state of South Dakota boasted of 237,753 inhabitants, and this was after the harsh conditions of the
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late 1880s had already forced some to flee.1
of

The expansion

agriculture in the southern half of the territory during

the Dakota Boom is equally impressive.

In 1880 the entire

territory had only 17,435 farms, nearly fourteen thousand of
which were in the southern half, totaling about J,800,000
acres.

Ten years later South Dakota alone had over 50,000

farms comprising over eleven million acres.2
The gross totals tell only part of the story.

Such

figures indicate the size of the influx, but not where these
people settled.

A large proportion found new homes in the

western and northern areas away from the more humid southeastern and eastern edges of Dakota.

The settled counties

of the southeastern tip of Dakota Territory also registered
large gains in the 1880s--Clay County's population grew
fifty percent.

The most remarkable growth, however, took

place farther west.

By 1879 the Big Sioux River valley was

filled and settlement was spilling over the prairie to ffieet
with that coming up the James River valley.J

By 1890 the

counties along the hlissouri were being settled.

?or example,

the population of South Dakota counties bounded on the west
by the ~issouri had exploded from about 1,400 residents in
1880 to nearly J0,000 in 1890.4
The Great Dakota Boom was the resurgence of immigration
into Dakota Territory after westward movement had been
stalled for several years due to depression, drought, and
grasshopper plagues.

Its course can be charted in the num-

18
ber of acres filed on in the southern part of the territory
between 1878 and 1887.

Land entries in 1877 amounted to

only 16J,7J9 acres, but the total for the following year
topped 940,000.

Claims climbed steadily to a peak of nearly

five and a half million acres in 1883 (though 1884 was the
high for the territory was a whole), and declined to
1,12J,2JJ acres in 1887.5
A variety of factors lay behind this rapid growth.
Foremost among these was the renewed construction of railroads in Dakota.

The first lines reached the fringes of

southern Dakota in 1872, but by the next year, when building
ceased because of the Panic of 187J, less than 100 miles of
6
track had been laid.
·:Jhen improving conditions in the East
permitted investment in western railroads again, a web of
rail lines spread across the territory.

A major impetus for

this construction was a rivalry between the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul and the Chicago & North Western roads, both
of which decided to extend their lines into the area in the
late 1870s.7
Secondly, increased rainfall after the drought of the
early 1870s convinced many settlers that South Dakota offered a more humid climate than was actually the case.8

This

was particularly true for central and northern South Dakota
where settlement moved onto the Great Plains proper.
conventional agriculture as practiced further east was
suitable during wet seasons, but as the rainfall cycle

Here

19
entered a dry phase in the mid-1880s many farmers found
themselves unable to cope with the changing conditions.
A third factor in the Dakota Boom was the promotional
efforts of a varity of sources, all extolling the glories
of the territory.

Boomer literature was by no means limited

to the years of the actual boom, but there was a profusion
of it in the 1880s and soon after.

The railroads were pri-

marily responsible for such advertisement in the 1870s and
early 1880s, although other private sources like townsite
companies, newspapers,
share.9

and steamship lines contributed their

The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul was particularly

active in promoting migration to Dakota, but other roads
were also responsible for pamphlets,

special excursion rates,

emigration agents, and exhibition cars that toured eastern
states.10
Dakotans were not willing to leave the task of informing the outside world of the region's benefits to private
hands.

In the mid-1870s

a territorial immigration bureau

operated for a time, sending out literature in English,
German, and Norwegian.

This was revived in 1885 and distrib-

uted thousands of pamphlets,
11
books.

reports, maps, lithographs, and

Other factors in the Dakota Boom included the availability of capital for investment in the West and advances
in agricultural technology.

As economic conditions

im-

proved after the Panic of 1873 capital flowed westward to
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lucrative

markets.

Hills mines,
from small

Part of it went into railroads

but much

of this money--especially

that coming

its way into farm mortgages. 12

investors--found

This was welcomed

and Black

by settlers

who were

and needed

capital

from the outside

provements

and to buy the machinery

just starting

farms

to make necessary
required

im-

for prairie

agriculture.
Progress

in agricultural

make possible

the boom.

working

large

tracts

allowed

the commercial

crop much more suited
wheat,

and contributed

of northern
technology
purchase

South

Better

plows

of ground.

and tools helped
and reapers

Changes

cultivation
to Dakota's

climate

Dakota.

spring

in

wheat,

a

than soft winter
of the wheat belt

The danger

present

Many farmers

went

and were caught

aided

in flour milling

of hard

to the development

was its cost.
machinery

techniques

in this new

into debt

to

short when the boom

broke.1J

The boom could not last forever:
break.

something had to

In :~kota in the 1830s what broke was the stretch

of wet years.

Localized drought struck in 1886, hitting

small grains in particular.

Widespread drought came in 1887,

though it was only spotty in 1888.

Severe drought returned

in 1889 and, with some exceptions, a shortage of rainfall
plagued the state until the mid-1890s.14
The effect of the drought was devastating,
in the western areas.

particularly

Eastern and southeastern southern
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Dakota fared better than the counties in the northern and
central portions.

The sections settled earlier received

more rain than those settled during the boom and their farm
economy was more diversified, thus able to absorb the shock
better.15

:iJheat in the entire territory averaged less than

ten bushels per acre in 1889, and some areas harvested considerably less.

Many were faced with destitution in an era

when state government was too limited to provide substantial
assistance.

In Miner County crops were so poor that star-

vation was imminent for thousands.16

John B. Streng, a

German farmer living a few miles south of that county, wrote
to H.T. Helgesen, commissioner of the North Dakota Department of Agriculture and Labor, whom he had heard was collecting funds for Dakota's needy, "~e have 4 little children and nothing to eat and no shoes for our children a~d no
feed for our horses . .

. . [ :-1] e shall perish with hunger,

all my neighbors are as badly circumstanced."17
The course of the boom and bust has been ably chronicled in one wheat belt county.

Brown County, situated on

the edge of the Great Plains in northern South Dakota, had
only J5J residents and 28 farms in 1880.

In the next years

the boom overtook it and by 1885 Brown had 12,011 inhabitants and 2,441 farms.18

By 1890 the population reached

16,855 and the number of farms totaled 2,527.19

In 1882

Brown County farmers harvested a bumper wheat crop, a
success that insured the crop's prominence in future plant-
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ing.

In 188) over three

wheat

than any other crop.

1885,

but the beginning

small

grain crops.

three

to four bushels

price

of wheat

bushel.

times more land was devoted
Good harvests

of the drought

Some areas

in the county

ranged

a poor showing

to come to the county

in 1886,

The next year increased

rainfall

only

Furthermore,

the

continued

winter

continued

and yields

were low in 1888.

per bushel

the artificial

stimulus

Such high prices
good

because

of an active

that was hard

of a ~illion

acres

King

more

-~1eat's

closest

to pass.
County

crops

hardship.

Prices

board

reach-

of trade.

tendency

Hence,

farmers

to protect
crop,

was a poten-

over a quarter

were plantej

with wheat

devoted

The dry weather

by prairie

fires

eventually

themselves

to stay

Even with the

the acreage

competitor.

thing with a poor wheat
through

farmers'

than five times

Brown County

diversified

local

crop at that price

in 3rown

in 1890 and was complicated
prices.20

presaged

but only under

than diversify.

of a large

tial bonanza

in 1839,

but

may have done the county more harm than

crop rather

the chance

of 1887-1888

in Aberdeen,

it only reinforced

with a single
risk,

for wheat

continued

some relief,

The severe

ed $1.27

a

to plant wheat.

it did not last.
drought

to$.62

settlers

brought

the

averaged

from only$.45

and farmers

through

in 1886 damaged

an acre that year.

in Aberdeen

Despite

continued

to

to oats,
continued

and low market

turned

against

to more

losing

but it was a lesson

every-

learned
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Census returns can be used to measure the bust as well
as the boom.

Between 1890 and 1895 twenty-seven counties in

South Dakota lost population, most of them located in the
region east of the Missouri River, but north and west of the
counties settled before the boom.21

Between 1890 and 1900

drought and other factors caused a drop in the population of
sixteen South Dakota counties, all of which lay on or west
of the James River.

Most of these lay between the James and

the Missouri, the area that received the greatest influx of
settlers during the boom and that is the eastern edge of the
Great Plains in the state.22 Furthermore,

the counties that

lost population often had urban sites that were growing, a
fact that conceals the true loss in rural districts.2)

Most

of those regaining population losses between 1895 and 1900
were situated east of the Great Plains or in the Black Hills.
Other factors contributed to the end of the boom.
road construction dropped dramatically in 1838.24

Rail-

During

the good years farmers had been too willing to mortgage
their land in or]er to get established or to expand.

The

result was that they had too much debt and not enough capital to survive a series of bad years.25

In 1890 South

Dakota ranked ninth in the nation in the percenta~e of families living in owned but mortgaged homes, following only
Kansas of the Plains states.26

The farmers' inability to

secure additional capital was compounded by a tightening
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money market due to a slump in business in the East and
eastern reluctance to invest because of fraud and failure
in speculative ventures in the West.27
Many of the seeds of the Populist movement were sown
during the Dakota Boom between 1878 and 1887.

That is when

settlers moved out into a region for which they were not
prepared.

That is the era when railroads stretched through

the future state, making commercial agriculture on a large
scale feasible, but also binding the farmers' fate to them.
That is when farmers shouldered a mortgage burden too heavy
for them to carry during hard years.

These were seeds that

would come to fruition in the 1890s.

The organization that

harvested those seeds was the Dakota Farmers' Alliance.
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CHAPTER II
THE DAKOTA FARMERS' ALLIANCE
When Dakota farmers found themselves in hard straits
during the nineteenth century their response was organization to act against a common threat.

This was first seen in

the Grange in Dakota Territory in the 1870s.

As farmers

faced difficulties in the late 1880s and 1890s they again
flocked to a farm order to seek relief, turning this time
to the Farmers' Alliance.
In the years just prior to South Dakota's statehood in
1889, the agrarians in the region were confronted by serious
problems.

The Great Dakota Boom ended, leaving many farmers

poorly prepared for hardships and deeply in debt.

Sagging

prices due to deflation and overproduction made wresting a
living from a stubborn climate more difficult.

Located far

from adequate markets, South Dakota's farmers depended
heavily on elevators and railroads to buy, store, and ship
their crops to eastern cities.

These corporations were,

however, powerful institutions that were accusej of exploiting helpless farmers.
The Farmers' Alliance offered embattled farmers a tool
to combat such barriers to agricultural prosperity.

Part of

the farm order's solution to these problems lay in cooperative enterprises that would allow agrarians a chance to
overcome some of the sources of oppression.

Hence the Alli-
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ance gave rise to a host of business operations such as insurance companies, purchasing cooperatives,

and elevators.

In addition, the Alliance appealed to sources outside agricultural circles for support against its enemies, petitioning particularly to laborers, whom it saw as common members
of a great producing class that was endangered by those who
would seek to enrich themselves from the labor of others.
The problems Dakota farmers encountered in the eighties
and nineties were not new to the region.

During the early

1870s the Patrons of Husbandry, a farm order that had been
organized by Oliver Kelley in Nashington, D.C., in 1867,
gathered some strength among settlers in southeastern Dakota
Territory who were suffering under an oppressive credit
system.

The Grange, as the organization is more commonly

known,first began in Dakota Territory in late 1872 and
quickly grew to about 2,000 members in fifty-six lodges.
Although the Dakota State Grange made efforts to eliminate
middlemen
success.

who siphoned farmers' profits, it met with little
A brief foray into politics in combination with

the Democrats by a portion of the Grange as the Anti-Monopoly Party in 1874 was also a failure and the organization
faded into obscurity.1
A few years later farmers turned to another organization to replace the Grange.

Milton George, the Illinois

editor who started the National Farmers' Alliance,issued the
first charter to a local alliance in Dakota in 1881.2

The
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first few years of the Northern Alliance, as the National
Farmers' Alliance is generally known, were marked by slow
progress in the territory.

By 1884, however, difficulties

with credit, railroad and elevator abuses, and declining
wheat prices convinced many farmers of the need to organize
more thoroughly.J
The forerunner of the Dakota Territorial Alliance was
the Beadle County Farmers' Protective Association, an organization formed by farmers on the edge of the Great Plains
in 1884 in search of a means of obtaining higher prices for
their crops and lower prices for their purchases.4

In

December 1884 a meeting of all granges, alliances and other
agricultural groups was called by W.F.T. Bushnell, the editor of the Dakota Farmer, to gather in Huron, the county
seat of Beadle County.

Although many of the territory's

sixty local alliances were not represented,

the convention

effected an organization and adopted a platform calling for
the equal taxation of all property, an end to railroad
passes to gover~1~nt officials,

the regulation of transport

rates by law, and legislation in the interest of farmers.5
In February 1885 the farmers again met in Huron to
elect a new slate of officers, adopt a constitution, and
formally become the Dakota Territorial Alliance.

Only

forty-three delegates, mostly from central South Dakota and
none from the northern half of the territory, attendect.6

The

following January the Alliance convened in Watertown where

Jl
Henry L. Loucks was elected president.?
Henry Langford Loucks was inseparably bound to the
Dakota Alliance and South Dakota's Populist movement.

Born

in Canada in 1846, Loucks lived in the United States briefly
during the mid-1860s before returning to his homeland.
re-emigrated in 1879.

He

After a few years in Missouri he

located on a farm in Deuel County, Dakota, in 188J.

In

1884 Loucks organized a farm club in Deuel that later became an alliance.

His election to the presidency of the

Dakota Alliance in 1886 was only the beginning of his rise
in agrarian politics.

In 1889 he became the president of

the Northern Alliance, but soon led the Dakota farm order
into the Southern Alliance where he was elected vice-president.

When the president, Leonidas L. Polk, died in June

1892, Loucks succeeded him and was elected president in his
own right in November of that year.

He also made several

bids for major office in South Dakota politics before his
death in 1928.

Condemned as an unprincipled schemer and

office seeker by his enemies and hailed as the "~~oses" of
the Alliance and the "patron saint of South Dakota populists"
by friends, Loucks left a large imprint on the state's
political scene in the 1890s.8
The Alliance grew rapidly under the adverse conditions
the farmers faced in the 1880s.

In December 1884 only about

sixty local alliances existed in Dakota.
number quadrupled.

In two years the

By December 1888, 744 suballiances dotted
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the territory with approximately 28,000 members.

By the end

of July 1889, over one hundred thirty more charters had been
issued.9

The order's early strength was concentrated in the

in the wheat belt counties of southern Dakota and in the Red
River Valley of northern Dakota, but it eventually spread to
cover all settled sections of the territory.10
As commercial fc:Giers, Dakota's agricultural settlers
~

depended heavily on the various aspects of the marketing
system for their success.

Abuses in this system and the

problems inherent in a frontier area drew farmers into the
Alliance as a means of meeting their problems with a united
front.

9ifficulties with railroads and elevators were part

of the problem.

Carrying a heavy burden of debt that was

a constant drain on the scant resources of the region was
another element in the Alliance's rise.

The disillusiorur.ent

caused by the end of the boom, the hardships created by the
drought, and the frustration experienced when it took larger
crops to bring the same return as prices spiraled downward
all combined to fuel the Farmers' Alliance.

When their ow~1

institution proved incapable of solving their problems and
when the two major parties showed themselves unresponsive to
the needs of farmers, the agrarians took the promising road
of independent political action.
The farmers' heavy dependence'on the railroad made it
a particular point of concern for the Alliance.

Extensive·

commercial agriculture was possible in large sections of

JJ
South Dakota only because of the ready access to markets
afforded by railroads.

The roads could literally decide the

life or death of a community by where they laid the tracks
as they expanded across 0akota.

A bumper wheat harvest was

meaningless unless it could be moved to market economically.
Settlers viewed these giant corporations with hope, for only
the steel rails could bring prosperity and growth, yet with
fear and suspicion of the power they could exert.
alarm was justified.

That

The railroads in South Dakota, in the

eyes of agrarians, abused their unbridled power and had to
be checkej,
Their first complaint was that freight rates were too
high.

Farmers found that excessive rates, especially as the

prices they received for their produce iecline1, could easily
gobble up one-third to one-half of their year's profits.11
The actual effect of railroad rates on farmers in the 1890s
has generated some controversy among histcrians, but recent
scholarship suggests that farmers, particularly those west
of the ~issouri, wsre injeed laboring under hie~ r~tes.12
The railroads contendej that such rates were justified
because the low volume of traffic in the state was carrie1
over long distances, which meant a high fixed cost of operation.

Severe winters also added to the costs of running

the roads.

Furthermore,

recently built.

most of Dakota's railroads had been

Rates had to be high enough to earn suffi-

cient revenue to pay debts from construction,

especially in

J4
areas where there was little business.13
This was an era when stock watering was common and the
fact that new railroads were often over-capitalized meant
higher rates were necessary to pay expected dividends.

In

addition, the valuation of the track and railroad equipment
was often undervalued to escape state taxes.

Farmers paid

higher rates at the depot and higher taxes at the courthouse because of such practices.14

The issue of raising the

assessments on railroad property later became a major point
in Populist Governor Andrew E. Lee's program.
Jarious other aspects of the railroads' service worked
hardships on the farmers.

Competition among lines in some

areas forced prices down and the common practice was to make
up such losses in areas where a road held a monopoly.

This

often resultej in higher prices for a short haul to a large
center than for the much longer distanc~s between large
cities.

It could be cheaper to ship a bushel of grain from

Chicago to ~nglanj than from ~akota to~e
polis.

millers of Minnea-

Railroais also solj transit between Jakcta and

Milwaukee rather than for the shorter route to the Twin
Cities to prevent the transfer of grain to a competing line.
The farmer could sell his wheat at a point closer than
Milwaukee, but he still had to pay the full rate although he
might be able to _sell his remaining mileage at a discount.15
Discrimination between large shippers and small ones
was another point of aggravation.

Customers who shipped in

35
bulk frequently received rebates and special prices for which
individual farmers could not qualify.

Major shippers were

accorded better service by the railroads.

Elevators had few

problems getting enough cars to ship their grain while individuals and small companies went begging for means of
transporting their crops.

Nhen parties did wish to build

elevators or flathouses in competition with established
elevator companies the railroads were often reluctant to
grant space on the right of way for construction or otherwise hindered them.16
Farmers and reformers found that the power of the railroad corporations was an obstacle to redress through the
political process.

The railroads had the organization and

the money to field strong lobbies and hire attorneys to
protect their interests in the legislature and the courts.
The custom of issuing free railroad passes to prominent
officials and molders of public opinion also infuriated
farmers.

Henry Loucks railed against the practice.

"The

syste~ [of passesJ is a da~nable lever of ccrrupticn, by
which the press, the politicians, and the people's representatives are influenced against the interests of the people
.... ~e, the victims, are charged enough extra to make up
for the free travelling, railroad lobbying,

etc."17

Farmers also had grievances against the grain elevators
they normally had to deal with while marketing their crops.
Like the railroads, the elevators were frequently monopolis-
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tic institutions in small towns.

Seldom did farmers have a

wide range of grain buyers with whom to do business, hence
the prices offered for their products were easily manipulated.

Line elevator companies--those operating a string of

elevators along a particular railroad--had good relations
with railway officials and both companies were hesitant to
allow other competitors in.
were huge affairs.

Some of these elevator chains

In 1889 an English syndicate purchased

78 elevators of the Van Duzen Company in ~akota and Minnesota and was negotiating for a dozen more.18

Even when

local elevators were willing to pay good prices, grain
dealers in the major terminals worked to keep the prices
down.

In 1889 there were reports that Minneapolis dealers

were exaggerating the size of the Dakota wheat crop to sup.
19
press prices.
Local elevator agents controlled the grading of grain
as well, so a man's crop might receive a low grade at the
elevator, but be sold to a miller in Minneapolis at a higher
one, with the elevatcr op~rator pocketing the extra profit.20
Lacking adequate storage space on his farn, the typical
South ~akota far~er us~ally had to sell his grain as soon
as possible, taking whatever the local elevator woulj offer.
Consigning the crop to the elevator was an alternative, but
the farmer had to pay storage fees and still could not be
certain of a higher price at a lat2r date.

Often settlers

had no choice but to sell because they had to satisfy debtors.
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Farmers with initiative might try to ship their wheat themselves, but they generally encountered problems getting
21
cars.
Even when a farmer's prices were not manipulated, he
often found little return in the marketplace.

Agricultural

prices were on a downward slope in the years following the
Civil :·Jar for two reasons.

One was the general decline in

the level of prices in the deflation that occurred as the
economy wound down from its wartime rate.

A second cause

was the vast increases in production that characterized
American and worldwide agriculture

in the latter half of

the nineteenth century.
As the government retired the greenbacks that had
circulated during the Civil War, price levels dropped to
match the subsequent appreciation
the economy.

of the currency left in

Between 1865 and 1870 alone the money in cir-

culation dropped 25 percent.

Accor~ing to one authority,

the general price index between 1865 and 1895 fell from
about 185 to less than 75, with a~ricultural
below that.22

ccm~odities

The effects of this can be seen in the prices

paid to farmers in South ~akota.

In the early 18~0s wheat

dropped below a dollar per bushel in Jakota and proved a
major impetus to the formation of the farmers' organizations.2J

Using the average price for July 15 of each year,

wheat brought $0.72 per bushel in 1890 and 1891, but fell to
$0.60 in 1892.

In 189J ~nd 1894 the price was under fifty

)8
cents a bushel.

After a slight rally in 1895, the price

dropped to $0.40 in 1896.

The remaining years of the decade

brought prices near or over the $0.60 mark, but only after
years of privation on South Dakota farms.24
As agriculture spread westward onto the huge tracts of
the Great Plains, farm production climbed, depressing prices
through the natural consequences of an increased supply.
Improvements in transportation in the United States and in
other countries expanded the markets of American farmers,
but also placed them in competition with agriculturalists
elsewhere.25
Another burden upon the farmers was the tariff, which
made the price of goods they bought artificially high but
which did not offer much protection for the goods they sold.
As one of the most heatedly debated issues of the Gilded
Age, the tariff was defended by the Republicans as the means
of encouraging native industries.

It was attacked by

Demo-

crats who looked upon it as an unwarranted aid to a favored
few at the expense of the many.

Although many Alliance men,

reflecting their Republican roots, favored the tariff, the
arguments of its critics had some merit.

Otto Anderson, a

Pennington County Alliance member, was a persistent enemy of
the "tariff robbers" who kept prices high on twine, but low
on cattle hides that the farmer marketect.26
The money lending institutions that had been so welcome
during good years became·enemies during the bad ones.

In-
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terest rates were high before the end of the boom, but loans
were available.

Declining prices made it more difficult to

pay off mortgages contracted during years of expansion; poor
harvests made it almost unbearable.

Farmers had to r-ef'Lnanc e

their mortgages or face foreclosure,

and, due to the poor

business conditions in the East, interest rates jumped because there was less capital at hand.

ilhen real estate mort-

gages were unavailable hardpressed farmers turned to chattel
mortgages on their equipment and livestock for ready cash,
even though it entailed interest rates that could reach J6
percent.

One of the ironies of this alternative was that

many families could not flee during difficult years because
their only means of transportation--their wagon and team-was mortgaged and could not be removed.27

Bankers who haj

been looked upon as friends during prosperous years began to
be viewed as usurers and symbols of exploitation.
The ~en most likely to join the Farmers' Alliance were
precisely those farmers who had the most to lose from drought
and agric~ltural depression.

A recent study of the me~ber-

ship of the Alliance in one South Dakota county has indicated
that the order drew most of its members from farmers who had
recently improved their status and were heavily mortgaged.
These men were most vulnerable to hard times, for they had
gone into debt to establish farms and did not yet have the
28
resources to weather financial difficulties.
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An example of how the Alliance used adverse conditions
to recruit new members can be seen in the attempts it made
to boost grain prices.

In 1889 when wheat was bringing only

t<>.50 to $0.60 a bushel, the Dakota Ruralist, official organ
of the Territorial Alliance, urged farmers to hold their
crops as long as possible in hopes of higher prices.

"In

the meantime look about and investigate the Alliance movement
which seeks to combine the farmers, and in this way meet
combination with combination."29
Part of the Dakota Alliance's response to these adversities was a range of cooperative enterprises.

rhe basic

thrust of these programs was to save money and to give the
farmer more control over his affairs.

Henry Loucks viewed

cooperation as the means to break trusts that monopolized
the markets in which farmers operated.

A cooperative store

could sell products for less than the traditional stores or
force local businessmen to lower their prices.JO
These various operations benefited the Alliance by
+.
b OOSvlng

1. t s ~e~ b ersn1p.
1

•

The historian of the Southern

Alliance credits the cooperative portion of the organizations
activities with being a major lure to farmers.Jl

The person-

nel in these businesses served as recruiters for new members.
In 1887 the 273 insurance agents operating in ~akota helped
start 103 new alliances in the territory.32

Indeed, the

desire to coordinate the efforts of various buying and selling
operations had been one of the reasons why the Dakota Alli-
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ance had been formed in the first place, with the price of
twine and coal being early concerns.JJ
The first major undertaking by the Alliance was the
Alliance Hail Association, formed in December 1886 and incorporated the following February.

The Association was able

to insure farmers against one of the environmental hazards
they faced at a significantly lower rate than traditional
insurance companies.

In its first year the hail insurance

program paid its claim in full out of an assessment that
was forty to fifty cents per acre lower than its competitors.
Over 152,000 acres were covered in 1887, 566,000 the second
year, and nearly 460,000 the third year.J4
The hail insurance proved such a success that the Alliance authorized the formation of a life insurance department
at its ~ecember 1888 meeting.

The Alliance Aid Association

began operations in early 1889, offering a $2,000 policy to
members between the ages of 18 and 50 for a $5.00 membership
fee.

·lhenever a member died, all other members were assessed

a fee of ~1.00 to $2.00 to cover the costs.35

The Alliance

also offered fire insurance for a time.36
The man in charge of the Alliance insurance efforts was
Alonzo

lardall, a Grant County farmer, a long-time agrarian

leader, and one of the most powerful men in the Dakota Allianc e .

Born in ':'lisconsin in 1845, ·."Jard all saw service in the

Civil ~Jar before he moved to Iowa where he was a leader in
the state's Grange movement.

He was one of the organizers

42
of the Dakota Alliance after his removal to that territory.
He also served as a member of the executive board of the
Southern Alliance.

In the early 1890s he started the Alli-

ance Aid Degree, the national counterpart of the Alliance
Aid Association.37
Perhaps the most ambitious cooperative venture by the
Alliance was the Dakota Farmers' Alliance Company, a joint
stock company created as a purchasing operation.

Authorized

by the Alliance's executive committee in July 1887, this
concern began business in January 1888 with George
as president.

c.

Crose

Its original capital of $200,000 was to come

from the sale of 20,000 shares of stock, with no member
allowed to take more than fifty shares to insure that no
individual could control it.

It originally functioned

through a large network of some five hundred local agents,
but in 1889 switched to county

purchasing agents to improve

efficiency.JS
The purchasing cooperative faced severe problems in its
early years.

~any wholesalers,

particularly agricultural

implement dealers, were reluctant to deal with it.

Further-

more, it lacked the necessary capital to buy in the quantities
it had hoped.39
Despite these obstacles,

the company managed to do over

$J5J,OOO in business in its first year, about half of which
was in twine.

In 1888 it sold around 75 carloads of twine,
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2,000 cars of coal, and 11 cars of barbed wire.

As the

cooperative gained momentum it offered more products.

It

secured a contract with a plow company, and offered miscellaneous farm implements,

sewing machines, oil and other items.

It even had its own illustrated catalog.40
A third Alliance business struck directly at an old
enemy.

In early 1888 a farmers' elevator company was in-

corporated in Minneapolis with Henry Loucks as president.
Only by controlling a terminal with ready markets could
farmers defeat the power of the line elevators.

British

investors were willing to put up half of the projected two
million dollars in capital in order to guarantee getting
pure hard wheat.41
One of Louck's associates in the firm was C.C. Wolcott,
the owner of a chain of J2 elevators.

When :Jolcott lost

badly in wheat speculation he had to borrow heavily from
the company and one of its officers.

Milling interests in

Minneapolis seized this opportunity to discredit their new
competitor and managed to frighten away English capital.
This affair and the enm i ty of the traditional commercial
channels for handling grain brought on the failure of the
Alliance elevator plans.42
Not all cooperative enterprises of the era were the work
of the Territorial Alliance.

A number of local alliances and

other groups made efforts at cooperation. to cut their costs
and improve their conditions.

By 1888 there were 42 farmers'
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elevators in the territory, eleven of them under the auspices
of alliances.43

For example, the White Farmers' Alliance

Elevator Company and a farmers' elevator at Alpena, South
Dakota, were praised for the savings they producea.44

In

Grant County a stock company consisting mostly of farmers
ran a cheese factory.45
The large scale cooperative businesses of the Alliance
were not successful in the long term.

As was the case with

the Alliance's elevator company, the hostility of older
businesses and the lack of capital seriously hindered the
Dakota Farmers' Alliance Company.

The Alliance Hail Associ-

ation fell on hard times when it could not pay all of its
claims.

It was later denied a certificate to operate in

the state when the insurance commissioner reported finding
evidence of favoritism in the manner the company paid
claims.
Recent historians have seen the problems the Alliance
faced in economic cooperation as having "a discernible radicalizing effect on the Dakota leadership, particularly on
Loucks himself."46

This is true in some cases, but the

failure of cooperation did not become the sole wellspring
for the Populist party or for future agrarian radicalism.
Loucks and Wardall became leaders in the Alliance crusade
against trusts and in the Independent movement, but not all
of the top Alliance men reacted in the same fashion.

Don C.
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Needham, once secretary of the Farmers' Alliance Company,
and A.D. Chase, formerly a director of the hail association,
remained in the Republican party rather than turn to independent action.47

Those early leaders who did turn to

rad-

icalism often had reformist backgrounds to begin with.
~ardall had been a Granger in Iowa.

He and Loucks had
given support to temperance and woman suffrage. 48
Even though some leaders in the Alliance were "radicalized" from their experiences in the cooperative movement,
this did not always apply to local leaders and the rank and

file.

Not all of the Alliance followed Loucks and his asso-

ciates into the Independent party with its controversial
proposals and the Populists alone never drew a majority of
South Dakota's electorate.

The state, despite occasional

bursts of agrarian reformism and a cooperative movement that
has been part of the farm economy since the 1880s, re~ains
conservative.
The cooperative efforts incurred the displeasure of the
business community,

especially local merchants whose income

suffered because of the competition.49

In defending the

cooperative movement from those who attacked it as an appeal
to man's baser instincts, Loucks retorted that it was a positive good.

The movement instilled a spirit of cooperation,

gave the profits to the men who earned them rather than to
trusts, and developed wholesome qualities like "self~reliance,
thrift, economy, knowledge, and independence."50

In two
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editorials in 1889 the Alliance leader disclaimed any desire
to foster antagonism between the town and country.

He assur-

ed townsmen that he had no intention to destroy the cities,
but, foreshadowing Bryan's famous statement about the dependence of urban areas upon rural ones, he pointed out that
the prosperity of the city depended on the prosperity of the
farm.

He warned town leaders that the farmers would readily

turn to cooperatives if the profits of middlemen

got too

high.51
The Alliance made one half-hearted gesture to overcome
such hostility and formally enlist town dwellers in its
cause.

Such people were urged to form a chapter of the

National Citizens' Industrial Alliance, an order open to
everyone but "stockholders,

officers or salaried attorneys

of railway, express, telegraph or national banking corporations ... 52

The idea never caught on in South Dakota, al-

though there was at least one such organization in the state,
located in Parker with sixty members.5J
The Alliance also solicited the support of laborers,
seeking to demonstrate that there was a unity of interest
between farmers and laborers as members of the producing
class against the corporations and trusts that oppressed both
of them.

Hugh J. Campbell, a speaker at the Farmers' Alli-

ance meeting in June 1889, talked of the great battle in
which they would socn engage, a battle that would decide who
would govern the state, "the great producing class" or "the
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great corporations,
political rings ... 54

the corruptionists,

the boodlers and the

Some of those attending the 1889 con-

vention were Knights of Labor, who had been invited to join
the farmers' assemblage by Loucks and the Knights' Grand
Master :'Jorkman in the state, Frank Wilder.55
The columns of the Dakota Ruralist give evidence of
support among Alliance men f'or the problems of labor, a
sentiment that seems to go beyond a simple appeal for labor
votes to achieve farm ends.

One might expect an agrarian

leader and politician such as Loucks to show his sympathy
for a labor dispute involving ~he Knights of Labor, but
resolutions by local alliances favoring the cause of the
labor group against companies that had discriminated against
the workers' order were common.

The '.:Jal worth County Alli-

ance voted to boycott the Grand Detour Plow Company, the
Henderson Shoe Company, and the Rochester Clothing Company.
The Huffton Alliance in Brown County added the Globe tobacco
combine to the list of targeted businesses and Rose Alliance,
No. 74, of 3pink County pledged not to buy from "any other
company that refuses to hire union labor ... 56

Other local

alliances criticized the government fer allowing the Pinkertons to interfere in the Homestead steel strike and for
harsh treatment of Coxey's army.

One alliance even endorsed

T.V. Powderly, the national leader of the Knights of Labor
for president.57
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The Knights of Labor do not seem to have played a
significant role in the politics of the 1890s.

The organiz-

ation had little strength in South Dakota, numbering only

J6 assemblies.58

The president and business manager of its

official organ opposed the independent movement and placed
his paper and himself--in his capacity as a delegate to
the Alliance convention that voted to form a third party-at the disposal of the Republican governor.59 Nor does it
appear that other labor organizations or laborers as a whole
heeded the Alliance siren.
Confronted by a diverse set of agricultural hardships
in the late 1880s and early 1890s, South Dakota farmers
turned to the Farmers' Alliance for solutions to pressing
problems.

Y.any agri~ultural settlers had over-extended

their resources and abilities and were hard put to cope
with the end of the Dakota boom.

Poor prices made thP

returns for even bumper crops insufficient.

Elevators and

railroads, upon which farmers depended for marketing,

seemed

to be draining away the meager profit from South Dakota
farms.

In response,

the Alliance developed a series of

cooperative ventures to alleviate some of the difficulties
and bid for the support of laborers against those interests
perceived as inimical to the wellbeing of the producing
class.
The Alliance recognized early that only part of its
program could be achieved through cooperation and appeals
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for unity to others.

It quickly turned to political pres-

sure, although at first in a non-partisan form.

The farm

order tried to work within the structures of the existing
parties, but it was political action nevertheless.

Such

items as railroad reform, new mortgage laws, and a greater
money supply could only be had by taking demands to the
polls and to the legislature.
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.June 10, 1890, :.:ellett€: Pa.pe r s . Tr,<:> o f'f ic i a l c r-r an cf the
Dax o t a As s emb Ly of the :-:nie;hts, the '.":·af.:ota :'::;i:-:~1ts of Lab or-,
is evidently no longer extant.
In late 1691 the paper chansed its name to the Industrial Republ~c.
In mid-1892 the
paper r:.erged with a Pcpulist daily, the AberdeE:n St8.r, arid t.h e
publication continued as the Star. Da%ota Ruralist,
December 2LJ-, 1891; June 9, 18~
--

CHAPTER III
THE RISE OF THE INDEPENDENT

MOVEMENT

Cooperative enterprises formed only part of the Alliance response to agrarian problems.

The organization's

members understood from the beginning that some of their
goals could not be accomplished without political action.
Business ventures could free farmers from dependence on
middlemen who drained off profits, but other objectives
required political remedies.

Indeed, the first platform of

the Dakota Farmers' Alliance, adopted in December 1884,
called for a number of items that could be achieved solely
by legislation.
In 1884 the farmers' demands were rather limited.

In

the course of the next six years, however, the Alliance
platforms grew in length and scope.

By the end of the

decade, Alliance men called for a sweeping exercise of ~over~~ental authority.
specific.

The reforms they desired became more

The Alliance found that its early goals were tco

li~ited and that a stronger role for governrnent--particularly
the national government--would

be necessary.

In these years

the Alliance discovered that their opponents exercised tco
much control over the government and that changes were needed
to protect the power of the corrunon man.
The farmers also made an effort to broaden their appeal
by including changes called for by other groups.

By 1889 the
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Alliance began to look to other economic interests--especially labor--that shared their disadvantages in order to
establish a common front.
The farmers first sought to reach their goals by working through the existing party structure.

They believed

that in an agrarian state such as South Dakota, where
farmers formed the bulk of the voting population, they could
easily compel both of the major parties to meet Alliance
demands.

This proved a false hope, for old party leaders,

although they attempted to placate agrarian protests,
followed their own goals and listened more intently to
other interests.

In 1889 the Alliance could claim that the

final session of the territorial legislature was a farmers'
legislature because a majority of the members espoused
agricultural principles, but even with such strength, the
farmers could not push through their demands.

By the end of the decade, some South Dakota farmers had
concluded--reluctantly

by their own claims and eagerly

accordin~ to their enemies--that the old parties could not
serve as vehicles to Alliance success in the political arena.
From this dissatisfaction and disillusionment sprang the
Independent party.

The new political venture achieved sur-

prising success in its ~aiden effort at unseating the old
parties.

Although the state slate went down in defeat, many

legislative districts polled a majority for the lndependents.
With the aid of the Democrats, the farmer's party was able
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to elect a U.S. senator during the 1891 session of the state
legislature.
Farmers' clubs began forming in 1884 to start cooperative enterprises.

Representatives of some sixty of these

local bodies gathered in Huron in December 1884 to discuss
their problems and needs.

These men recognized that their

objectives would necessitate political action.

There was

no waiting period during which the cooperative ventures
were tried and found wanting before the farmers took the
first steps toward involvement in the territory's public
affairs.

That first meeting adopted a platform calling for

the equal taxation of all property, an end to the practice
of giving railroad passes to government officials,

the reg-

ulation of transportation rates by law, and legislation in
the interests of the farmers.

1

In the next few legislative sessions, the farm element
made its voice heard, even if it was not always strong enough
to force legislators to heed its cries.

In 1885 the farm-

ers were able to achievP passa;e of a law establishi~g a
railroad commission,
ineffective.

although the regulatory body proved

In 1887 the Allian:e managed to get a law

.
.
.
h
2
1 1cens1ng grain ware ouses.

By 1889 the demands of the Farmers' Alliance had become much more elaborate.

This reflected the continuing

problems of South Dakota farmers, the realization that a
more active exercise of governmental authority would be
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necessary, and bids for the support of other interest groups.
Meeting in Huron that year, the Alliance accepted a platform calling for government ownership and operation of all
public necessities,

particularly railroads; a national

monetary system with the power to issue legal tender directly to the people without going through private banks, equal
taxation, and courts of arbitration.

To reduce the power of

corporations and bosses, the Alliance proposed the secret
ballot and the direct election of U.S. senators.

Perhaps

reflecting the early interests of some leading Alliance men
and the desire to garner support from all quarters, the
platform demanded state and national prohibition.

As a

concession to the Knights of Labor and as a recognition that
all independent producers of wealth must stand unitej, the
convention included several issues beneficial to the labor
movement.

Child labor and the hiring out of convict labor

were to be ended.

The contract system was no longer to be

used by national, state, and city governments.J

These con-

stituted calls for political involvement--albeit

in a non-

partisan fashion--before the business operations of the Alliance came to grief in the early 1890s.
Political interest was present in the local alliances
as well.

The Dakota Ruralist recorded the resolution of a

number of individual alliances that demanded action on one
subject of concern or another.

In some counties, farmers

established organizations specifically intended to keep a
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close eye on doings in the 1889 territorial legislature and
to appraise their representatives of the agrarians' desires
on legislation.4
Organizations apparently not connected to the Alliance
also sprang up to agitate for demands similar to those of
the farm organization.

In Aberdeen a body called the

Brotherhood of Purpose was established in early 1890.

It

sought a number of the planks of the Alliance platform as
well as government loans on real estate, free silver, and
laws against usury.

In Lincoln County a group called the

Farmers' Grader was founded to prevent class legislation.5
On the local level farmers sometimes were so frustrated
with the old parties' unresponsiveness that they turned to
independent political action.

In Brookings County, a people~

ticket was fielded in 1884, but with no success.

Similar

tickets ran elsewhere in Dakota that same year.

In Grant

County, Territorial Alliance treasurer l.D. Scott gained
office as an independent later in the decade.6

The corres-

ponjents of Rep~blican Gover~or Arthur C. Uellette exhibit~d
concern over the strength of these unorganized efforts to
make the far~ers' voice heard when the old parties proved
deaf.

Such independent slates made inroads in Republican

vote totals and sometimes turnej out county office holders.7
The official line of the Farmers' Alliance, however,
was that it would work for the interests of its members from
within the structures of the existing political parties.

The
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early Alliance had no expressed intention of establishing a
third party, but neither did it propose to stand idly by
while other·groups dominated the political process.

To make

this point in October 1888, Henry Loucks cited the constitution of the Dakota Alliances
The object of this organization shall
be to unite the farmers of Dakota for their
protection against class legislation, and
the encroachments of concentrated capital,
and the tyranny of monopoly. To oppose in
our respective political parties THE ELECTION
OF ANY CANDIDATE TO OFFICE, COUNTY,TERRITORIAL
OR NATIONAL, ';JHO IS NOT THOROUGHLY IN
SYMPATHY ':JITH THE FARMERS' INTEREST. The
[sic--To?] demand that the existing political parties shall nominate farmers or those
who are in sympathy with them, for all
offices in the gift of the people, and to do
anything in a legitimate mannea that may
serve to benefit the producer.
The constitution made no mention of action outside of the
parties then operating, but Loucks went on to warn the Republicans and Democrats that if they failed to name men
acceptable to the Alliance, it would be the farmers' "plain
duty to call conventions, nominate independent candidates,
and elect them."9
The zenith of the official Alliance policy of working
within the limits of the existing parties came with the legislature of 1889.

This final session of Dakota's territorial

legislature was dominated by men who professed allegiance to
the Alliance.

The fact that the House actually adopted a

rule allowing any Alliance matter to be voted on at any
time if a majority of the members favored such action,
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regardless of the regular order of bills, speaks of the
strength of the farm order in this session.10

Indeed, the

official organ of the Alliance had to remind over-eager
legislators that the lawmakers were assembled to provide
legislation beneficial to all of Dakota, not just its
farmers.11
The Alliance majority notwithstanding,

the 1889 session

did not produce the legislation clamored for by the agriculturalis~s.

Part of this problem lay in poor organization

an~ inadequate leadership.12

The old party politicos also

seem to have provided a roadblock to Alliance goals.

In one

case a bill that had been passed by both houses was stolen
before it reached the committee of engrossed and enrolled
bills.

~ithout proper action from this committee, the bill

could not become law.13

An additional obstacle was the

governor, Democrat Louis K. Church, who used his veto power
liberally against the Republican legislature.

This obstruc-

tion moved the House to consider a memorial to President14
•
1
•
•
.
elect Harrison
comp~a1ning
o f Ch urch's attitude.
The
results of the 1889 legislature--termed an "astonishing defeat" by one historian of Dakota15--did

not speak enthusi-

astically for the official Alliance line of using the old
parties to achieve agrarian ends.

The farmers of Dakota,

however, were not willing to abandon their old party loyalties just yet.
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Loucks, as the president of the Dakota Alliance, publicly followed the non-partisan policy in the early months
of 1889.

The Alliance was willing to work within the bounds

of the old parties, but only as long as those parties could
serve as vehicles to agricultural ends.

There were times

when the carrot of Alliance support or the stick of independent action might be emphasized more than the other, but
the basic message remained the same.16
As the annual Alliance convention in late June approached, Loucks took pains to quiet fears among old party politicians that the organization would strike an independent
course.

The farm leader assured the suspicious that the

Alliance would maintain its current position of working
through existing parties.

This line became one of Louck's

recommendations to the convention in his presidential address.17

Similarly, Hugh J. Campbell, a Republican politi-

can sympathetic to the agricultural body, assured the convention that independent action was unnecessary,

for "the

Republican party comprises four-fifths of the pecple.

The

farmers comprise four-fifths of the Republican party.

A

word to the wise is sufficient.1118
The farmers convened at Huron agreed.

The body resolved

"that it is the sentiment of this Alliance that our object
can be best obtained through the machinery of our respective
parties as we are, in the majority, (sic] in both of them,
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and we have only to make a systematic effort to possess ourselves of them."19

The Dakota Ruralist noted that "certain

would be advisors" had sought a call for a third party but
that the convention was hostile to the idea.20
Republican leaders did have reason to be wary of the
political intentions of Alliance leaders.

Governor Mellette

received several warnings in 1889 that men high in the farm
order's circles were plotting for office.

In April, Coding-

ton County politician Frank Crane informed Mellette that A.
D. Chase, territorial lecturer for the Alliance, had divulged
details of a plan whereby some aspiring Republicans would
support Loucks and others for state office if the Alliance
leadership would back them for congressional seats.

Chase

was a bitter rival of another Alliance leader, Alonzo ·.Jardall, and was willing to come over to Mellette's side.21

In

July ~ellette received word from two of his correspondents
that the Alliance leaders were putting together a slate to
run in the fall election.

C.H. Van Tassell, present at a

meeting of the Alliance's Executive Boar1, reportGd that the
organization was considering putting forward John M. Patten
for governor, Abe Van Osdel for lieutenant governor, and
Loucks and J.·;. Harden for the U.S. Senate.

There was dis-

agreement about the wisdom of such a move from three members
present--Don C. Needham, George Crose, and Van Tassell.

A

few weeks earlier, Mellette had been told of a different
.
s 1 a t e th a t was b e1ng
cons1·a ere ct . 22

Although none of these
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letters mentioned the possibility of an independent party,
Mellette and other prominent Republicans--men who coveted
the offices on which farm leaders had their eyes--would understandably be alarmed by such rumors.
In the months ahead Loucks carried on an aggressive
defense of farmers' rights, including using the threat of
independent action.

In late August he warned Republicans

that their party must respond to Alliance demands.

His tone,

probably designed to influence the nominations of the upcoming party convention, was ominous.

Warning that farmers

would tolerate only so much, Loucks informed Republicans
that "that limit is almost reached."23
The Republican convention could be considered by many
to be an Alliance victory.

The last territorial governor,

Arthur C. Mellette.won his party's nomination for governor.
Candidates with the Alliance's blessing were selected for
the positions of lieutenant governor,

secretary of state,

attorney general, auditor, and one supreme court justice.
The treasurer had been endorsed by the Knights of Labor. The
platform included planks calling for a warehouse law, elected
railroad commissioners with adequate power, laws against
trusts, aid for irrigation, and constitutional prohibition.24
Although the Ruralist expressed its satisfaction with
the nominees and platform of the convention, Loucks cautioned
South Dakota's dominant party that there had been a "very
strong sentiment" at the last meeting of the Alliance for
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independent political action, a sentiment that would have
been carried out had it not been for the moderating influence of the leaders.

:·Jhile the convention of farmers in

June had agreed to work through the old parties, Alliance
men were not bound to support the nominees of the regular
parties.25
There were elements within and without the Al:iance
that disagreed with Loucks's stance.

George Crose, presi-

dent of the farmers' purchasing cooperative, argued that
the June convention had determined the organization's action
and that Alliance men were obligated to stand behind the old
parties, particularly the Republican party, which had incorporated many Alliance measures into its platform.26
Loucks's editorials indicate resistance on the part of the
Republican leaders who feared the farmers' movement would
threaten their power.

Such politicians spread rumors that

the Alliance proposed to ally with the Democrats and that
farmers seeking office did so because they wanted to force
class legislation upon Dakotans.27
The legislature--with Republicans in the majority--met
briefly in October to elect two U.S. senators.

The four top

candidates were R.F. Pettigrew, the leading Republican politico; Gideon C. Moody, attorney for the Homestake mine and
popular in the Black Hills; A. J. Edgerton, who had some
Alliance support; and Alonzo Wardall, an Alliance of'f i ci.a l..
The Republican caucus chose Pettigrew and Moody and the two
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were elected, much to the chagrin of Wardall.

Edgerton had

not pressed for his own victory and Loucks suspected him of
remaining in the contest just long enough to prevent ~'lardall
from obtaining sufficient votes to win a seat.

Edgerton's

reward for the ploy allegedly was to be a federal judgeship,
a position to which he was appointed shortly after the election.

Loucks's charges seem borne out by a letter Mellette

received a little over a week before the senatorial election.
D.F. Royer pointed out that the Alliance and the Democrats
would oppose Pettigrew and Moody and urged Mellette to work
on the prohibitionists in the legislature to back Moody and
Pettigrew so that a temperance man like Edgerton could be
appointed to the federal bench.28
!\1eeting again in January, the lawmakers enacted a
number of measures in the interests of the farmers.

Most

important was a law for the regulation ~f grain warehouses.
Other legislation allowed county co~~issioners to distribute seed grain to the destitute, provided for the taxation
of corporate property, and maje illegal certain trusts and
combinations.

Some more substantive reforms long sought by

the Alliance were not enacted, however.

A bill to prohibit

legislators from accepting railroaj passes was defeated before it could even be printed.

A measure to regulate tele-

phone and gas companies failed in the House.

A bill requir-

ing the taxation of mortgages held by non-residents evoked
fear that it would drive away needed capital.

The House op-
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posed a bill that would have set railroad passenger rates.29
By the time of the next Farmers' Alliance annual meeting, set for early June, strong sentiment for independent
action had developed.

The old parties had not responded to

the needs of the farmers.

Efforts to dominate the existing

political parties had failed.

Political bosses had foiled

farmers' attempts to force their will on the old line politicos.

The only recourse, if the interests of the farmers

were to be safeguarded, was to take possession of the government as a new party.
By a vote of 413 to 8J, the farmers assembled in Huron
voted to blaze an independent trail.

Citing the failure of

the Republicans and Democrats to deliver the state from
"fSreat evils which, if not removed, will bring retribution,"
the convention felt the formation of a new party was justified.

The "wealth producers" of the nation were being im-

poverished while a plutocracy was reaping a fortune from the
misery of others.JO

One participant who disfavorej the move

wrote of the decision,

"The feeling was very strong for in-

dependent action and it was no use to oppose it.

It must

have its run."31
South Dakota farmers were not alone in their discontent.
Throughout the northern and central Great Plains during that
hot summer, Alliance meetings resolved for independent political action.

The earliest efforts to that end seem to have

been made in Kansas in March, although the first state Alli-
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ance gathering to issue a call for a convention was South
Dakota's.32
Although the Alliance men deferred nominations for state
offices until July, the convention did put together a platform.

Their first demand was for a flexible amount of cur-

rency issued by the government directly to the people without the intervention of private banks.

Second, the farmers

called for government ownership and ope~ation of the railroad, telegraph, and telephone companies and for the provision of those services at cost.

Third, the new party

wanted the free and unlimited coinage of silver.

Fourth,

the men in Huron sought the secret ballot in state and national elections.

Next, the farmers demanded "the most rigid

economy consistent with the safety of our state and nation."
Last, the independents wanted laws prohibiting the ownership
of land by aliens, legal action against the land then held
by aliens and syndicates, and the repossession of all land
held by corporations but not being used.JJ
Two individuals of national reputation addresaed the
convention.

One was Ben Terrill, National Lecturer for the

Farmers' Alliance.

Terrill's presence normally would not

raise suspicion, since he was attending a meeting of a strong
state organization of the farm order.

However, Terrill had

been making a tour through the state prior to the convention,
a tour that can be followed through the pages of the Yankton
Pr~

and Dakotan, a Republican sheet.

In late May the paper
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reported that Terrill received hearty applause from the Brown
County Alliance when he spoke against bringing politics into
the Alliance.

In early June, in contrast, the Press and

Dakotan recorded that Terrill called for independent action
in a speech to the Minnehaha County Alliance.

Shortly after

the convention that gave birth to South Dakota's Independent
party, Terrill again talked in favor of the new party.

The

question that remains unanswered--and unanswerable from the
resources available in this study--is what was Terrill doing
in the state?
cidence,

Was his presence in South Dakota a mere coin-

or was his purpose to sound the sentiment for a

third party.?34
The second personage of renown was Susan B. Anthony, the
national leader of the woman suffrage movement.

Anthony had

been in the state campaigning for suffrage when she received
word that the Alliance convention was considering forming a
new party.

The year before Loucks and Wardall had con-

vinced her to tour South Dakota to work for suffrage.

She

had done so on the assurance that the Alliance stood behind
the reform and that the farm order controlled state politics.
Anthony rushed to Huron to try to dissuade the convention
from an independent course, something she feared would make
suffrage impossible.

Not only did the convention choose

its own direction, it refused to include suffrage in the
platform.

The most the suffragettes received was a resolu-

tion endorsing the right to vote for women.

The women
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working for the franchise felt betrayed.JS
The July convention adopted a slightly different platform for the fall election and nominated candidates.

The

convention called for an end to national banks, the direct
issue of legal tender notes to the people, taxes on income
and real estate, the ownership and operation of the railroads by the government, and·the secret ballot.36
There was an undercurrent of support for Governor
Mellette for the Independent nomination for the top executive slot, although it is unlikely that he was seriously
tempted by the possibility of an Independent candidacy.37 The
nod for the governorship instead went to Henry Loucks.

Loucks

faced a serious challenge from A.E. Van Osdel, a leader in
the Yankton County Alliance.

Although reports of the exact

vote of the convention vary, Loucks edged Van Osdel by a
margin ranging between three and sixteen out of nearly 250
votes.

Van Osdel received the nomination for lieutenant

governor instead.JS
The reactions from the old parties, especially the
Republicans, came quickly.

The most common tactic was to

accuse the leaders of the Independents of being nothing but
office seekers.

They were just "blatent [sic] political

wolves in the clothing of agricultural sheep," according to
one Republican editor.

Deprived of preferment by the old

parties, argued party heads, these men were willing to prostitute the Alliance for their own political ends.J9
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Nor were all of the charges levied against the Independents limited to simple office seeking.

Loucks was por-

trayed as a demogogue and as a man who lacked enough sense
to be trusted with public office.

In the words of a pro-

minent Republican speaking to his party's state convention,
Loucks was an immigrant "whose ignorance of the character of
American institutions is only equaled by his impudence and
insincerity" and was a "public nuisance" who "ought to be
abatect."40

It was rumored that one of the Independent can-

dictates for Congress, Fred Zipp, was an atheist and anar. t • 41

Ch l.S

More seriously, Republicans attacked Loucks's citizenship.

Investig~tion of courthouse records in Lo~cks's county

proved that he did not take out final papers for naturalization until Augu~t 11,1890, Jver a month after his nomination.
This left him 0pen to charges that he lacked sufficient
background in American ways to be awarded cffice.42
Another scare tactic commonly used by Republicans was
• •
k
h
t' ire TLnuepen~ent
r1
-"
•
c 1 a1~1ng
t1;at
teen
movement was nothing

but a plot of the Democratic party to oust the GOP from state
office. By identifying the third party with the old foe, Republicans hoped to activate traditional loyalties.

Any votes

for Independents would only sap the strength of the Republicans, tnus allowing Democrats to take the laurels in
elections. Loucks was condemned as a "valuable and inexpensive annex to the democratic party."

After there were in-
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dications that Democrats and Independents were fusing in
some localities, Republican fears seemed confirmed and the
Independent party was accused of being a "democratic aid
society."4J

Six months before he was nominated, the Yankton

Press and Dakotan predicted that Loucks would run for governor in 1890 with the financial aid of the Democratic national
commi•tt ee. 44
Moreover, the Republicans claimed there was no need
for independent action.

The GOP had offered the farmers

virtually anything they had asked for.

The Republicans

could point to a number of achievements on the state and
national levels--the opening of the Sioux reservation, laws
against trusts, a warehouse law, and prohibition among
them--for which the Alliance should be thankful.

The aura::>

rians had the nu0erical strength to control the Republican
party so there was no justification for a new party.45
Not all of the opposition was the work of the old
parties.

Some Alliance men expressed their dissatisfaction

with the bid for office on the part of their leaders.

The

Turner County Alliance allegedly "repudiated" the Independent ticket, while many Clay County farmers felt the Alliance
should stick to a~riculture.

A number of Alliance officers

were willing to cooperate with th9 Republicans rather than
go with the new party.46
The patterr. of attack that the Republicans used aga i ns t
their opponents in 1390 was virtually identical to the methods

7J
the party had use.j in the 1870s against Grangers who considered independent action.

Then, too, the leaders of the

movement were accused of being nothing but office seekers
who would deliver the state to the Democrats even though the
farmers controlled the Republican party and could force their
will upon it.47
The Democrats met in convention a few days after the
Alliance made its decision for an independent course.

Like

the Independents, the Democrats called for a graduated income
tax and sought the remonetization of silver.

They also op-

posed the current tariff and the McKinley bill.

On cultural

issues, the Democrats condemned woman suffrage and asked for
resub~ission of the prohibition amendment.

The convention

found Governor Mellette abhorrent for giving the state a bad
image in his efforts to c0llect aid for drought sufferers.48
~:eeting in Mi, tchell in August, the Republicans also
ado~ted several planks similar to the IndepenJent platform.
The convention called for an increased circulation o: currency, the coina~e of silver, and the secret ballot.

To

appease the groups to which the Independents appealed, the
Republicans end)rsed aid for artesian irrigation and acknowledged labor's right to organize.

The delegates also

recommended legislation to control combinations, a protective
tariff, adequate pensions, the protection of school lands,
and the enforcement of prohibition.49
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This last issue proved divisive.

The platform com-

mittee reported a prohibition plank reaffirming the party's
support for the reform, acknowledging it as the will of the
people, and pledging faithful enforcement.

Sol Star,· speak-

ing for the Black Hills, immediately protested the plank and
warned the convention that it could cost the party his section of the state.

Star preferred a substitute motion

pleading that enforcement was impossible.

The convention

chose to compromise with an acknowledgement of prohibition
as part of the state's fundamental law and a statement promising enforcement.50
The Republicans reco~nized that holding their own in
the fall elections would require hard work.

A third party

based on Alliance numbers would be a serious challenge to
Reputlican hegemony.

Several of Mellette's correspondents

counseled swift and thorough

organization.

Some argued in

mid-June for founding Republican Leagues in every precinct.
A Republican State League soon followed.51
By the end of July, Republicans felt more confident
about the November contest.

By then, it seemed that the In-

dependents were losing their appeal and that as the election
approached the farmers were returning to their traditional
parties.

In October, one of Mellette's confidants predicted,

"The Independent movement has passed high-water mark, and is
now on the down.grade."52
The Republicans were concerned about the behavior of
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some of South Dakota's ethnic groups in 1890.

To some na-

tionalities, the Alliance seemed to have a special appeal.
To the people of other lands, issues like suffrage and prohibition touched on cultural nerves.

Scandinavians often

supported the reforms offered by the Independents and Republicans exhibited some anxiety for that ethnic group.

Tl'B

Germans and Russian-Germans felt threatened by prohibition
and woman suffrage, issues that challenged their notions
about personal behavior and the home.

To these latter groups,

the personal liberty of the Democrats and that party's stand
for resubmission of the prohibition amendment held out the
hope of defending their cultural values.
The Scandinavians--primarily

Norwegians in South Dakota

--formed a substantial proportion of the state's population.
Usually they supported the GOP, but in 1890 the Independents
began to make inroads in this traditionally Republican bloc.
One of Mellette's correspondents warned him that the Scandinavians had largely deserted the GOP at Flandreau.

In some

areas of the state, a large portion of the group abandoned
their old political ties at election time.5J
The Scandinavians had generally supported prohibition
in the state.

Suffrage was a different matter.

pealed to the group in vain.

Women ap-

In Clay County the townships

that gave the highest votes against the amendment were the
ones dominated by Scandinavians.54
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The Germans and Russian-Germans also furnished large
number of voters, although most of their votes, with the
exception of Russian-German Protestants, went to the Democrats.

The Germans were anxious to safeguard their cultural

traditions and treated threats to those traditions with
hostility.

At the Democratic convention a delegation of

Russian-Germans had appeared wearing badges printed with
"Against Woman Suffrage and Susan B. Anthony."

In one case,

Russian-Germans refused to allow a suffragette to speak in
a local school house.

The presence of a plank favorable to

prohibition in the Republican platform proved burdensome in
the counties settled by the Germans from Russia.

Mellette's

image as a suffragist and prohibitionist caused some concern
among party members because of the effect upon ethnic groups.55
Germans had also been wary of the Alliance's militant
stance for prohibition.

Uhen the prohibition amendment was

before the people in 1889 the farm order had demanded its
acceptance and rigorous enforcement.

In response, a German

farmer had advised the 2a~ct~ Ruralist to leave the reform
to women, for it would only hurt the Alliance.56
Nor were the Czechs in 3outh Dakota enthused about the
reforms the Independents advocated.

In Tabor, the state's

Czech center, the Independents did not receive a single vote
in 1890 and suffrage drew a single ballot.57
At the polls in November the Republicans maintained
their hold on the state government.

Mellette received J4,487
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votes out of 77,562 cast--44.5 percent.

In their first try

at office, the Independents drew 24,591, for 31.7 percent of
the electorate.

The Democrats dropped to third place, get-

ting just 18,484 ballots in the governor's race, 23.8 percent of the total vote.

In 1889 Mellette had received

53,964 votes while his Democratic opponent attracted 23,840.
Suffrage was defeated by a two to one margin.58
The Republicans swept the executive seats, but the
legislature was a different story.

In the Senate the GOP

had a tenuous one vote lead over the Independents and Democrats if the latter parties acted in unison.

In the House,

these two parties had a single seat more than the Republicans.

This margin allowed the Independents and Democrats

to cooperate in organiz in.g the lower house.

·.Ji th this, th8

opposition forces were able to gain control of the electic~s
committee and deny seats to six Republicans on the basis of
election irregularities.59
A task that took much of the session was the election
of a U.S. senator.

In 1889 one of the senators chosen haj

been elected to a short term; now Gideon C. Moody had to
stand for re-election before a le~islature in which his
party held a minority of all seats.
for Moody.

Victory proved elusive

The Republicans could not muster enough votes of

their own and they could not attract the needed ballots from
their opponer.ts.

7he opposition, for their part, could not

unite on a candidate to replace Moody.

Their leading candi-
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dates in the early ballots were Bartlett Tripp, the Democrats'
leader; J. :J. Harden, a Democratic Alliance man; and George
Crose and Alonzo ·vardall, both high ranking Alliance officers.
Neither the Independents nor the Democrats seemed willing to
give up the chance of sending a man of their own affiliation
to the Senate.
The ballots continued for nearly f ou~ weeks.

;,Jl'len it

was apparent that he could not garner sufficient support,
Moody released the legislators pledged to him.

Most of the

Republicans switched to A.B. Melville, a proponent of artesian irrigation, but others scattered their votes.

The In-

dependents put their strength behind :iardall, then Harden,
but neither succeeded.

They then turned to Hugh J. Campbell.
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3ehind the official votes, there was a good deal of
maneuverin~.

A number of office holders with positions in

the national govern~ent re~ained in Pierre to exert their
influe~ce for the Repuhlicans, to the ire of the Democrats
and !njependents.61

Ttere was a ru~or that the Democra~a

wn·;l-:! .:;iv-e ~~.8ir v o t s s

0~1

t h e senator Ln return for a De~>

cratic representative and presidential electors in 1892. Some
Republicans schemed to give their party's vote to George Crose
rather than see the opposition pick another candidate. ~.T.
LaFollette, brother of Wisconsin's Robert LaFollette, counseled Kellette to strike a bargain with Independent James H.
Kyle and send him to the Senate with Republican votes.

An-

other Republican warned Mellette in late January that the
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Independents would throw their weight behind Kyle and hope
for Democratic support.62
For the Republicans, this last prediction proved sadly
accurate.

In the thirty-first ballot Kyle received the In-

dependent vote and the Republicans switched back to Moody.
The Democrats continued to stand by Bartlett Tripp.

In mid-

February the Republicans tried out Thomas Sterling as a
candidate, but he was unable to do better than Moody.

Then,

on February 16, enough Democrats turned to Kyle to give him
the margin of victory.

It had been rumored that the Demo-

cratic support was the result of a bargain between legislators in Illinois and South Dakota.

The Democrats in South

Dakot~ were to back the Independent choice while the Independents in Illinois were to vote for the Democrats' man.
The rumor was fueled when the Speaker of the House traveled
to Illinois in early February.

Three days before the fingl

ballot a Republican resolution condemning any interstate
agreement with Illinois affecting the election was defeated
by a strictly partisan vote.

The Republicans also charged

that the Democrats received a plejge that resubmission would
be passed i~ Kyle was elected.63
Kyle's election was something of a fluke.

Kyle, a Con-

gregationalist minister, had been asked to speak at a Fourth
of July gathering in Aberdeen the previous summer when the
planned speaker could not attend.

The farmers in his audi-

ence were so impressed with his presentation that they nomi-
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nated the clergyman for the state senate at the Independent
convention the following day.64
The question of resubmission to the poeple of the prohibition amendment was an important issue that surfaced
periodically during the session.

The Democrats had pledged

to work for resubmission and the first bill providing for it
came on January 9.

The measure succeeded in the House and

the majority report of the committee considering it in the
Senate recommended that it pass there.

In the closing hours

of the session, the upper house turned the bill down "after
a warm discussion."65

Governor Mellette had been under pres-

sure by ardent prohibitionists not to let their prized victory be undermined before it had been tested.66
Among its other actions, the 1891 legislature established the Australian ballot in the state, allowed townships to
finance the construction of artesian wells for irrigation
through the sale of bonds, and memorialized Congress for the
free and unlimited coinage of silver as legal tender and the
direct election of senators.67
From its inception, the Dakota Farme~s' Alliance realized
that some of its goals were possible only through political
action.

These objectives were limited in the beginning,

but as the decade of the 1880s wore on, farmers experienced
more problems and more obstacles to solving those difficulties.
South Dakota's farmers originally believed that the
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existing political parties could serve as means to agrarian
ends.

Such hopes proved illusory, for the Republicans and

Democrats would not act on agricultural problems as the Alliance demanded.

Therefore,

in June 1890 the annual convention

of the Farmers' Alliance chose to strike a new course independent of the old parties.
party.

Thus was born the Independent

Although not powerful enough to loosen the Republi-

can grasp on the state's executive branch, the new party
polled nearly a third of the electorate and displaced the
Democrats as South Dakota's second strongest party.

In

cooperation with the Democrats in the 1891 legislature, the
Independents were able to unseat a Republican U.S. senator
and replace him with a man of their own party.
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CHAPTER IV
THE REPUBLICAN YEARS, 1891-1895
The 1891 election of Kyle proved to be the Populists'
sole significant victory during the first half of the decade.
Although the new party would gradually boost its share of the
electorate in the coming years, the Republicans continued to
hold a plurality--and, by 1894, a majority--of the state's
voters.

Despite these years in the wilderness, however, the

Populists remained the state's second strongest party.

By

contrast, the Democrats lost steadily until their 1894 share
of the votes comprised less than twelve percent of the ballots
cast.
By the mid-nineties,

in spite of a poor record in its

early contests for office, the fortunes of the Populist party
appeared to be waxing.

It had been able to retain the loyal-

ties of a substantial share of the state's voters and conducted vigorous educational campaigns.

R.F. Pettigrew,

the

leading Republican politico, adopted important points of Populist doctrine--a fact that set him apart from the sentiment
of his own party and marked him as a likely candidate for
conversion.

The ryemocrats, stunned by a disastrous showing

in 1894, were more open to fusion in the future.

The Re-

publican administration, rocked by a scandal that imperiled
the state's solvency, gave the Populists a weighty issue for
the 1896 election.
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The Farmers' Alliance did not fare as well as the Populist party.

Some of its vital leadership was lost when

Henry Loucks and Alonzo Wardall took positions with the national alliance.

The men succeeding to the highest positions

in the Alliance opposed the direct involvement of the order
in the world of politics and worked to separate the organization from public

affairs.

The Alliance was further dis-

credited by the continuing problems of its cooperative enterprises.
The Independents received another chance at office in
1891 when a special election was called to fill a congres-

sional seat left open by the death of the incumbent.

The

fall campaign was marked by calls from all parties for an
increased money supply and by efforts to resubmit the constitutional clause on prohibition.

While the Independents

endorsed the prohibitory law, the Democrats opposed it and
the Republicans sidestepped the issue.

Republican R.F.

Pettigrew, however, advised Germans that the best hope for
a representative unsympathetic to prohibition lay with the
GOP.1
This election was the first in which the subtreasury
plan was advocated in South Dakota.

The subtreasury was a

proposal whereby farmers could store their crops in government warehouses and borrow eighty percent of the value of
those crops at one percent interest per year.

Such a scheme,

claimed the Southern Alliance, would allow farmers to avoid
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selling their crops when the market was glutted and prices
were depressed.

It could also curtail speculation in commod-

ities, establish a system of short-term rural credits, and
provide a means of making the nation's money supply more
flexible in times of need.

One of South Dakota's Congress-

men, John A. Pickler, introduced the bill to implement the
subtreasury in the House of Representatives, although Republican Senator

R.F. Pettigrew derided the measure as

'''the most absurd piece of legislation I have ever seen
presented. ' "2
:'/hen the votes were counted in November, the Republicans carried the day with 17,614 votes, for 44.5 percent of
the electorate.

The IndependentG captured 14,687 votes, for

37.1 percent of the vote.

The Democratic candidate polled

only 7,299 votes, just 18.4 percent of the votes cast.J The
Republicans had managed to attract the same proportion of
votes as they had in the 1890 contest, while the Independents
were able to gain slightly over five percent more of the
votes.

The Ruralist attributed the loss to the fact that

Republican townsmen could turn out for the election with
little trouble, while many farmers were not willing to lose
the time it took to go to the polls and support the Independents. 4
Although the Republicans often maintained that prosperity would destroy the Independent movement, the 1891 election showed that agrarian unrest had become strong enough for
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a third party to hold the support of a significant share of
the state's voters--and even increase its proportion of the
vote--in a year when conditions showed some improvement in
the farm economy.

In 1891 corn and wheat production increas-

ed substantially and wheat prices rose slightly, although
corn prices dropped fifteen cents a bushel.5
Undaunted by the defeat, the Independents recognized
that they would have to convince South ~akotans that the old
parties were unwilling and unable to cope with the state's
needs and that a third party was the answer.

Therefore, the

party mounted an intense campaign to educate the voters
about the issues troubling the farmers.
Newspapers espousing Independent doctrine were a large
part of this campaign.

By la~e 1891 there were about forty

such newspapers being published in the state and the editors
. t•ion. 6 The leading paper
had f orme d a re f orm press assoc1a
continued to be the Dakota Ruralist, but a number of other
papers achieved prominence in the reform movement.

Freeman

Knowles' s Deadwoo:i Daily Ind_§J2endent and ·.'iillian E. Kidd's
Aberdeen Star furnished Independents with their first two
urban daily papers.

A host of new papers began and many

small country papers abandoned the GOP to join the new movement.7

The Ruralist expanded its size and offered its read-

ers joint subscriptions to other reform and agricultural
papers, including German and Norwegian publications.8
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Through the winter of 1891-1892 and on into the fall
campaign, the Independent party kept up its efforts to convert men to new ways of thinking and voting.

The reform

press urged the formation of local circulating libraries
stocked with literature of the new movement, and newspapers
offered such books and pamphlets at low cost.

For example,

on the eve of the 1892 election, the Deadwood Daily Independent advertised a list of reform books that included James
B. '\feaver's ~Call

to Action, Ignatius Donnelly's Caesar's

Column, Hamlin Garland's Jason Edwards, and articles reprinted from Arena.9

The Alliance sponsored farmers' insti-

tutes with pre-planned topics designed to stimulate thought
and gain Independent votes.

Some of the issues dealt with

included the abolition of the national bank system, the volume of the money supply, the subtreasury, free silver, and
government ownership of the railroads.10

As the election

approached, Independent newspapers carried advertisements
for campaign songs such as "The Coal Baron's Song" and "The
'.·forker' s Battle Hymn of Freedom," devices geared toward
stirring voters' enthusiasm.11

Such methods of campaigning,

particularly the educational drive that was carried on
through the winter months, were respected by the opposition,
one representative of which compared this quiet campaign to
"'old fashioned Methodist experience

meetings. 11112

The state's Independents were the first party to convene in the 1892 election year.

Gathering in Redfield in
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June, the agrarian party endorsed the St. Louis platform and
the record of Senator Kyle.

To aid debt-ridden farmers, the

platform favored reducing the legal rate of interest to eight
percent and taxing the holders of mortgages rather than the
ones mortgaged for the value of those mortgages.

In an

appeal to labor, the convention adopted resolutions opposing
the use of Pinkertons against workers and demanded work safety
and compensation laws.

The delegates recognized veterans in

resolutions praising their sacrifices and attacking the old
parties for favoring bond holders over soldiers.

The con-

vention opposed the sale of any more of the state's school
lands and endorsed an amendment making initiative and referendum part of the fundamental law.

In the only issue that

brought dissent, there was a move to include a statement
calling for the resubmission of prohibition.

The assemblage

instead chose to include a statement opposing repeal of any
. .
of the state's criminal
laws. lJ

F or governor the convention
.

picked A.E. "Honest Abe" Van Osdel, the candidate for lieutenant governor in 1890.

The Scandinavians received at least

one spot on the ticket in the person of S.G. Mogan, candidate for secretary of state.

Mrs. R. B. Hassell, the first

woman in the state's history to be accorded nomination to
state office, was selected for superintendent of public in.
14
s rue ion.
t

t

The Republicans congregated in Madison in late July for
their convention.

The platform, a lengthy document, endorsed
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the national platform and Harrison's administration, high
tariffs, and reciprocity agreements.

Reflecting the Re-

publican effort to retain the farm vote, the convention
adopted a series of planks that overlapped the demands of
agrarians.

The party pledged support for bimetallism,

government aid to irrigation, postal telegraph and postal
savings bank systems, rural free delivery, equitable taxation, the regulation of the rates of express companies, and
an elected railroad commission with the power to set rates.
The Republicans opposed speculation in agricultural commodities.

They appealed hesitantly to labor in a plank sup-

porting working men and opposing both Pinkertons and the
"agitation of demagogues" that promoted unrest between labor
and capital.

The party endorsed better roads and proper

recognition of the nation's veterans.15
The party's nominations also exhibited concern for
various interest groups.

For governor the convention selec-

ted Charles H. Sheldon, a Day County farmer, who, as an Alliance ~an, had served in the territorial legislature.

The

Republicans hoped the farmers would be satisfied with "Farmer
Sheldon," as the gubernatorial candidate was sometimes known.
Sheldon
veterans.

and the congressional nominees were all Civil War
Norwegian-born Thomas Thorson was chosen to run

for secretary of state against a Populist candidate who had
also come from Norway.

J.E. Hipple was nominated for auditor

to please the Germans and Russian-Germans.16
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The Democrats met in Chamberlain in early September.
The platform that was adopted included support for resubmission and a moderation of the current laws enforcing prohibition, a call for tariff reform, and a resolution against
the use of Pinkertons to break strikes.

The convention op-

posed fusion with the Independents and nominated a complete
slate, but authorized the state central committee to remove
the names of some candidates if fusion could be effected.17
The third party's opposition to the Republicans in 1892
took several courses.

During the campaign, the Populists--

as the Independents began to be called that year--attacked
the tariff as a sham issue promoted by the old parties to
distract the voters from more serious problems. 18 In the
Black Hills, where Populists appealed to wage earners rather
than to farmers, newspapers concentrated on labor issues.
The Deadwood Daily Independent warned miners that a vote for
the Populists could help prevent the use of militia and Pinkertons a~ainst strikers.

Sheldon's criticisms of Loucks's

ethnicity in 1890 left him open to charges of nativis~.

The

Dakot~ Ruralist characterized him as the "know-nothing candidate for governor."19

Reform editors showed themselves as

adept at underhanded political tricks as their foes when they
ensnared a number of their Republican colleagues in a scheme
to sell editorial space to a fake Chicago firm that desired
to run anti-alliance articles.

During the spring of 1892 the

Rural~~t gradually revealed the details of the trap and the
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of the Republican papers that had fallen into it.20
The Populists' inexperience in the world of political
campaigns and the loose nature of bonds to the third party
were revealed by some of their methods.

Lacking the.support

of large businesses that would contribute to their canvass,
the Populists sought to obtain money at the grass roots
level.

The Dakota Ruralist "tried to raise $1,000 through

$1.00 pledges and local alliances agreed to plant wheat, the
proceeds of which would be used in the fall campaign.21

As

th~ election approached, Populist newspapers took pains to
remind the farmers how necessary it was for people to take
time to vote during a busy harvest season.22
The Republicans counterattacked by using some of the
same objections to the Populists as they had against the
third party at its birth.

Former Republicans who had turned

their backs on their old party were called office seekers.
Editors concerned about the state's public image cautioned
the electorate that support for the Independents might "engender a popular suspicion that the state was the abode of a
dissatisfied, disgruntled, revolutionary and possibly famishing people."23

Voters were warned that a bal~ot for the

Populists could prevent Benjamin Harrison's re-election and
give the presidency to the Democrats.

The decision of the

Democratic convention to leave open the possibility of fusion
with the Populists led to rumors that secret negotiati6ns
were being conducted that could deliver the traditionally
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Republican state over to the opposition.24
Pettigrew was particularly interested in retaining the
loyalties of South Dakota's ethnic groups.

Hence, he fielded

a number of agents to cultivate those segments of the state's
population.

He exhibited special concern for funding the

Norwegian paper in Sioux Falls, the Syd Dakota Ekko, and
solicited money for it from the national party committee.25
Election day brought a resounding victory for the Republicans.

They swept the state executive offices and both

congressional seats.

The Independents took only six places

in the senate and eleven in the lower house of the state
legislature.

In the gubernatorial race, Sheldon won by

nearly 11,000 votes over Van Osdel and by nearly 20,000 over
the Democratic candidate.

The Republicans took 47.5 percent

of the total vote, a gain of three precent over their 18)0
share.

The Independents made a slight gain

in terms of

their prop0rtion of the vote, but obtained 2,000 fewer votes,
possibly because some of the farmers who had supported the
third party in 1890 had been fJrced out by drought in the
intervening years.

The Democrats slipped about three per-

cent from their tally in 1890.

~Jeaver ran about four thou-

sand votes ahead of Van Osdel as South Dakota Democrats chose
the People's party candidate for president over Cleveland
even though they remained loyal to their party on the state
leve1.26

This may have been due to dissatisfaction with

Cleveland over such issues as veterans' pensions or it might
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have been because state Democrats were the only party in 1892
to support resubmission of prohibition.
The Dakota Ruralist laid blame for the defeat on two
factors.

First, the Independents were split over who should

guide the party, the old Alliance leaders or men less connected with the farm order.

Second, the party had failed to

take a firm stand on prohibition.

This alienated Republican

prohibitionists who saw little reason to leave their old
party, but was not enough to entice resubmissionists to
switch to the Independents.

The Independents' past record

on the issue demonstrated that party's support for prohibition, even if it had not emphasized the reform in the cam.
27
paign.
Analysis of the voting patterns in 1892 has shown that
the towns of the state were the strongholds of the Republican
party.

The population of towns of three hundred or more

people cast over 55 percent of their ballots for the GOP,
but under a quarter of their votes for the Populists.

The

Populists drew the bulk of their support from the rural sections of the state, particularly those areas specializing in
wheat production and those inhabited by farffiers of native or
Scandinavian origins.

The ranching counties of the northern

Black Hills also turned to the Populists.

The areas of the

state characterized by corn and swine production, the regions
settled by Russian-Germans,

and the mining counties of the

central Hills tended to vote Republican.

Democrats were
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slightly more successful in the towns than were the Populists.
The Democracy gained a larger share of the vote in the German
Catholic counties in the central and southern portions of
the eastern half of the state.

They also fared better in

the western counties than elsewhere.28
In addition to the preponderance of townsmen who backed
the Republican party, the inclusion of a number of Populist
reforms in the Republican platform and promises of aid to
the agricultural economy probably helped keep farm voters
in the GOP folct.29

The fact that 1892 was a presidential

election year may also have contr~buted to the decision of
many voters to remain in the party of Lincoln.
Unlike the 1891 legislature, the body that convened in
Pierre in January 189J was predominantly Republican.

The

session brought no major changes, although it enacted several measures concerning railroads and the problems of
debtors.
The issue that attracted the most attention in the
legislature seems to have been the state's railrcads.

A

series of bills were introduced both by Republicans and
Populists that would have achieved some degree cf regulation
over railroads, but many of these were defeated.

Moreover,

much of this legislation constituted only piecemeal attacks
on the roads' power.

Efforts to set a flat passenger rate

and to give the board of railroad commissioners the power to
fix rates met staunch Republican opposition.

Nor was a res-
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elution to prosecute the railroads for bribery for distributing railroad passes among lawmakers any more successful.JO
Even minor regulations often failed to succeed, such as ones
calling for spark arresters on locomotives and establishing
railroad liability for injuries to persons and livestock.Jl
The session did provide for the popular election of the board
of commissioners and gave that body power to order the construction of side tracks, connections with competing lines,
fireguards along the right of way, and the construction of a
certain kind of switch.32
In other actions aimed at defusing Populist demands, the
Republican legislature enacted measures to aid debtors, limited
elevators and monopolies, promoted irrigation, and amended
the state's secret ballot law.

The body also appropriated

$60,000 for South Dakota's exhibit at the :~orld's Fair.33
The legislature narrowly rejected a bid to resubmit
prohibition, but this was accomplished only when a member
who had favored the proposal changed his mind after intense
lobbying.34

The men in Pierre also turned down reques~s by

Black Hills interests for an anti-Pinkerton law and defeated
a bill calling for initiative and referendum, a reform that
had been one of the planks of the Populist platform.35
As the Populist party grew more and more a part of South
Dakota's political scene in the early 1890s, the Farmers'
Alliance--the organization that had given birth to the third
party movement--began to decline.

The business concerns of
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the agrarian order continued to meet opposition from elements
outside the Alliance.

The character and quality of the lead-

ership changed as the old warhorses who had led the farmers
into the Independent movement were replaced by men of the
second rank who sought to divorce the farm order from politics.
In the early ni~eties the ~akota Farmers' Alliance
Company was taken over by the National Union Company, a firm
that had been formed from the National Cordage Company.
This latter business had been part of a trust controlling
jute and twine prices.

The purpose of the National Union

was to create a national wholesale firm that would cater to
the various state alliances and assume control of the local
stores that belonged to the state cooperative purchasing
companies.

Opponents of this idea assaulted the takeover as

a scheme to defraud the Alliance and as gross hypocrisy for
conniving with a trust.36
Republican papers had a field day when the state insurance inspector found fault with the manner in which th~
Alliance Hail Association was paying claims.

After the in-

spector charged that the association favored some claimants
over others, the state auditor refused to grant the company
a certificate to continue operations.

Although the AHA was

destroyed, the Alliance organized the Union Hail Association
to replace it.

.i/hen an insurance firm unconnected with the

farm order went bankrupt in 1891, the Alliance also drew
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criticism because Alonzo Wardall, a prominent Alliance officer, was involved in the defunct company.37

The failure

of the Alliance Hail Association appears to have contributed
to the termination of contracts to build an Alliance office
building

in Huron, an incident that hurt the Alliance and

the Populist party in that city.38
Failures such as. these gave the opposition plenty of
ammunition.

The Republicans charged that Alliance leaders

were bilking the farmers through poorly organized cooperative
ventures.

Not only were these leaders skimming off a profit

for themselves through high wages and expense accounts,
charged Republicans, but they were also using the farm order
to boost their own political purposes.39
During the early nineties the Farmers' Alliance lost
its two most noted officers.

Upon the death of Leonidas L.

Polk, president of the Southern Alliance, Loucks succeeded
to that order's top position in 1892.

In late 1893 Alonzo

Jardall moved to Topeka, Kansas, to head the Alliance Aid
. t' ion. 40
A ssoc1a

In 1892 J.R. Lowe was elected tJ replace

Loucks as the president of the state organization.

Lowe,

who had been serving as the associate editor of the Dakota
Ruralist, was joined by two vice presidents arid a secretarytreasurer, all of whom were new to their positions.

The

Alliance thus lost the continuity of leadership that had
characterized it for the previous several years.

The 1892

Alliance convention also decided to end the free subscription

10)

to the Dakota Ruralist that had been sent to all the state
order's members.

Thus both the Alliance and the third party

lost a major source for promulgating their doctrines.41

By

1894 the Alliance experienced another turnover in leadership.

H.N. Smith, who had been the Independents' standard-bearer
in the 1891 specia.l election, was chosen president and a
Mrs. Anderson from Manchester was elected vice president.
Furthermore, Smith pledged to keep the Alliance out of politics.42

In 1895, although Smith was re-elected, new indivi-

duals filled all of the lower offices.

That convention de-

cided the state alliance had declined so far that it had to
be reorganized and county meetings were called for that purpose.43
The involvement of the Alliance in politics against
the better judgement of some of its members, the loss of
major leaders, and the continuing problems of its business
op~rations all combined to undercut the organization's
strength.

ihe order's afficers eventually decided to remove

it fro~ politics and to reor~anize it.

This experience was

similar to the course of the North Dakota Alliance, which
was disrupted by every election until 1892 when the damage
44
caused was too great for the farm group to recover.
The judicial elections of 1893 proved another defeat for
the Populists.

Of three supreme court seats and eight cir-

cuit court positions, the Republicans w~n all but one, which
went to an Independent from Deadwood.

In the races for the
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supreme court, the Republican candidates all topped 20,000
votes while their Populist foes drew less than lJ,000 apiece
and the Democrats attracted under 8,000.

Victory was elusive

for the opponents of Republicanism despite a degree of fusion
.
.
't s. 45
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Loucks charged this loss to the failure to wage an
aggressive campaign--something the Dakota Ruralist had clamored for in September--and ihe burden of fusion.

Other Pop-

ulists blamed Loucks for the defeat, claiming his opp0sition
to the state central committee was a major cause.

T.M.

Simmons, chairman of the state committee, allegedly attributed the Populist defeat to the Alliance leader, maintaining that Loucks had been too interested in his own political future and had tried to manage the campaign even though
he was not officially connected with it.46
The 1894 political season opened with the Populist
convention at Mitchell.

Displaying their grass roots origins,

some of the county delegations made the journey to the city
in farm wagons.47
the Omaha platform,

The convention affirmed its support for
the 1892 document that had become the

foremost statement of the Populist creed.

The remainder of

the state platform reads like a hodge-podge of likes and
dislikes.

The platform criticized the Sheldon administration

for "reckless and extravagant mismanagement and maladministration" and sought the removal of the state's institutions of
higher education from politics.

To aid the farmers, the con-
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vention wanted mortgage holders to be taxed for the value of
the mortgage and those with mortgages on their property to be
exempted from such taxation.

To benefit laborers, the plat-

form included a plank calling for laws to improve working
conditions and to compensate injured workmen.

As a means of

better regulating the consumption of alcohol, the delegates
favored nationalizing the traffic in liquor.

The gathering

also endorsed woman suffrage, although a resolution to that
effect apparently was not officially added to the platform.
Other portions of the document advocated the initiative and
referendum,

opposed the sale of state school lands, demanded

federal ownership of all coal fields and endorsed veterans'
.
48
pensions.
The Dakota Ruralist offers few insights into the convention and the struggles for control by various factions.
The Republican press alleged that there were elements that
had opposed Loucks's management of the convention but that
the farm leader had been able to stave off these threats.
Robert Buchanan, the unsuccessful aspirant for the gubernatorial nod, was portrayed as the major figure opposing Louc~s
and the issue on which the two men were divided was fusion.
The convention, however, chose to stick to the middle of
the road between the old parties and avoid combining with
the Democrats, an action that would have risked compromising
the party's principles in the pursuit of office.

The ~ioux

Falls Press, a bitter opponent of the Ruralist, charged that
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Loucks had been able to prevent the re-election of T.M. Simmons as the state central committee chairman.49

The Press

also claimed that reform papers were split over the issue of
suffrage and that some editors refused to print the resolution endorsing it.5°
To head their ticket, the Populists named Isaac Howe
of Spink County. Howe, a Vermonter who had trained in medicine and law before coming to Dakota Territory in 1882, had
been a Republican judge before joining the Independents.

He

converted in 1890 and was elected to county office under the
banner of the new party that year.

In the 1894 convention,

he was Loucks's choice for candidate at the top of the Populist slate.

It was an unfortunate selection.

Already in

his seventieth year, Howe's health was not equal to the task,
although that may not have been apparent at the time of the
nomination.

By November there were rumors that he was seri-

ously ill and before that month was out he was dead.51
The Republicans gathered in Yankton in late August for
their convention.

Aware of the growing importance of the

silver issue and in favor of an increased money supply, Pettigrew had come out in support of the free coinage of silver
in 189).

In the months prior to the convention the senator

worked to start Republican bimetallic clubs that would boost
the reform, and he tried to convince Republican leaders in
the state of the necessity of a strong silver plank to steal
the Populists' thunder.

His efforts were partly rewarded,
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for one of the major elements in the platform was a declaration favoring the coinage of all American-mined silver at a
ratio to gold of sixteen to one.52

The remainder of the

platform endorsed a protective tariff and reciprocity,

imrni-

gration restriction to keep out ''pauper and criminal classes,"
legislation to limit the power of trusts, laws to give the
railroad commissioners authority to prevent discrimination,
and the recognition of veterans.

The document pledged sup-

port for an orderly labor movement and backed courts of arbitration to settle disputes.

The convention also praised

''the admirable manner in which the present administration
had conducted the affairs of the state, maintaining the
public credit at all times.''

Although the Republicans ac-

corded a suffragette a seat on the rostrum, the platform was
silent on voting rights for women and on prohibition.SJ
The gathering nominated Sheldon for re-election to the
governorship and put forward the names of John A. Pickler
and Robert J. Gamble for U.S. representatives.

The candi-

dates for the ~ajor state offices of lieute~ant governor,
secretary of state, auditor, and attorney general were the
incumbents, but Kirk G. Phillips was named for treasurer i~
place of J.J. Taylor, who had been the party's choice in

1892.54
~eeting in Sioux Falls in early September,
endorsed Cleveland's administration

the Democrats

(with the exception of

his action on soldiers' pensions) and favored free trade, the
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coinage of silver and gold, the direct election of senators,
proper treatment of Civil War veterans, and state aid to irrigation.

Aiming to reduce the influence of corporations,

the convention called for legislation prohibiting members of
the cabinet and Congress from owning stock in companies that
were affected by national laws, legislation to control trusts,
and a measure forbidding politicians from accepting railroad
passes.

The platform denounced the state Republican party

for heavy taxes, excessive salaries, the deposit of state
funds in banks for partisan purposes, the failure to regulate railraods, and unjust taxation of farmers and laborers
while the rich avoided taxes.

The delegates derided the Re-

publicans for catering to prohibitionists while hypocritically
failing to enforce the law on the matter.
tinued their support for resubmission.

The Democrats con-

An effort to get the

convention's approval of a plank for free silver and the
direct issue of paper money to the people was not successful.
The delegates rejected fusion with the Populists. 55
!he most striking feature of the 1894 election in South
Dakota was R.F. Pettigrew's strenuous efforts to be returned
to the U.S. Senate.

With the attention that a master crafts-

man devotes to his work, Pettigrew initiated an intense and
well-organized campaign that would assure his re-election.
During much of 1894 the senator gave his time to contacting
various Republican leaders throughout the state and to developing an organization of supporters in all of the counties.
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His aim was to see that enough Republicans sympathetic to
his political goals would be in the next session of the state
legislature to give him another six years in Washington, an
objective that much of the Republican press shared.56
Senator Pettigrew exerted himself and his resources to
see that interest groups throughout the state would be reached in his canvass for re-election.

Among the state's largest

ethnic groups the senator hoped to cultivate support through
the immigrant press and prominent speakers.

He requested

the editors of the Norwegian Syd Dakota Ekko and the German
Dakota Freie Presse to translate and publish an article that
had first appeared in the Sioux Falls Press that enumerated
the benefits he had already gained for the state while in
office.57 Pettigrew tried unsuccessfully to get national
committee funds to subsidize the Presse during the campaign.
He did, however, order that 250 to JOO Germans in his home
country receive six month subscriptions to the paper at his
expense, hoping that these traditionally Democratic voters
could be swayed to his cause.58

Pettigrew's correspondence

included evidence of his attempts to send speakers and campaign workers among the state's Scandinavians,
Russian-Germans,

Germans,

Finns, Czechs, and Indians.59·

Pettigrew apparently had important support among religious groups.

A number of clergymen actively backed his·candi-

dacy, including the influential Catholic Bishop ifiartin I iarty.
1

Marty asked a number of priests under him to use their in-
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for an easy route to office.

Indeed, there were rumors in

the spring of 1894 that James Kyle and Robert Buchanan were
in Washington bargaining with state and national leaders of
the Democracy.62

Loucks was not adverse to Democrats sup-

porting the Populists, however, and counseled them to join
ranks with the reform party as the only means of defeating
Sheldon.

Pettigrew was much concerned that fusion might

occur in the legislative races, an event that might deprive
him of re-election.63
By 1894 some of the men who had joined the Independents
in 1890 were drifting back to their old parties, disillusioned about the Populists'

inability to effect reform, lured

back by concessions in the old parties' platforms, or jisgusted with the willingness of some Populists to fuse with
the Democrats.

The Republican press seized this opportunity

to discredit their opponents

and recounted the stories of

these disaffected reformers.

The GOP often put these men to

work on the campaign trail to convince other Republicans of
the futility of the third party.64
In some cases resubmission became an issue in the
legislative races, for the men who convened in Pierre in January would have to deal with that question.

By the mid-

nineties many in the state questioned the practicality of
prohibition.

The Republicans and Populists, both of whom

had once vigorously defended prohibition, hedged on the issue
in 1894 while the Democrats kept up their strong opposition
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fluence to help elect legislators sympathetic to Pettigrew,
a move that apparently stirred some degree of anti-Catholicism.

Pettigrew noted the bishop's action in a letter to a

GOP leader in Davison County, but disavowed any foreknowledge
of the endorsement,

explaining,

"I was a very liberal sub-

scriber to the fund to build the Bishop's house at this place
[Sioux Falls] and I presume he feel[s] kindly towards me."
In the same letter Senator Pettigrew related that he also had
Lutheran support "because I gave the grounds upon which their
school stands and several hundred dollars in money besides.1160
Pettigrew also relied on the railroad corporations doing
business in the region.

The Great Northern apparently con-

tributed $5,000 to his campaign.

The senator asked various

favors from the roads, including intervention to influence
the political behavior of employees and changes in train
schedules to permit crews to vote in selected precincts.

In

Brown County, where the Republicans expected a close race,
Milwaukee road officials assured the senator that "they would
.
.
d o everything
they can" to a1. d h i1m among their
workers there. 61

The perennial issue of fusion surfaced again during the

1894 campaign.

Prior to the convention Loucks had preached

against any combination with the Democrats that could split
the reform party and prompt droves of former Republicans to
return to their old political fealty.

His great fear seems

to have been that there might be an arrangement between Democratic leaders and men among the Populists who were looking
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to the measure.

In Clay County the Populists claimed that

the Republican legislative nominees were willing to approve
resubmission and the Republicans replied by making the same
charge against Populists.65
Caught in the backlash against Cleveland's administration following the Panic of 1893, the Democrats lost heavily
at the polls.

Of over 75,000 ballots cast in the guberna-

torial contest, the Democrats captured less than twelve percent, substantially less than their 1892 total and less than
half of their 1890 strength.

The Populists, although doing

poorly compared to the Republicans,

drew nearly thirty-five

percent of the state's electorate,

its best performance yet.

Prohibitionists,

fielding a separate ticket for the first

time in the 1890s, attracted about 1,000 votes.

The Re-

publicans returned to their status as the state's majority
party, with 52.6 percent of the vote.

The GOP swept the

state races and obtained a firm hold on the next legislature.
In Clay County, where fusion on the legislative slate ~anaged
to give those seats to the GOP's opponents, the Republican
editor said somewhat enviously,

"The whole wide world went

Republican Tuesday--with the exception of Texas and Clay
County. "66
The Republican success extended to the county level as
well.

One GOP newspaper tallied the results of county elec-

tions in fifty-one organized counties and found that the Republicans had won an overwhelming victory.

Counting eight

11.3
"fairly lucrative" offices in each county, the Republicans
took nearly eighty percent of the positions, the Populists
slightly over eighteen percent, and the Democrats less than
two percent.67
The 1895 legislature,

dominated by Republicans,

easily

gave Pettigrew the re-election for which he had labored.
He was unanimously selected.the choice of the Republican
caucus and won by a large margin in the legislature.68
The 1895 session considered legislation that would have
enacted Populist reforms, but, in the end, chose to avoid
such changes.

One of the major issues was the regulation

of the railroads, particularly to allow the railroad commissioners the power to set rates.

The Republicans,

despite

the advice of Pettigrew who had begun to see the need for
such a law, turned back efforts to strengthen the regulatory
body in an significant fashion.

The lawmakers did pass a

memorial to Congress calling for free silver, but on reconsideration the Republicans decided to rescind the measure
and to expunge all mention of it from the official journals.
Nor did a bill establishing initiative and referendum succeed.69
As the culmination of several attempts in the sessions
of the 1890s, the proponents of resubmission finally were
victorious.

The legislature approved a joint resolution to

place the question of prohibition on the 1896 ballot.70
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One issue that required much of session's attention
came quite unexpectedly.

In his message to the legislature,

Governor Sheldon praised the former state treasurer in glowing termss
Mr. ~:1.W. Taylor, our efficient and
faithful outgoing treasurer, is entitled
to the thanks of the people for the zeal
and energy which he has at all times displayed in the management of his offices,
and it is a matter of pride to him ... that
he leaves the public service carrying with
him the unbounded respect of those who
have known his business methods and his
desire7to preserve the credit of the
state.

These words came back to haunt Sheldon, for Taylor also left
public service carrying with him the state treasury.

His

accounts were short some $J67,000.
During his term as treasurer, Taylor had handled the
state's money unwisely.
publican politicians,
time.

He made loans to a number of Re-

only some of whom could repay him on

Other funds had gone into bad investments and to prop

up banks owned by members of his party--banks that went under
during the economic stresses of the Panic of 189).

As his

tenure of office came to a close, Taylor realized he could
not produce the state's funds and so absconded.

He eventu-

ally returned, but only, according to charges made by both
Republican and Populist newspapers, after a deal promising
leniency.

With the funds he brought back, his own property,

and the holdings of some of his bondsmen, Taylor was able to
reimburse the state for all but about $98,000.

In punishmer.t,
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he was sentenced to five years in prison, a term that was
reduced to two years by the state supreme court--upon which
sat a judge to whom Taylor had loaned money.72

Among those

hurt by the defalcation was former governor Arthur C .. Mellette,
one of the treasurer's bondsmen.

Mellette lost heavily when

the state attached the property of those who had offered
surety for Taylor, his health failed, and the ex-governor
died the following year.73
Such a disaster demanded action from the legislature.
The lawmakers enacted legislation appointing a committee to
investigate the scandal, established a reward for Taylor's
capture, and authorized the attorney general to begin proceedings against the ex-treasurer's property and that of
his bondsmen.

To save the state from financial disaster, the

legislature allowed the new treasurer to issue bonds to replace money taken from the school funds and levied a deficiency tax to raise additional revenue.

To prevent such a

fiasco in the future, the legislature passed laws to ens~re
the safety of public funds and to tighten standards of accountibility from state officers.74
The first half of the 1890s held few successes for the
Populists in South Dakota.

With the exception of mustering

enough strength through fusion with the Democrats to elect
a U.S. senator, the new party was unable to place any of its
candidates in major office.

The party proved tenacious, for

it increased its share of the electorate between 1890 and
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1895 despite its string of defeats.

The Republicans,

however,

were able to retake ground lost in 1890 and by 1894 had reestablished themselves as the state's majority party.

The

GOP was victorious in its quest to regain its old glory because of strong efforts to solicit the farm vote through concessions in its platforms and candidates, the traditionally
Republican orientation of the state's townsmen, through vigorous campaigning, and by benefiting from the nation-wide
repudiation of Cleveland's administration.

The Democratic

party, never dominant in South Dakota politics to begin with,
was a shadow of its former self by 1894.
The early 1890s were also characterized by the decline
of the Farmers' Alliance.

Deprived of its old radical lead-

ership through the assumption by Loucks and Wardall of national alliance office, the farm order was taken over by men
from a different cut of cloth--men who sought to divorce
the organization from politics.

Furthermore,

the Alliance

was shaken by the difficulties or failure of a number of its
business operations.
The second half of the decade held some promise for the
Populists.

The leading Republican politician in the state,

Richard F. Pettigrew,

had embraced free silver as the solu-

tion to the nation's

economic woes and was advocating more

stringent regulation of railroads.

Such positions estranged

him from the majority of his party and made possible his
movement into the sphere of opposition leaders by 1896.

The
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1894 disaster left the Democrats with little choice other
than to throw their diminished numbers behind the Populist
party through fusion.

The Republicans,

although they had

returned to majority control in 1894, would have to carry
the onus of the Taylor defalcation
a burden that proved heavy indeed.

into the next election,
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CHAPTER V

FUSION, VICTORY, AND DEFEAT

By 1896

events made fusion possible among those politi-

cal groups discontented with the Republica~ party.
F. Pettigrew,

Richard

estranged from his party over the issues of

silver and railroad regulation, bolted the national Republican convention with other Silver Republicans.

When the

state convention also turned down a silver plank, his followers walked out to form their own party.

In the Populist

ranks a fusion element finally gained sufficient power to
commit that party to union with other pro-silver intere3ts.
The Democrats, seizing on the opportunity to defeat the Republicans,

joined the reform coalition without even both8r-

ing to hold a convention.

Under the leadership of Andr·ew

E. Lee, the fusionists managed to win a narrow victory in
the fall election.
'fictory at the polls, however, did not bring the success for which the silver coalit~on had hoped.
on state government was incomplete,

for the Republicans re-

tained most of the executive machinery.
was weak.

Their hold

The reformers'

unity

Although they controlled a majority of the leg-

islature, the fusion forces failed to elect a U.S. senator,
allowing James H. Kyle to be returned to Washington with Republican votes instead.

Nor were the reformers able to unite

on all of the measures Lee deemed vital.
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As disappointing as this was, it was the climax of
fusionist success.

In 1898 the Republicans regained control

of all but the governorship,
self.

and Lee could do little by him-

The 1900 election swept the reform coalition from

every position in the executive branch and left them with a
mere handful of seats in the legislature.
By 1900 the spark that .had ignited the Populist revolt
had gone out.

Farm prosperity returned as prices edged up-

ward, as normal rainfall resumed, and as agrarians developed
better methods for farming the Plains.

The Republicans had

been able to counter much of the Populist threat by concessions in their platforms and choice of candidates.

When

Populists did gain power, they did little to further their
goals.

New issues diverted the electorate's attention from

conditions in the state to affairs of the world.

This com-

bination destroyed any further hopes for Populist success.
With the circumstances that had provoked rebellion in the
first place gone, voters returned to their traditional voting
patterns and the Republican party resumed its dominance.
Pettigrew gradually moved out of the mainstream of his
party over the issue of silver.

Convinced that popular sent-

iment was going in the direction of free silver and his own
fortunes badly hurt in the Panic of 1893, the senator took
up the cause of the financial reform by that year.

This

stance and his attempts to persuade the 1895 legislature to
enact strong regulatory measures alienated him from powerful
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elements within the South Dakota GOP.

Although Pettigrew

managed to get elected a delegate to the national Re!-'' ·"-lican
convention in St. Louis in 1896, his opponents in the party
forced upon the delegation a pledge to support the national
ticket and platform.

~then the national convention over-

whelmingly rejected a minority report calling for endorsement of free silver, Pettigrew joined other silverites in
walking out of the convention.1
The state Republican convention in Aberdeen in July was
the scene of a showdown between silverites and those who
chose to abide by the national convention's decisions.

When

the gold forces defeated a silver plank in the platform by
a wide margin, a number of the delegates--principally
Pettigrew's home county--withdrew

from

from the convention.

The

remaining delegates condemned Pettigrew and resolved that he
"has ceased to be in touch with the Republican party of this
state and has forfeited its political respect and esteem."2
The convention adopted a platform endorsing the actions of
the St. Lou is
stration.

convention and c ornme nd i ng the .Sheldon admini-

The state Republicans also asked for arbitraticn

to end strikes, a more powerful railroad commission,

strong

efforts against trusts and combines, and better regulation
of grain elevators.

For governor the Republicans nominated

Norwegian-born A.O. Ringsrud.3
The Populist state convention was held in Huron in midJuly.

The party's platform called for inflationary measures
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such as free silver
government

ownership

enough railroad
government
savings

through

mileage

ownership

banks,

senators,

and the issue

for settlers,

purchase

of the telegraph

bill,

work
nings

condemned

of James

Bryan for the presidency.

dissention
to place
chose

instead

to endorse

ed upon voters
parties.

merchant

of all

~illiam

item caused

as did an abortive

the Populists

offered

The
the
Jensome

attempt

The convention

amendment

the issue without

of

free homes

commended

and backed

in the platform.

and reform

election

owned by aliens.

the resubmission

to consider

For governor

a Vermillion

plank

.postal

and repossession

This last

among the men in Huron,
a prohibition

direct

administration,

H. Kyle and Pettigrew,

of

competition,

commission,

and land

the present

notes,

and telephone,

set by a nonpartisan

idle land held by corporations
delegates

through

and referendum,

a tough railroad

tender

or construction

to lower rates

initiative

tariffs

of legal

and call-

reference
Andrew

to

E. Lee,

mayor who had been born in

Norway. 4
The 1890s marked the inauguration of a new era for South
Dakota's immigrant groups.

Prior to this decade the state's

politics had largely been the province of the native-born and
the political position of ethnic groups had been determined
by attitudes on cultural issues.

With the advent of Populism,

economic issues began to take precedence and neither of the
old parties could take for granted the continued loyalty of
some significant blocs of immigrant votes.

The result of
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this development was an increased awareness by politicians of
the importance of some foreign-stock groups.

This led to the

nomination of foreign-born men to state office in an effort
to attract certain ethnic voters.

The trend reached its

peak in 1896 when both the Republicans and the Populists
selected Norwegians as their gubernatorial candidate.

The

choice of Lee may have been crucial for the Populists' victory, for it split the Scandinavian strength in the election.5
Scandinavians,

one of the state's two largest ethnic groups,

continued to occupy a favored position in South Dakota's political circles for some time to come.

In 1898 the fusionists

renominated Lee and in 1900 both the Republicans and the reform coalition offered men of Norwegian stock for the governorship.
The Silver Republicans met in Huron at the same time as
the Populists and chose to cast their lot with the reform
party.

For their support, the Pettigrew followers

lowed one place on the state

were al-

ticket, which went to :'/. T. La-

Follette, who was nom l na t ed for railroad c omm i s s i oner.
Democratic state committee,

The

seeing an opportunity to create

a coalition strong enough to displace the Republicans,

can-

celled the party's convention and joined the fusion forces,
thus becoming the third leg in a tripod of silverites.6

State-

wide fusion, a specter that had haunted Republicans and oldline Populists alike during the first years of the decade,
had finally been accomplished,

although there was some oppo-
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sition to it among reformers.?
For the few remaining Democrats, fusion with the Populists should not have presented major problems with readjustment.

The issues that separated the Democrats from the

other parties in 1890 no longer occupied a position of immediate importance.

Prohibition and personal liberty had

been supplanted by economic problems.

Resubmission of the

prohibitory clause of the constitution, while still before
the public in 1896, was no longer opposed by any major party.
Furthermore,

Democrats would not feel alien in the reform

coalition, for many former Democrats had joined the ranks of
the Populists since 1890.

While the Republicans gradually

regained voters lost in the first election of the 1890s and
the Populists increased their share of the electorate,
bers of Jemocratic voters fell precipitously.

nun-

Ideologically

unsuited for the Republican party, many of these Democrats
must have turned to the reform party.

South Dakota fits the

patterns established in two Plains states to the south.

In

~ansas and Nebraska the new party drew most cf its support
from Republicans in 1890.

After that year, when cultural

issues no longer sharply divided them from the other parties,
Democrats began to filter into the Populist party.

At the

same time, Republicans who had flirted briefly with the third
party in 1890 returned to their former affiliation.8

·

The fusion forces in South Dakota were by no means in
complete agreement on all issues.

By 1895 the division be-
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tween those who wanted to stand by the Omaha platform in its
entirety and those who sought to trim the platform to a few
basic issues was becoming acute.

Some elements believed that

a broad platform could bring in more voters even though some
might disagree with particular features of the program. Others
felt the emphasis should be on the financial plank, specifically on free silver.

The Panic of 1893 and the repeal of

the Sherman Silver Purchase Act had brought new life to the
silver issue, with many new converts to the Populists maintaining that it must precede all other reforms.

The fusion

of 1896 was based on free silver and the South Dakota state
Populist platform did not endorse the Omaha platform as had
the 1894 document.9

The division in the Populist ranks in

1895 was evident in Senator Kyle's decision to withdraw fro~
the boarj of directors of the Aberdeen Star, one of the leading Populist dailies, because he favored free silver as a
primary objective and could not endorse some of the radical
features of the Populist program.10
In the fall campaign the fusionists emphasized the primacy of silver.

It was the foremost issue in the contest for

them and was the necessary prelude to other reforms.

To Pop-

ulists the demonetization of silver--the "Crime of 1873"--had
been a conspiracy on the part of the monied interests to saddle the nation, particularly debtors, with dear money based
solely on gold.

Now the same monied interests--personified

in the financial leaders of New York and London--stood behind

1)2

McKinley to beat back the threat of free silver.

The men of

Wall Street and Lombard Street--particularly the Rothschilds
and other European .rews--were again involved in a conspiracy
against the American people.
to fight back.

Silver was the weapon with which

South Dakotans were aided in their advocacy

of silver when William Jennings Bryan made a brief tour of
the state in October on behalf of the free coinage issue and
the leading fusion candidates.11
~ith the T&ylor defalcation still relatively fresh in
the minds of the voters, the fusionists had an issue upon
which the Republicans were vulnerable.

The corruption that

had characterized the previous administration was an easy
target for the opposition to use against particular individuals and the Pepublican party as a whole.12
The Republicans charged voters not to let the minor
issue of silver draw attention from the important matters of
the tariff and restoring the Republicans to national power.
As the fusionists placed more emphasis on silver, the Republicans shiftej their attacks to the dangers and difficulties
of the white metal.

Such a move would, contended the Repub-

licans, benefit mine owners and harm laborers.

The i3sue also

frightened away badly needed capital and settlers.13

The

Populists had maintained that there was a direct connection
between the price of silver and wheat and that as long as the
price of the first commodity was depressed, the price of the
latter would be as well.

When wheat prices began to edge up

!JJ
in the fall of 1896 while silver dropped, the Republicans
capitalized on the opportunity to show the falsehood of their
opponents' arguement. 14

Some Republican newspapers, particu-

larly those in areas settled by Russian-Germans,

pointed out

that silver sentiment was low among that nationality because
of unhappy experiences with the metal in Russia~5
The Republican press also found fault with Andrew Lee.
An astute businessman, Lee had amassed a fortune by the time
he entered state politics.

Republicans attacked him as a

"millionaire plute candidate" who could hardly represent the
average farmer and queried how he could have gained such
wealth if economic conditions were as dismal as the Popu16
lists portrayed them.
The Republican editors also accused
Lee of being a poor public speaker, implying that he was
handicapped by a poor command of the English language.17
The 1896 election marked the peak of Populist success.
-~en the votes were counted they found that the reform coalition had narrowly carried the major races.

Bryan edged

'iilliarn ~cKinley by fewer than 200 ballots.

Lee jefeated

Ringsrud by a margin of J19 out of over 82,000 votes cast.
The fusion forces also managed to elect the attorney general,
both congressmen, and the three railroad commissioners.

The

bulk of the state's executive offices, however, remained
under Republican control.

The legislature went to the fu-

sionists by a majority of nineteen.

The Black Hills, badly

shaken by the depression, swung to the fusionists,a factor
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th a t provi. d e d th e margin
Resubmission of the prohibition question, an issue in
the state's politics in some fashion for most of the decade~
was temporarily settled when the electorate, despite the
strenuous efforts of prohibitionists,

chose to repeal the

prohibitory clause of the state constitution.
was defeated by a margin of nearly 7,000
on the issue ran over

Prohibition

votes and balloting

ten thousand votes ahead of the other

amendments put to the people.

The Prohibition party candi-

date for governor drew about seven hundred votes away from
.
19
the other parties.
One of the first orders of business when the legislators
convened in Pierre in January was the election of a U.S.
senator.

Kyle's term was about to expire and a legislature

controlled by fusionists W)uld again have the opportunity to
fill a Senate seat.

The problem that plagued the lawmakers

of 1891 was present again; the fusion forces could not a€ree
on a candidate.
ler i n

The Republicans united behind John A. Pick-

r.'lid-January, but the r-e fc.rrn caucus

could not se t t l e

on a single man and fcur fusionist candidates divided the
Kyle, F.~. Goodykoontz, A.J. ?lowman, and Henry
. d t o th e posi't' ion. 20 L ee an,d P e tt•igrew opL ouc k s a 11 aspire
fielj.

posed Kyle, although other factions in the party stood bc21
hind the clergyman.
The balloting continued for weeks before the Republ Leans suId e n.Ly switched to Kyle.

V"Ji th the aid

of a small number of Populists and Democrats, the Republicans
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were able to return Kyle to Washington.

The circumstances

of his re-election moved him closer to the Republicans during his second term.22
Governor Lee pushed for effective railroad regulation
in the 1897 legislature.

With both parties pledged to such

legislation in their platforms, a regulatory law was enacted
relatively early in the session with overwhelming bipartisan
support.

I'he Palmer-t'lheeler bill widened the investigatory

powers of the railroad commission, prohibited rate discrimination and combinations in restraint

of trade, ordered

railroads to furnish cars whenever requested, and empowered
the commissioners to set maximum rates.

The right to control

rates was vigorously contested by the various railroads in
the state.

Sympathetic courts granted injunctions to the

roads to prevent the imposition of rates until the U.S.
Supreme Court finally ruled in 1901 that such commissions
could not establish railroad rates.2J
Prohibiton having been repealed, the legislature was
left with the task of providing somG means of regulation of
the liquor trade in the state.

The leeislators enacted a

high license bill to serve as a temporary meas~re and submitted an amendment to the people that would establish a
state dispensary system for alcohol.

The new law also per-

mitted local option.24
In other actions the legislature dealt with a variety
of proble~s and minor reforms.

The lawmakers revised some
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of the state's executive machinery and added an oil inspector
and an insurance inspector.

This latter position was cre-

ated to take the distribution of insurance statements to
newspapers out of the hands of the Republican auditor.

A

measure that would have revised the Board of Charities and
Corrections so as to give the fusionists control of the state's
penal and charitable institutions failed. Still pursuing
the Taylor defalcation,

the legislature established a three

member committee to re-examine the evidence from the previous
investigation and to look for corruption elsewhere in the
state government.

To ensure that anyone who bilked the state

of its treasury would receive tougher

treatment

in the courts,

the legislature stiffened penalities for embezzlement of public funds.

At the request of Governor Lee the lawmakers

required the treasurer to produce the state funds to be
counted.

Unlike his predecessor,

treasurer Kirk G. Phillips

was able to account for all of the money in his care.

Other

acts passed by the legislature that touched on traditional
farmer and Populist concerns included laws dealing with ballot reform, ~ine safety, irrigation,
competititon.

and combination to limit

In ad~ition to the dispensary measure, the

legislators submitted to the voters at the next election
amendments dealing with woman suffrage and the initiative
and referendum.25
The 1897 legislature was at best a qualified success.
The fusion forces--although holding a majority of the seats

1)7
--were unable to unite on some basic measures.

The reformers

could not generate enough support to break the Republican
hold over some of the state's major institutions.

The Re-

publicans seized the initiative and elected a U.S. senator.
Although the legislators enacted a railway regulatory act,
it was a measure to which both parties had pledged themselves.
As one Republican editor summed up the fusionists' success
in Pierre, the record upon which they would have to run in
1898 "is not an enviable one."26
The judicial elections of 1897 also proved disappointing

to the fusionists.

Of the eight circuit court positions

to be filled, the fusionists managed to capture only three.
Nor were the groups opposing the Republicans able to maintain even the degree of unity they had achieved the preceeding year.

In one of the races the Populists and the Demo-

crats nominated different candidates.27
A major task for reform leaders in 1898 was preserving
the fragile bond among the fusion forces.

To that end Petti-

grew labored diligently in the months prior to the first
conventions of the various anti-Republican parties.

The

senator was concerned that the mid-road Populists--those who
wanted to keep the reform party in the middle of the road
between the old parties and who believed that any combination
with either the Republicans or Democrats was tantamount to
heresy--would succeed in turning the Populist party back to
its independent stance.

Furthermore,

Pettigrew worried that

1J8

a

gold wing of the state's Democrats might scuttle an attempt

at fusion.

To prevent this he sought to convince other reform

politicians that the Democrats should be accorded four positions on the next ticket.28
Pettigrew's effort was successful. '.\TJ'len the Populist
state central committee met in March to set a date for the
party's convention,
support.

a resolution favoring fusion received wide

Henry L. Loucks and Robert W. Haire opposed the

measure, but to no avai1.29

The three parties held separate

conventions in Aberdeen in July and settled uoon a sinGlc
ticket, which was headed by Governor Lee.

The parties then

adopted individual platilirms which were similar to one another, and a series of resolutions that were co~~mon to all
of the parties.

The common features included calls for free

coinage of silver at sixteen to one, initiative and referendum, government ownership of public utilities, election of
Supreme Court justices, and an end to federal court injunctions.

The resolutions also supported the war with Spain.

Planks in the separate platforns included de~ands for more
regulation of trusts, postal savings banks, direct election
of senators, an income tax, labor legislation,

and more equit-

able taxation.JO
The Republicans,

convening in Mitchell the following

month, chose Kirk Phillips to oppose Lee.

Following Republi-

can principles, the delegates endorsed the gold standard and
protection for American products.

The party also favored the
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annexation of Hawaii, postal savings banks and a postal telegraph, and the Nicaraguan canal.

The convention also con-

demned illegal trusts and supported the railroad commission
in its struggle

to set rates.

The convention was pleasantly

surprised when Henry Loucks announced his return to the GOP
in a letter he asked to be read to the convention.

Loucks

stated that he could not countenance the takeover of the Populists by the Democrats.

He also urged the Republicans to

include a plank favoring the initiative and referendum in
their platform, although the convention obliged him cnly to
the extent of suggesting that voters study the matter.

Before

the November election Senator Kyle joined Loucks in converting back to the Republicans.31
In the course of the campaign, Pettigrew continued his
courtship of the state's ethnic groups, especially the Germans.

He was particularly concerned with converting the

Germans from Russia to free silver and offered to send literature to circulate among that group.

He was also inter-

este) in persua)ing the ~akota Freie Presse to take up the
cry for silver and was approached by a silverite who hoped
to obtain sufficient funding to purchase that Russian-German
organ.

However, Pettigrew could not raise the money.32

One

of the Democratic nominees on the fusion ticket was a German
from Hutchinson county, a Russian-German area, a choice that
Lee hoped would help swing that ethnic group into the fusion
column.33
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Lee attempted to undermine his opponent by inquiring at
various banks around the state whether or not Phillips as
treasurer had been pocketing interest received on deposits
of state funds.

Naively, Lee simply asked bank officers if

Phillips had received any interest or other consideration
for doing business with their banks.

Phillips, a banker by

profession, certainly would ·not have made such transactions
with men whom he did not trust.

Lee's efforts before the

election were rewarded by an indignant letter from one cashie~ who hinted that Lee was propelled by political motives
rather than concern for the state's treasury.34
The Cuban crisis gave the :fusionists an issue with which
to condemn the McKinley administration.

Before American in-

tervention Populist newspapers castigated the president's
weak policy.

America's duty, they claimed was to free the

Cubans from the clutches of Spain on humanitarian grounds.
Such newspapers charged that ~c~inley was conciliatory because the "money power of the world" dictated that Cuba must
remain under Spanish Misrule because financiers like the
Rothschilds held Cuban bonds that would only be paid if Spain
controlled the islanj.35
Governor Lee also supported military intervention in
the Caribbean but wanted it go no further.

Lee argued that

American action against Spain after the sinking of the Maine
was necessary both to liberate Cuba and to defend American
honor.

The territories gained from Spain, moralized the
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governor, must not be returned.

Rather, the U.S. should

dedicate itself to uplifting the struggling peoples and to
protecting them from foreign nations as well as from American
capitalists.

When the First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry

was sent to the Philippines and deployed against the native
rebellion in 1899, Lee demanded their return, maintaining
that the regiment's term of enlistment had expired with the
end of the war and that any further use of the troops would
only benefit capitalists.36
Pettigrew also favored intervention to alleviate Cuban
suffering and saw a money power plot behind the president's
actions.
Morgans."

Such was the work of "the Roth[s]childs and :JrexelHowever, there was danger, too, in a war of con-

quest, for such would only aid the plutocrat and war contractor.

Furthermore,

the tropical islands were inhabited

by "inferior races" that might enjanger American institutions.)?
Republican papers often agreed with their opponents on
the neej to rescue the Cubans from Spain, but they differed
with fusionists over the disposition of conquered lands.
Territorial acquisition was the prerogative of the victor.
Having freed these lands,

it was the duty of America to pro-

tect and govern the territories until they were capable of
caring for themselves or were fit to be admitted as states.
The time had come for the United States to expand overseas
and open new markets; the nation should retain the former
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Spanish possessions and raise a larger army to guard them.38
Other Republican tactics in the 1898 campaign included
publicizing fissures in the fusion ranks and criticizing Lee
for corruption in his administration.

Republican papers took

delight in pointing out unrest at the fusion convention and in
enumerating the old-line Populists and Democrats who found
the tri-partisan combination unpalatable.

Republican editors

charged that Populists in office under Lee were as guilty of
misusing public funds as had been their Republican predecessors, and indictment that bore some truth. Some also claimed
that Lee had covered up such graft.39
The November election proved disastrous for the fusionists.

Lee barely held onto his office, winning by a margin

only slightly larger than he had had in 1896.

Every other

reform candidate for state office met defeat.

The Republi-

cans gained a solid majority in the legislature.

For a time

Lee was threatened by a contest from Phillips, but the for~er
treasurer decided to drop the matter.

Lee was still pressins

for an investi~aticn of Phillips' transactions and the Republican may have chosen not to go farther in hopes that Lee
would do likewise.

1'lhen the governor did seek action he

found the legislature and the attorney general uncooperative.40
The amendments on the ballot er.countered mixed success.
The voters approved the measures allowing initiative and referendum and a state dispensary system to control liquor sales.
The woman suffrage amendment, however, was defeated 22,985 to
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19,698.

The campaign for suffrage in 1898 was far more re-

served than it had been eight years earlier.

This time the

National Suffrage Association sent in only one lecturer for
an extended tour and a few other speakers of some note appeared briefly.41
Lee found plenty of factors to blame for the Populist
loss.

He claimed to various correspondents that the defeat

was due to voter aJB,thy, the intense effort of the saloon
element in the Black Hills, poor management, the absence of
many silver supporters from the mining counties because they
were overseas in military service, and voting fraud.42

Ap-

parently he did not seriously examine the possibility that
South Dakota's electorate simply did not believe the fusionists could solve all of the state's problems or that the Republicans presented a more attractive alternative.
Pettigrew attributed the defeat partly to voting fraud
anj heavy spending on behalf of the Republicans by the railroads.

A more important cause, according to the senator, was

the breakdown of fusi1n on the c~unty level .. Jithout that
~rassroots unity, the election of reform candidates was impossible.

Nor had the fusion forces sufficiently emphasized

the vital national issues of free silver and public ownership
of railroads.43
After 1896 other factors combined to reduce fusionist
voting, both in the state and in the nation.

Financial prob-

lems, a major impetus to the formation of the Independent
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movement, seemed less pressing as the economy began to improve
during McKinley's administration.

An increasing gold supply

due to new finds and be~ter processing techniques enlarged
the money supply.

The Spanish-American

War sparked a wave

of patriotism and diverted attention to foreign affairs.

Some

Populists could not abide with fusion with the Democrats and
the dilution of old principles.

For these, the Republican

par t ~r o ff ere d a more appea 1 a. ng so 1 u t' a on . 44
The 1899 legislature did little to further the reforms
the fusionists had sought.

The lawmakers did enact legisla-

tion to put the initiative and referendum into effect, made
some changes in voting laws, allowed taxpayers to pay their
taxes in two semi-annual installments,
act.

and passed a pure food

Presented with three different bills to establish a

state dispensary system, the legislature chose to act on none
of them, deciding instead that such a system would be too expensive.

Instead the lawmakers decided to refer the dispen-

sary a~endment back to the voters in 1900.

The Republican

do~inated lesislature also refused to pass a measure that
would have given Lee the power to remove his own appointees.45
Nor did fusionist fortunes fare any better in the judicial elections later that year.

This time the fusion forces

managed to maintain their unity and offer a single candidate
for each of the three state supreme court positions in contention.

The highest court in the state, a bulwark of Repub-

licanism and suspected of protecting corruption among GOP of-
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ficials, was an important target for the reform groups.

The

Republicans, however, easily held on to their control of the
court.46
The 1900 political season began early in South Dakota
when the Populists who were amenable to fusion held their national convention in Sioux Falls in early May.

The body nom-

inated ~lilliam Jennings Bryan and Charles A. Towne for its
presidential and vice presidential candidates.

Towne's se-

lection came only after a protracted struggle between extreme
fusionists who wished to leave open the second position for
the Democratic national convention to fill and a faction who
felt the Democrats must concede a place on the ticket.

The

latter group won the skirmish but lost the war, for Towne was
unacceptable to Bryan and the Democrats, who replaced him with
Adlai E. Stevenson.

The platform adopted in Sioux Falls call-

ed for the free coinage of silver, a graduated income tax, a
reduced tariff, public ownership of railroads, postal savin~s
banks, direct election of senators, initiative and referendum,
and i~~igration restriction.

The attendance was f2r short of

what city and party planners had hoped for, and probably fewer
than two thousand dele~ates and spectators appearect.47
Two weeks later the Republicans convened in Sioux Falls.
The platform lauded the McKinley administration, acknowledged
the contributions of Civil War veterans, and praised the hereism of South Dakota's contingent in the Spanish-American
and in the Philippines.

jar

The delegates approved of the free

1~
homestead bill, endorsed strict action against trusts, and
expressed their satisfaction with sound money.
the groups who had supported the Populists,

To appeal to

the convention

encouraged widening the powers of the railroad commission to
the regulation of telephone, telegraph, and express companies, and endorsed rural free delivery.

The delegates also

pronounced their support of national Republican policy ·toward
the territories taken from Spain.48
The convention continued the trend of recognizing the
state's ethnic population in its choices for office.

The Re-

publicans picked Norwegian-stock Charles N. Herreid as its
gubernatorial candidate.

Herreid was joined on the ticket

by a fellow Scandinavian,

O.C. Berg, who ran for Secretary

of State.

A representative of the state's Dutch population

joined the slate as a candidate for railroad commissioner.49
The Populists and Democrats gathered in convention in
Yankton in mid-July.

There were not enough Silver Republicans

on hand for them to hold a separate convention,

but the other

two le~s of the reform co~lition ~et individually to for811la~e
their respective tickets.
port of Lee, Pettigrew,
party platform.
Philippines,

The ~emocrats announced their su~-

Bryan and Stevenson, and the natio~al

The party denounced ~c~inley's policy on the

but com~ended the state's soldiers for bravery

in the insurrection.

The delegates called for a feder~l in-

come tax and better railroad regula~ions,

anj decried the act-

ions of the 1899 legislat1Jre and the Republican controlled
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board of assessment and equalization.

The convention also

supported the South African republics in their fight against
British imperialism.so
The Populists endorsed the Sioux Falls platform, Lee,
Pettigrew and Bryan.

On foreign affairs the delegates de-

manded Philippine independence under an American protectorate,
lauded South Dakota's men in the Philippines, criticized corruption in the administration of Cuba, demanded full U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans, and sympathized with the South
African republics.

On economic and business issues the con-

vention opposed trusts and sought public ownership of the
"means of production and distribution" whenever necessary,
the direct issue of money by the government, postal savings
banks, and silver at 16 to 1.

In addition, the platform in-

cluded planks condemning the board of assessment and equalization, praising the railroaj commissioners,

calling for lili-

eral pensions, and deploring the use of troops against strik-

.
.
51
ing
miners.
The Jemocrats de~anjed a larger share of the state tictet
than they had received during the past two major electior.s.
7hey received the secretary of state, the com~issioner of p 1~1

lie lands, the treasurer,
electors.

the auditor, and two presidential

The gubernatorial selection was Burre H. Lien, a

businessman and former mayor of Sioux ?alls.

Lien's nomination

continued tne practice of ethnic politics; he was of No~wegian
stock and had been instrumental in forming the state's most
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important Scandinavian newspaper.

Lee reluctantly accepted a

nomination to the U.S. House of Representatives.52
The fusion coalition in 1900 tried to make an issue out
of American imperialism, particularly with Russian-German
voters.

These people, reasoned the fusionists, had left Rus-

sia to avoid militarism.

McKinley's policies overseas meant

a large army that must be supported with high taxes and would
lead to war.

Russian-German attachment to the Republican

party, however, was too firm.53

The fusionists also directe1

blows at the leading Populists who had returned to the Republicans, charging that Kyle had been bought by the Republicans
in 1897 and that Henry Loucks--the man who had led the Indepenjent movement in 1890--was a political traitor who was
seeking to replace Pettigrew as senator when the legislature
met in 1901.54
The 1900 campaign was markej by speaking tours by several important politicians.

In late September William Jen-

nings 3ryan sped across the state, making a dozen stops in a
single day.55

In October ~ark Hanna conducted a tour of west-

ern states that included some forty-four speeches in South
Dakota.

Hanna and Pettigrew were the bitterest of foes.

The

South Dakotan believed that Hanna was responsible for the 1896
Bryan defeat and vituperatively attacked him in the Senate.
The feud on the Senate floor between the two men climaxed in
early June when Pettigrew accused Hanna of bribery in 1898.
Though Hanna never publicly used Pettigrew's name, his tour
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was aimed in part at ensuring a Republican victory in South
Dakota in 1900, a victory that would place the question of
Pettigrew's re-election in the hands of a hostile legislature.56
The 1900 election was complicated by the presence of two
minor parties.

One was the Prohibition party, a common fea-

ture in several of the major state elections of the 1890s. The
other billed itself as the Po~ulist party, in contrast to the
People's party of the reform coalition.

The miniscule Popu-

list party claimed to be the true mid-road portion of the
ori~inal Populist party.

The fusionists derided it as a Re-

publican ploy to split the opposition.

Whatever its purpose,

the Populist party of 1900 was a failure. Neither of these
factions was important in the campaign--the Pro~ibitionists
received less than 1,400 votes and the Populist party slightly
over three hundred.57
The 1900 election was the death stroke for the fusion
movement in South Dakota.
went to defeat.

Every candidate on the state ticket

Lien lost by nearly 14,ooo.

Lee led the fu-

sionist candidates, but by any standards his loss was a landslide.

In the leg.1.9.ative races, only fifteen fusionists were

elected comparej to 117 Republicans.58
The 1900 election did not kill the Populist party imrnediately; the victim lingered on for some time before finally succumbing.

In 1902 the ~emocrats and Populists fused again,

this time with results even more dlscouraging than the preceding election.

In 1904, the Populists fielded a separate
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ticket that attracted a mere 1,114 votes--far less than either
the Socialists or the Prohibitionists received.59
By this time only minor leaders of the old reform coalition were left.

Loucks and Kyle had both returned to the

Republican fold, although Kyle died in 1901.

Lee, Pettigrew,

U.S.G. Cherry, and W.T. LaFollete moved into Democratic ranks.
filliam E. Kidd, Father Robert W. Haire, and H.W. Smith became
Socialists.

Freeman Knowles, who had been one of the Populist

Congressmen elected in 1896, ran for Congress in 1902 and for
governor in 1904 and 1906 on the Socialist ticket.

As late

as 1924, opposition politicians of the Populist era were still
involved in the state's public affairs.

That year an aged

Henry Loucks ran as an Independent for the U.S. Senate.

Two

of his opponents were U.S.G. Cherry, a former Silver Republican, and Thomas Ayres, once Lee's personal secretary.60
Many of the c )ndi tions that had spawned the Popu Li s t
party had been remedied.

A large share--though by ~o means

all--of the state's farm population had taken the angry path
of the !njependent movement in 1890 because of financial troubles and the belief that the old parties were unwilling to
listen to agricultural demands.

Low prices, drought, and a

heavy burden of debt had made success precarious to men who
were often overextended and unable to cope with the exigencies
of the environment.

'Vhen the old parties seemed more inter-

ested in irrelevant issues and to be under the domination of
corporations, many farmers throughout the Plains states took
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matters into their own hands, converting the organization of
the Farmers' Alliance into a political party.
By 1900 farm conditions were improving.

Crops had fared

well in the state during 1890 and 1891, although prices were
mixed.

From 1893 to 1894 yields fell, and farmers, expecting

prices to rise as a result, were dismayed when prices dropped
even further .

Growing conditions were a bit better in 1895,

but the market was worse.

In 1896 South Dakota farmers har-

vested large crops and the price of wheat edged upward, though
corn prices sagged further.

The worst was over, however.

From 1897 on, prices tended to climb and drought no longer
ruined hopes of a good harvest.
. th e ma k.ing. 61
prosper1. t y was 1n

A new period of agricultural

Nor were farmers so ill-prepared for the circullistances
of farming in Dakota by 1900.

A major proble:n in the late

1880s and early 1890s had been the emphasis on a single cash
crop, the failure of 'vh i ch left unfortunate farmers in desparate straits.

Thro·1gh the course of the nineties there was

considerable effort on South Jakota farms to build a he~ge
against just such a disaster through various means.

One sol-

ution that flourished briefly was the use of artesian irrigation as a way to avert the destruction of drought.62

Others

took the more practical route of learning to farm in the environment in which they lived.

New methods of dryland farm-

ing were developed in South Dakota to suit the conditions
found there.

In Brown County Hardy Webster C&mpbell devised
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new techniques of working the soil to preserve its moisture.
The state established sub-experiment stations to test irrigation procedures and to try out new crops.

Agricultural

scientists travelled abroad to find new strains of plants
that were better suited to the dry climate found on the
Plains.63

Most importantly, farmers began to diversify

their operations so as not to rely too heavily on a single
crop.

Sometimes this entailed switching to livestock in

areas where rainfall was '.::oo .tndependable.

In other places

diversification might mean growing a variety of crops rather
than just one.
boomed.64

This was the era when the dairy industry

It required a major drought to convince farmers

that their meth0ds must change to accomojate the land.65
The major political parties--particularly

the Republi-

cans--threatened by the Populist upstart in 1890, began to
realize that they could not always take the farm vote for
granted.

~he res~lt was a series of platforms in the nine-

ties that included man:' of the Populists' major demands and
e and i da t e s who were idsntified with the farm e Lezerrt .

'I!':is

was a means of def~sin~ agrarian disconte~t until conditions
improved,

other issues distracted the voters, and minor re-

forms could satisfy farmers.

The fact that the Republicans

managed to hold on to so much of the state government attests
t~ the efficacy of this tactic.

In a jecade of major unrest,

the Populists never won an important office without the aid
of the Democrats.

The few victories the Populists did have
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were often won by slim margins; nor were they lasting victories.
As the nation recovered from the Panic of 189J, as
the state's agricultural economy climbed out of the depths
of drought and depression,

as fusionists proved themselves

no more successful at significant reform than the Republicans
had been, and as new issues far removed from local concerns
demanded the attention of South Dakota's electorate, the Republican party returned to unassailable power in the state.
That was the party to which the bulk of South Dakota's voters
were tied through old loyalties.

The disruption of the 1890s

may have weakened the bonds between party and voter, but it
did not sever them.

As the circumstances that had given rise

to the Independent movement in 1890 disappeared, voters drifted back to their old parties.
The Populists passed from the scene with many of their
goals un~et.

Serious financial reform and public ownership

of transportation were beyond their power on the national
level.

On the state level ~~ch of the cre~it for what re-

gulatory leg~slation wns passed during the 1890s helon~s to
the reformers, either directly or indirectly.

The laws,

however, were all too often ineffective or were struck down
by hostile courts.

Lasting rate regulation,

would have to wait for another era.

for example,

The Pop~lists did pro-

vide the impetus for the initiative and referendum in South
Dakota.

Businesslike Andrew Lee brought a measure of honesty
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and integrity to state government at a time when those qualities were sorely needed.

However, many of the Populist

goals were left to a new generation of leaders, working within the structure of the Republican party to achieve.
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chair~an in 1900.
4. £iuron H Jroni te, July 14, 1 g96; SprinR;fi eld T i:i:es,
July 24, 189b': Salem Pioneer Register, September 4, 1S96,
Herbert 3. Schell, "An f r ew 2. Lee," in South Dak c t a ' s
Governors, Charles J. DalthorR ed. (3ioux Falls: ~idwestBeach Co., 195J), p. ); R. F. ?ettigrew to Arthur Linn,
February 15, 1897. R. F. Pettigrew Papers, Pettigrew
"use um, .Sioux Falls, South --:akota. The microfilmed version
of these papers available at the Center for .lestern Studies,
Augustana College, Sioux Falls, were used in this st~dy.
1
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University of Nebraska
Press, 1981), pp. 5-67.
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increasing importance of the silver issue in the 1890s see
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University of Minnesota Press, 19)1; Lincoln:
University of
Nebraska Press, 1961), pp. 301-20, 340-45, 349.
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July 4, 11, 1895,
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'!illi<:i-m Jennings Bryc:i-n, The F.irst Bat~le: ~ .3to:~ cf the
Canpa1~n of 1826 (Chicago:
.. B. Conkey Co., lBJ ) ,
pp. 53 -JS.
The anti-Semitism and belief in conspiracy seen in the
Populist view of the financial prob:ems of the late nineteenth century have been interprete) as portions of the
darker side of Populism, most notably by Richard Hofstajter,
The Age of Refor~:
From Bryan to F. J. R. (New York:
Alfred A. Kno pf , 195~pp.
70-31, especially pp. 77-31.
::e'?d,
"Popu l.Ls t ':'luught,"
pp. J5-J7, detects a r is i ng s e r.se
of anti-3enitisrn in the colu~ns of the Da~Jta R~ralist and
associates this with the addition of ·.1. · '.::;. J<:idd to the editorial staff. The fact that the remainder of the Populist
press in the state showed no signs of revulsion at this
nativism, Jeed argues, implies that other Populists shared
the same attitudes.
South Dakota Populism contained a degree 0f antisemitism. Almost invariably, however, anti-Semitic references in the Populist press and those found in Richard F.
Pettigrew's papers were directed neither at the Jewish
im.~igrant in America nor at the Jewish people as a whole.
Rather, the object of the attack was the wealthy Jewish
banker, particularly Rothschild, who was seen as an ally of
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as the ".Shylock" to whom farmers were deeply in debt, to
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sought to prevent the silver standard. For examples of this
type of anti-Semitism, see the Dakota Ruralist, August 10,
October 19, 1893, May 24, 28, 1895; Salem Pionee£ Register,
August 14, September 11, 1896, R. F. Pettigrew to Otto
Anderson, probably May 28, 189'7; Pettigrew to J. O. Andrews,
December 9, 1897, Pettigrew Papers. On the other hand, the
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"Jewish money-lenders" and the "European Jew power." The
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Lombard 3treet, which has been taken as a sign that Anglophobia played a part in the Populist anti-Semitism.
For a
discussion o f the term "Shylock, " see ..'alter T. K. Nugent,
The Tolerant Populists:
::ansas Populis:n and Nativism
(Chicago: Universi~y of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 114. Cn
Anglophobia, see Nugen t , pp. 115-116, and John Hirsham,
"Anti-Semitis:n in the Gilded Age: A Reinterpretation,"
P.riss iss ippi Valley Historical Review 4J <r•:arch, 1. 9 57): 574.
There see~s to have be8~ fewer refere~ces to E~gland in
South Dakota than there were in Kansas. A larger proportion
of Kansas lanj xay have been held by for~igners.
It should also be noted that the Populists were not
the only ones who exhibited some signs of anti-3e~itis~.
!n1eed, a st~~Y of one GOP newspaper in South l~~ota de:~anstrates that Republicans were also guilty of anti-Se~itism
and of ~elievir.g in conspiracies in the work of trusts and
in the demon8tization of silver. Sea Louis Y. Va~ Jyke,
"Hof staJ ter and Tri~ H 1roni t2:
Pr-a i r ie Pund i try on the Ji::.
River, 1894-1'?99," in Twelfth Jakota Historv Confere~ce,
H .. l , 3la1\:ely, ed. U·:ajison, 3.D.: --·Jakota"Jtate
Co Ll.e ge ,
1981), pp. 617-12. Other segments of A~orican society-notably urban workers and sc~e eastern intellectuals-expressed ethnocentris~ toward Jews in the late nineteenth
century. John Higham places this into the context of
ethnic tensions and "status rivalries" that characterized
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a number of groups that faced discrimination as America
0

1
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adjusted to various changes. See John Higham, Send These
to Mes Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America (New
Yor~ Atheneum, 1975), pp. 102-137:°
Some historians have gone to great lengths to minimize
any anti-Semitism among the Populists.
For examples, see
two of Norman Pollack's articles, "The Myth of Populist
Anti-Semitism," A:nerican Historical Review 68 (October,
1962)1 76-80, and "Handlin on Anti-Semitism: A Critique of
'American Views of the Jew,'" Journal of American History
51 (December, 1964): J91-40J. This second article is a
reaction to Oscar Handlin's "American Views of the Jew at
the Opening of the Twentieth. Century," Publications of the
American Jewish Historical Society 40 (June, 1951)1
J2J-4~ Handlin argues that the Populists provided the
basis for a later strain of anti-Semitism.
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CHAPTER VI
PROBLEMS OF POPULISTS IN POWER1
THE ANDREW E. LEE ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH DAKOTA, 1897-1901
When the Populist party captured the governorship of
South Dakota in 1896 it had great hopes for reform.

After

three unsuccessful bids for major state office, the Populists had managed to form a coalition that could muster
enough votes to defeat the dominant Republican party.

The

newly elected governor, Andrew Lee, was a sound businessman
who promised, among

other things, honesty and economy in

government, more equitable taxation, and railroad regulation.
With fusion forces in control of the legislature,
seemed within reach.
dashed.

these goals

The high hopes, however, were soon

Although they achieved some refor~s, the fusionists

made few lasting changes.

This chapter focuses on three ma-

jor barriers that prevented the success fusionists sought.
First, Lee and his allies faced the problem of incomplete success.

They never gained full possession of the ex-

cutive, legislative,

and judicial branches.

reformers won the governorship,

Although the

most other elected state of-

ficers were Republicans,

some of whom used their positions

to obstruct Lee's plans.

Fusion forces held a majority in

the 1897 Legislature,

but could not act in unison to accom-

plish some of the measures Lee sought.

In 1899 the governor

had to contend with a Republican legislature.

The fusionists
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were never able to gain control of the elected judiciary,
so their reforms often faced hostile courts.
Second, the very nature of the fusionists militated
against united action.
ate parties,

They were composed of three separ-

each of which had to be satisfied from an in-

sufficient pool of appointments and offices.

They often

did not work well together, as was evident in 1897 when a
U.S. senator was elected by a combination of Republican and
Populist votes.

Consequently,

leaders had to devote much

time to keeping the alliance intact.

Moreover,

the Popu-

lists themselves were seriously split over the question of
fusion with the Democrats and Silver Republicans.
ulists were also divided by personal rivalries,

The Pop-

notably that

between Lee and his attorney general, Melvin Grigsby.
Third, Lee experienced embarrassing troubles with his
own appointees.

Because of the loose nature of the reform

coalition and Lee's own inexperience in state politics, he
lacked adequate knowledge about some of his officers.
sequently,

Sub-

so~e of them proved to be as corrupt as the Re-

publican officials Lee had replaced.

Others were disloyal

to the governor.
The 1896 election in South Dakota stands as one of the
most hotly contested political battles in the state's history.

In July of that year Senator R.F. Pettigrew led a

faction of Republicans out of their party over the issue of
free silver.

This force joined the Populist convention a
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few days later and the combined groups adopted a platform
and ticket acceptable to each.

Andrew Lee headed the ticket.

The South Dakota Democrats endorsed the action of the Populist-Silver Republican convention and effected fusion among
the three parties, with the free coinage of sil~rer at a ratio
of sixteen to one being the major issue binding the old pol1•t• ica 1

1
.
enemies.

Andrew E. Lee, a Norwegian-born merchant in Vermillion,
first came to political prominance for his stand opposing a
local water company, even though he owned stock in the firm.
His support for the taxpayers against his own economic interest earned him a position on the city council in Vermillion and later two terms as its mayor.

His reputation for

this incident spread beyond the boundaries of Cl~y County.
In 1896 Lee's background as a reformer,
regulation of corporations,

his support for the

and his endorsement for free

silver garnered for him the Populist nomination for governor~
The results of the 1896 election were hardly an overwhelming endorsement for the People's party, as the fusionists were called.

Lee carried the state by only 319 votes

out of over 82,000 cast.

The only other state officers the

reform coalition captured were the attorney general and the
railroad commissioners.

The U.S. representatives went to

the People's party and South Dakota gave its electoral votes
to :villiam Jennings Bryan.3

As difficult as this situation

may have been for an executive who wished to make reforms,
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affairs only worsened in 1898.

After the election of that

year, only Lee remained to represent the fusion forces
against the Republicans.

Lee's own margin of victory was

so slim that his opponent threatened a contest.

4

The consequence of such victories was that th~ reformers faced the problem of incomplete success.

So many Re-

putlicans continued to hold office that Lee always felt the
threat of obstruction by his political enemies.

The gover-

nor had no mandate from the people with which to cow the Republicans who stood in his way: nor did he have enough of
his own officers to give him all the support he needed.
A number of the positions in the executive branch were
controlled by elected Republican officials who used their
powers to hinder Governor Lee.

H.E. Mayhew, in his cap-

acity as auditor, managed to delay investigations into state
affairs by a special tripartisan investigating co~~~ttee
created by the legislature.

~ayhew refused to recognize

the legality of the commission,

which wanted to examine his

condiict in office and that of other state officials as part
of the aftermath of a major defalcation with state funds two
years earlier.

Lee urged the members of the committee tQ

begin operations even though Mayhew threatened to turn down
their vouchers.

The governor hoped that the commission would

find enough evidence of wrongdoing in its first month to insure that Mayhew would not risk the political consequences
of blatantly covering up for corruption in public office.
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Mayhew's tactics were successful.

The commission did not

make any investigations, although Lee used the public examiner, Maris Taylor, in much the same fashion he had hoped to
employ the commission.5
The state Board of Equalization at the time was composed of elected state officers, most of whom were Republicans during Lee's tenure.

Although equal taxation of indi-

vidual and corporate property had been one of Lee's major
goals, the members of the board chose to ignore most of his
recommendations.

Lee secured some readjustment of the as-

sessments of railroad property, but his correspondence reflects disillusionment with the board.

He termed the results

of the 1898 meeting of the board to examine rates as "gra!1d
stand play" by his political opponents, a situation that
only grew worse by 1900.6
Some appointive positions in state gover~~ent remained
in Republican hands until the current appointee's term of
office expired.
for aovernor Lee.

These also served as a point of aggravation
Lee evidently sought to replace the sup-

erintendent of the insane asylum in Yankton whom he considered "rank and abusive to our party" and whom he believed
was simply using his office to serve his own political ends.
C.~. Ainsworth, the superintendent of the reform school, had
benefited financially from his capacity, warned the children
in the institution that they would be mistreated under new
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management and encouraged them to run away.

Lee was forced

to demand the early resignation of the state oil inspector,
a GOP holdover, after a Standard Oil agent complained that
the man was neglecting his duties.7
Another headache for Lee arose when the former Board of
Regents refused to step down.

The board has been reconsti-

tuted by means of an amendment on the ballot in November 1896,
but the old regents sued to keep their positions on the basis
of a technicality concerning how the ballots were printed.
Lee believed the motives behind the contest were to maintain
control of the state school treasury, to keep Republican
friends on the faculty of the schools, and to embarrass the
..
t ra t"ion. 8
new a d m1n1s

A major portion of the 1897 legislative session was
spent wrangling over the election of a U.S. senator.

James

H. Y.yle, the incumbent, had been elected by a combination of
Independent and Democratic votes in 1891, but was alienated
from various segments of the fusionist forces.

Both Lee and

R.F. Pettigrew, the leader of the Silver Republicans and
South Dakota's other senator, opposed Kyle's re-election. The
fusion forces, however, were unable to unite on a single candidate and Kyle was elected through a combination of votes,
mostly coming from Republicans.9
Karel Bicha

has viewed Populists as conservatives whose

ideology differed little from that of their opponents.
terms the 1897 Legislature in South Dakota a "reformer's

He
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fiasco" that wasted much of its time on investigation while
achieving few reforms.

Bicha fails, however, to note the

long struggle over Kyle's election and deep rifts in the
anti-Republican forces, factors that militated against reforms that did not have widespread support.

The Populists

could not muster enough votes to control the legislature
themselves and the reform coalition did not have enough unity to elect a U.S. senator, much less accomplish any major
changes.

Perhaps the lack of party discipline explains the

paucity of results more than any deficiencies in ideology.10
In the 1897 session Lee and his allies were particularly
anxious to revise portions of the state's administrative
structure to insure fusionist control of most of the state's
patronage.

Part of their plan called for the creation of

the office of insurance commissioner whose responsibility
entailed examining the insurance companies operating in the
state and designating the newspapers in which the companies
must publish legal statements.

The insurance patronage,

which was considered a lucrative polit~cal pl~m hy partisa~
newspaper edito~s who could prosper if their party controllei
it, was unjer the management of the state auditor, a Republican, until the 1897 Legislature established a separate
insurance commissioner in what was seen by friend and foe
alike as a blatant move ~o secure patronage for the fusionists.11

Another in~ortant part of the action to secure the

state's patronage was the revision of the Board of Charities
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and Corrections.

Lee confided to a Populist that if the

present board could not be altered "there will be but little
patronage for our boys who have worked so hard in our party.1112
The failure of this reform--through the defection of several
Populists and Silver Republicans--left the control of institutions like the insane asylum, penitentiary,

and reform school

temporarily in Republican hands.
Governor Lee was convinced that there was a plot among
the Republican legislators in 1897 to keep the state's revenues down and its expenditures up to embarrass his administration financially.

Lee had promised a businesslike and

economical approach to state affairs and one means of attaining this was a high liquor license law to replace the constitutional prohibition that had been repealed in November

1897.

Lee feared that the Republicans opposed this measure

because they did not want the new administration
any better than their own party had.

to function

Althou~h the high li-

cense bill succeeded and helped raise badly needed revenue,
Lee exhibit2d

the sa~e fears with the 1899 Legislat~re,

which was under Rep 1blican dominance.
1

justified,

The apprehension was

for the legislat~re appropriated about $400,000

more than it provided revenue for.13
Lee accepted the fusionist loss of the legislature in
the 1898 election with resignation.
feat to a Black Hills Populist,

As he bemoaned the de-

"there is no great fun in

being elevated to the Governor's chair with a hostile legis-
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lature and state house to train with, but that seems my fate.1114
Lee's fears for 1899 were well placed, for the legislature attempted to hinder his control of the state's administration in several ways.

During his first term Lee had man-

aged to gain some measure of control over the Board of Charities and Corrections through the appointment of new members
to it.

One bill in the legislature that failed to become

law would have reduced the board to three members, a move
that would have left the Republicans in control of it and
the institutions it governed.

Only Lee's veto prevented the

abolition of the office of Insurance Commissioner,

which

would have returned the insurance patronage to the Republican auditor.15
Lee experienced some problems with his own appointees
during his first term and was hopeful that this legislature
would enact legislation allowi!'lg him to remove appointed officers for cause.

Although such a bill passed the House,

died in the Senate.

Lee m0urned the defeat,

it

"I am therefore

at the ~ercy of my appointees during my term of office.··16
The Senate also rejected two of his appointees and threatened
to turn down others.17
Even if the People's party had been able to gain secure
control over both the executive and legislative branches, the
state's judiciary was generally controlled by the Republican
party.

This Republican dominance constituted another obstacle

to the fulfillment of Lee's goals.
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A major portion of Lee's efforts in his first term was
aimed at the investigation and prosecution of corruption
among state officials.

In 1897 the governor helped finance

a case against H.E. Mayhew, the state auditor, for withholding fees paid to him.

Lee felt so strongly about the matter

that he was willing to pay the attorney's fees out of his
own pocket if necessary.

The case, however, came before a

hostile Republican judge and was dismissed.

Lee complained

bitterly that "the court made the rankest ruling I ever
heard •...

He [the judge] showed his malice from begin[n]-

ing to end and is so bitter agains[t] populists that he
could not conceal it.0018
One of the outstanding issues in the 1896 campaign was
the regulation of railroads, but legal action against the
corporations was useless without the cooperation of the
judicial system.

The legislature gave the state railroad

commissioners power to regulate freight rates in 1897, but
the law did not stand up in court.

The major railroads in

South Jakota managed to get injunctions in U.S. district
court to prevent the enforcement of ths new rates, and, after
years of legal battles,
unconstitutional.

the U.S. Supreme Court held the law

In December 1897 the state supreme court

ruled unconstitutional a railroad litigation fund the proponents of the legislation had hope to use to defend the
rates.19
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When Lee was trying to oust the old Board of Regents to
replace it with one of his choosing, he did so with trepidation, knowing that he faced a court that opposed him politically.

He conveyed this pessimism to a correspondent,

"The

Supreme Court being radically republican we can expect no
mercy from them if there is any way for them to find an ex.
t
cuse t o go agains
us. ,.20

The reformers recognized the need to control the courts
to insure success in their programs.

They understood that

Republican judges could not be depended on to stand against
the in te r-e s t s of railroads and other corporations,

nor would

they be sympathetic to prosecutions of Republican officeholders.

Some believed that~.~.

Taylor, the state treasur-

er who had embezzled over $350,000 and left the treasury virtually empty, would have received nore than a light sentence
of two years had not his party controlled the bench.21
difficulty was that the Populists had problems
their voters for judicial elections.

Tr.e

mobilizing

Lee saw part of the

pr ob.Lem as the timing of the elections. Held in the ye ar s between gubernatorial elections,

farmers felt their time was

better spent on the farm than at the polling place.

An

embittered Lee wrote of the problem after the Mayhew decision,

" ... the populists will stay at home and husk ~o~n

and let such men [as the hostile judge in the case] be reelected to domineer on them"22

Lee tried to arouse support

for the 1899 campaign by writing letters asking help at
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election time, but after the defeat mused that the 150 he
did send out should have been fifteen or twenty thousand
instead.2J
The fusionists' tenuous control of the state government
was further complicated by the fact that much of the state's
patronage remained outside of Lee's control.

The Republicans

were often able to reap the advantages of office-holding
while the Lee administration was saddled with the responsibility of seeing that the government was run in the interests
of the people. Lee was left without enough positions at his
command to satisfy the normal demands

on any elected offi-

cial, such as the claims of ethnic groups for recognition
in public office.
Lee's complaints about not having enough control over
the state's appointive positions were common.

In 1897 he in-

formed an office-seeker that he could promise nothing as all
of the institutions were controlled by the Republicans but
the Soljier's Home at Hot Springs, even though his administration was charged with the proper manage~ent of them. Ee
viewed the situation as untenable and dangerous to the future
welfare of the reformers' party.

The abuses, however, con-

tinued and tried Lee's patience.

In 1899, after learning of

graft at the state penitentiary,
political allies,

he snapped at one of his

"It is the same old story.

belongs to the Republican machine.

Everything

They can steal the State

blind and the people will laud them all the more for it.1124
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He deeply regretted his inability to place L.T. Norman, whom
he called "the man to whom I owe my election" for an
article in a Norwegian paper in Chicago.

He tried to get

him jobs at the penitentiary and the asylum but failed because those institutions were dominated by local interests.
The Board of Regents seemed more interested in giving spots
to the Republicans than to Lee's recommendations.

He finally

asked his public examiner to give the man a position as a
deputy.25
Many of South Dakota's ethnic groups placed demands on
Lee for proper recognition for their nationality for support
rendered during his campaigns.

His own countrymen,

the Nor-

wegians, who formed a large segment of the state's voting
population, were particularly insistent on recognition and
,,.11

critical when they felt they had been slighted.36
~ans, another sizeable bloc in voting strength,
they were due more than they received.
ruffled feathers,

The Ger-

also felt

Lee sought to sooth

compliment the Germans for their contri-

butions, anJ explain that he had given that nationality one
position but could not do more for them from his insufficient
pool of appointments.27

The Irish and Czechs also laij claim

to jobs under the governor's control. 28
Moreover, the reform forces found they were unable to
control the federal patronage in the state.

Pettigrew cut

himself off from the Republican party when he joined the bolt
of Silver Republicans at the national GOP convention ir. 1896.
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Kyle's re-election to the Senate in 1897 with Republican
votes made certain the fact that whatever patronage a U.S.
senator could affect would go through an opponent of Lee and

29
Pettigrew.
The second major obstacle to the success of the People's
party was the fact that they were a loosely joined coalition
of forces, bound by the silver issue and the desire to replace the Republican party as the controlling force in the
state's politics.

As such, they were composed of a variety

of groups whose allegiance to the old parties had often been
rooted in strong philosophic or cultural ties and who could
easily

be persuaded to return to old

behavior.

patterns of voting

The leaders of these diverse groups were old pol-

itical opponents who were sometimes hesitant to abandon
their earlier differences.

Nor were the leaders always ready

to give up their own personal political ambitions for the
sake of party unity.
The tri-partisan nature of the reform forces complicated
an already difficult situation with regarj to patrona~e because each group needed to share in the spoils of office for
theunion to survive.
him.

Lee was aware of the trying task before

Senator Pettigrew, an experienced hand at dealing out

patronage, warned him early in his administration of the problems involved.
although he felt

He counseled Lee not to neglect the Populists
QOSt

of the patronage should go to the Demo-

crats and Silver Republicans because the PoPJ,lists had gotten
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most of the elected officials.JO
Lee made strong efforts to please the different parties,
but inevitably drew criticism that indicated dissent within
the coalition.

His major error seems to have been giving

too much to the Democrats.

That party's share of offices

included appointments to the wardenship of the penitentiary
and a portion of the administration of the insane asyl~~.
Lee objected to the degree of control his Democratic appointees sought to establish over these institutions,

even to the

point of rejecting Lee's suggestions for minor positions
under them.31

Some Populists were angry over this apparent

neglect by Lee for his own party.
seeker c omp La i ned , ". .

A disappointed office-

I deplore the fact that the major-

ity of the honors justly earned by our party, should be relinquished to the Democrats ... 32
One group in particular that felt alienated because of
the distribution of patronage was the old Alliance lea-Jership. that had been the core of the independent movement in
the first place.

Lee was especially concerned that Henry

Loucks, who had heaJed the Independent movement in 1890, was
disappointed because men who had been fighting for the party
for years were not receiving their just reward.JJ
Leaders of the fusionists found it nearly impossible to
weld the separate parts of their party into an effective political unjt.

They lacked the leadership, discipline, and

cohesiveness of a regular party.

Often caring more for their
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own political futures than for the good of the coalition,
some politicians worked at cross purposes from ethers.
This weakness was best illustrated in the 1897 Legislature when splits in the reform forces became prevalent in
key issues.

Although the fusionists were in the majority,

they could not combine to elect a U.S. senator without the
aid of Republican votes.

The balloting for senator dragged

on for nearly a month with the Republicans united behind one
candidate and the fusionists split among fotrmain ones. When
the Republicans suddenly switched to James H. Kyle, he retained enough supporters among the Populists and Democrats
to get elected.

He received the votes of fifty-two Republi-

cans, ten Populists, and three !:>emocrats.

Leaders of the

new party saw the lack of unity among the reform forces, the
political ambition of several of the candidate~ who refused
to withdraw from the race, and the unreliability of the Democrats as the major causes of the defeat.34
event with discouragement.

Lee viewed the

He termed Kyle's election the

"foulest and dirtiest piece of work" he ha.: ever seen, and
informed Pettigrew,

"I feel at this writing as

though our

whole administration is going to be a failure ... J5
The failure to elect the senator without Republican
support contributed to the disunity among the reform force~.
Up to that point Pettigrew had planned to join formally the
Populist party, but ~yle's victory convinced him that he
could serve best by further organizing the Silver Republicans
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and keeping them as a separate entity for the time being.36
Lee's hopes for a new Board of Charities and Corrections
were defeated when several members of the reform union opposed his plan in the senate.

This defection disgusted Lee,

who felt the loss left all of the important state patronage
with the Republicans.37

Lee's major complaint was against

C.S. Palmer, a Silver Republican from Minnehaha County, who
evidently voted against the governor's wishes as a protest
to the way some of the Populists who had voted for Kyle were
lured back into the party with favors rather than being
castigated.JS
A substantial portion of party leaders' efforts was
devoted to healing the rift between the reform forces and
making them into a viable political force that could attract
enough

votes to stay in power.

Pettigrew spent about two

months in mid-1897 trying to reconcile the differences between

Lee and Palmer.

He sought to arrange a deal where-

by Lee would lend his support to Palmer's choice for the
penitentiary warden and Palmer would en:orse Lee's car.jidate
for the commandant of the Soldier's Home.

It was a com-

plicated arrangement and Pettigrew privately believed that
Palmer's choice would be unacceptable to the Board of Charities and Corrections that would consider his choice anyway.
He also had to contend with the stubbornness of both Lee and
Palmer.

Palmer was too resentful of his treatment and Lee

was too interested in punishing the state senator for easy
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compromise.

The two opponents eventually came to terms and

Pettigrew was hopeful that the political trading had healed
old wounds

.39

Apart from these major quarrels, politicans still saw
handicaps in the effective performance of fusionists in the
legislature.

The observations of R.F. Pettigrew,

one of South

Dakota's most experienced politicans, were perhaps most insightful.

Although he complimented them on their overall qual-

ity, he still saw the need for better leadership in their ranks.
He termed them an "unorganized mob" and pointed to the jealousies that divided them, as well as their wariness of being

4o
bossed about.

N or was th'is pro bl em misse
'
db y P opu 1·is t s.

Lee complained of the legislators during the midst of the
senatorial election that they were "worse than a lot of sheep."
One Populist editor lamented the fact that the legislators
accomplished little because they were so split by factions. 44
The three parties had been able to combine their strength
in the 1896 election, but that was no guarantee they would be
able to duplicate the feat in 1898.

·.Ji th each party having

an interest in preserving its own identity to a degree, this
was no mean task.

Pettigrew spent a considerable amount of

his time in the first half of 1898 to insure cooperation
among the parties. He was of the opinion that the parties
coulj draw more votes by maintaining their distinct bodies
rather than by fusing outright, and that the Populists should
place the names of four Democrats on their ticket and let the
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other party endorse it.
given the treasurer,

He recommended that the Democrats be

audtior, superintendent of schools, and

either the secretary of state or the lieutenant governor,
while the Silver Republicans would be recognized with·two offices.

He even suggested to a leading Democrat that the cen-

tral committee chairmen of the Silver Republicans and Democrats meet prior to the state convention and choose their
candidates for the combined state ticket, hardly a method
acceptable to Populists who had opposed slates made in backroo~s. 42
The actions of the conventions, which met at the same
time in Aberdeen, closely followed Pettigrew's suggestions,
although the Republican press claimed there was dissent in
the Populist convention over the issue of distributing some
of the offices to the other elements of the anti-Republican
forces.

Each settled on the same ticket after consultations

through conference committees.

Although each party adopted

a platform that was slightly at variance with the others, the
bodies for~ulated a single fusion platform they could all
stand by.4J
Not all members of the parties opposing the Republicans
supported the combination with old political enemies and the
endorsement of new principles.

This dissatisfaction mani-

fested itself in a series of defections to the Republicans
by prominent leaders of the reform forces.

Several had re-

turned to the Republican fold in 1896 when fusion was first
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accomplished,

but the number increased in 1898 as politicians

found the union unpalatable.

Republican papers had a heyday

with such embarrassing incidents to the fusionists.

The Gary

l!ll.er-State published a lengthy interview with Bartlett Tripp,
formerly a leading Democrat, who turned to the Republicans in
1898.

Just before the election of that year, the Vermillicn

Qakota Republican listed the major opposition leaders who had
come into the Republican fold in protest over the combination
of the other parties.44
The Populist party in particular suffered from some
severe divisions during the late 1890s.

The most pronounced

of these was over the issue of fusion itself.

Many old-line

leaders had opposed fusion with the Democrats for years for
fear of destroying the.Populist party or of diluting the principles for which it stood.

This eventually led to Henry L.

Loucks's ~eturn to the Repub~ican party.
ulists were split by personal rivalries,

Moreover, the Popespecially one be-

tween Lee and his attorney general.
Loucks was willing to work with the refer~ coalition at
first, though he was not wholly in favor of it.

In December

18)7 Pettigrew saw him as theleader of the middle-of-the-road
Populists, those who felt the best policy for the third party
was to remain clear of both of the old parties, but still was
optimistic for Loucks's support for the union in 1898 and
claimed the agrarian reformer was a friend.

In early 1898

Pettigrew urged his correspondents to treat Loucks with care,
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believing the man would join the fusionist ranks fully after
the Populist convention endorsed union.

Pettigrew's position

on Loucks hardened after the latter opposed fusion at the
meeting of the Populist state central committee in March,
but he still hoped the Alliance leader would fall into line
when the nominating convention met.

During April 1898 Petti-

grew became more suspicious of him and more defensive about
the need for fusion.

By April 29, the senator was ready to

confide to one of Loucks's old foes that the man was "an infernal old scoundrel."45

Though Pettigrew was careful to

speak cautiously of Loucks to other early Populists, he hinted to members of his own party that the man might be pla.nnin.§;
a move to the Republicans or that he was already in their pay.
Whatever Loucks's course, Pettigrew believed more firmly as
the summer wore on that the old reformer would do little
damage to the party if he left it.46
Although his drift away from the fusion camp was evijent,
Loucks's renunciation of the Populist party came as a surprise to many.

In a letter a~dressed to Doane Robinson with

the request that it be read at the Republican state convention,Loucks rejoined the party he had fought for so many years
and asked the gathering to endorse initiative and referendum
to draw other middle-of-the-road Populists.47
Lesser lights in the old Populist ranks sharej Loucks's
distaste for fusion.

C.B. Kennedy and W.E. Y.idd expressed

some opposition to fusion in 1898 and Kidd's allegiance to
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the reform coalition was questioned in 1900.48

In 1900 a small

convention in Yankton in October by middle-of-the-road Populists fielded a formal Populist ticket in opposition to the
fusionist People's ticket.

The Yankton Press~

Dakotan, a

Silver Republican paper, criticized the new party as nothing
but a Republican trick to defeat the reform union.

Whether

it was because the new party was seen by voters as such a
scheme or because it entered the race too late is uncertain,
but the candidates it offered drew only a handful of votes.49
No party is free of rivalry among its leaders, but the
Populists in the 1890s were plagued with a particularly acrimonious feud between Governor Lee and Melvin Grigsby, the
attorney general.

Grigsby had been a gubernatorial aspirant

at the 1896 Populist state convention,
in the balloting.

but had placed third

Grigsby received the nomination for attcr·

ney general instead and carried the state by a slightly larger
margin than Lee's own.5°
The new administration had not even taken office before
party leaders voiced suspicions of the new attorney general.
Pettigrew predicted that he would side with the railroad corporations against any new regulations.51

In the course of

Lee's first year in office Grigsby proved himself such an
irritation that ~ee addressed a lengily letter to him in late
October 1897 setting forth his complaints against the man.
The governor accused him of attempting to prevent investigations of Republican officeholders suspected of misconduct,
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trying to sabotage Lee's railroad program by crippling the
legislation intended to regulate the corporations and by helping the railroads escape just taxation, and obstructing the
prosecution of government officials being tried for diverting
funds to their own purposes.52

Grigsby sought to further his

political fortunes by securing the command of a regiment of
cowboys during the Spanish-American War.

Raised under the

same law that authorized Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders,
Grigsby's Cowboys, as the unit was known, never saw combat,
but still proved a useful tool for developing a political
base.

Grigsby's bid at replacing Lee at the head of the Pop-

ulist ticket in 1898 failed, however, and he never again
posed a serious threat to the governor.53
A third barrier to Lee's administration was the trouble
he experienced with his own appointees.

~his problem, though

less serious than the other obstacles examined earlier, proved a constant source of irritation for the Populist governor.
Because of the loose nature of the reform forces and Lee's
own inexperience in state politics, he lac~ed sufficient information about some of his appointees.

As he surveyed his

administration in 1900, "I hav8 had many things

to co~tend

with and one of the greatest troubles of all was we were almost all strangers to
advantage ... 54

on[e] another and worked to great dis-

Part of this was because the members of the

reform coalition had recently been political foes and many
did not know each other until 1896.

Another part was prob-
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ably because Lee had never held state office before and did
not have the ties to people around the state that other politi.ci ans could rely on.
The inevitable result of these deficiencies was that
Lee made errors in his appointments.

He regretted his mis-

takes, for the failures of his appointees reflected on his own
performance.55

In some cases, ill-planned appointments proved

embarrassing when Republicans noted that Lee's own men were
guilty of the ~me offenses of which he accused his political
opponents.

In other instances, blunders severely crippled

aspects of his control over state affairs.
One of the most troublesome offices at Lee's disposal
was that of the insurance commissioner.
to the position was J.H. Kipp.

His first appointment

H.E. Mayhew, the auditor who

had previously conducted the insurance business.

charged Kipp

and a deputy with the same corrupt practice of overcharging
for examinations for which Lee was prosecuting iV'.ayhew.

Lee

eventually removed Kipp, but still had problems with a tern. th e pos1t1on.
. .
56
porary replacement 1n
In April 1898 Lee asked for the resignation of another
appointee,

R.E. ~owdell, the oil inspector.

Dowdell had been

guilty of failing to turn in all of the fees he received for
his work, a complaint that Lee had made against many of the
Republican state officials.

Dowdell was not prosecuted, but

had to reimburse the state for the funds he retained.

Repub-

lican newspapers seized on such opportunities to embarrass Lee.
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Shortly before the 1898 election the Vermillion Dakota ReID:!,blican brought up the issue of Dowdell's seemingly favored
treatment and speculated that the reason might be Dowdell's
support for Lee at the Populist convention at Aberdeen.57
The most serious of Lee's mistakes with appointments
involved his selection of the Board of Regents.

A constitu-

tional amendment passed in 1896 cleared the way for Lee to
appoint a new board to replace the one formerly in charge of
the state's educational institutions.
ees to the new board, how~ver,

A number of the appoint-

showed themselves to be incom-

petent or disloyal to the governor.

Lee found his choice for

the Republican member of the board, C.N. Herreid, was determined to use his office for his own political ends.

He viewed

two other members as occasional allies of Herreid and possibly
jishonest.
reliable,

A fourth was incompetent.

Only one mem~er was

and he became so disillusioned with the difficulties

of dealing with the other members that he submitted his resignation to the governor--a resignation that Lee refused to acce~t because he could count on him "to help keep them [the
rest of the board] straight and prevent them disgracing my
administration ... 58

Lee's inability to manage his Board of

Regents cost him badly needed patronage as well, since he had
great difficulty getting the regents to accept any of his
recom~endations for positions.59
The three hindrances to Lee's administration enumerated
here were by no means the only difficulties the Populist gov-
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ernor met during his two terms in office.

Lee took office as

the state and nation were recovering from years of drought
and depression.

South Dakota was still suffering the conse-

quences of the theft of state funds two years earlier.

In

keeping with the dominant economic philosophy of his day, Lee
sought retrenchment in state expenditures to provide tax relief during the lean years.

Lee also served during the

Spanish-American War, a time when America had to make decisions about·the role the nation should play in the world
and how it should view the territories it received from Spain.
Lee, along with many other Populists,

supported the war

against Spain to liberate Cuba for humanitarian reasons, but
opposed the annexation of any of the lands taken from the
defeated power.

:'Jhen a South Dakota regiment was sent to

the Philippines to quell the native rebellion,

Lee strer.u-

ously protested the use of the state's troops for reasons
other than those for which the men had enlisted.
ployment of South Dakota soldiers,

This em-

the question of bringing

them home, and the value of foreign territories to the
United States were all issues that sidetracked the normal
affairs of the state for a time.60
Andrew Lee's administration cannot be called one of
great reform.

Too many obstacles stood in the way of success.

The reform coalition was never able to gain control of the
entire state government so bulwarks of Republicanism stood
in its way. The diverse backgrounds and aspirations of the
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elements of the coalition made cooperation difficult and cohesion impossible.

Lee's own misfortune at selecting the

wrong men to fill the offices within his grasp compounaed the
difficulty,

especially since he had too few places to give

out in the first place.

These were some of the problems that

a Populist could face when trying to capture and control a
predominantly Republican state with an untried and sometimes
uneasy union of forces tied together by the issue of silver
and the hope of defeating the GOP.
But Lee's years in office can not be called a complete
failure either.

He did not achieve many of his major goals

such as lasting railroad reform, but he managed to bring a
degree of honesty to a government that had seen too much
graft in the preceding years.

Lee has been criticized for

wasting too ~uch of his time pursuin~ corruption and petty
policies rather than using it to bring about lasting refor~s.
but, given the barriers

to a more successful administration,

the governor may have done the best he could.61

His own

popularity outstripped that of his party, as was evident in
the 1893 election, but mere popularity could not achieve
tangible results.

Perhaps the most noted historian of the

Populists expressed the dilemma best,

"Evidently their genius

lay in protest ~ather than in performance.1162
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CHAPTER VII
SOUTH DAKOTA'S ETHNIC GROUPS DURING THE POPULIST ERA:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The use by historians of social science techniques during the past two decades has opened up a new frontier in the
study of the past.

It is now possible to study in detail

the grassroots electoral behavior of masses of individuals.
This frees historians from heavy dependence on the writings
of the leaders whose views of society and history found their
way into the written ·records while the common man stood mute.
This chapter involves a statistical study of ethnic
groups in six South Dakota counties.

Its goal is to deter-

mine how various ethnic groups--and subgroups within those
bodies--acted during the political campaigns of the Populist
era.

This is possible by the isolation of select counties

with strong ethnic communities and bivariate analysis of the
precincts within those counties.
Several factors determined the choice of the half dozen
counties included in the study.
was the ethnic mix of the county.

Foremost among these factors
An effort was made to in-

clude all of the major foreign stock groups in the state in
1900 if a county could be found with a large enough element
of that group to make analysis feasible.

Population stabil-

ity through the decade was also nec e saary .

:vi +h.in the con-

fines of that restriction an attempt was made to sample ethnic groups in various regions of the state.

For example, of
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the four sample agricultural counties in which Scandinavian
settlements were found, two were in or near the wheat belt of
the northern half of the state and two were in the corn belt
of the southeastern section.
Secondly, election statistics on the precinct level had
to be available for the Populist era or a large portion thereof.

This restriction forced the selection of Campbell County

for the Russian-German representative in the northern section
of the state because no precinct level returns have been preserved in McPherson County, the most Russian-German of those
counties in 1900.
Edmunds County.

Nor were complete returns available in
Instead, Campbell County was substituted,

although it was settled later, had a smaller population, and
had less stable precinct boundaries.
Shifting precincts caused some difficulties in all of
the counties under study.

Hardly a decade old as a state

when the Populist era drew to a close, South Dakota was yet
too young to be confined

by

immovable boundaries.

The typi-

cal problem was the separation of towns from townships as
separate voting precincts sometime during the 1890s as these
towns grew in size.

This situation was commonly met by

simply reaggregating the data for town and township to produce a stable voting district for the entire period.

This

was the method followed in Clay and McCook counties.

In Deu~l

County a town was created along the border between two townships so those two districts were aggregated into a single
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unit of analysis.

In Bon Homme County large-scale changes

were made between 1892 and 1894 when a number of new precincts were organized.

Since the exact boundaries

1890 precincts were not available,

of the

the first two elections of

the Populist period were ~mply eliminated from the study. In
Campbell County the creation of a new precinct between 1890
and 1892 took place, but the exact boundaries
of the county was omitted from analysis.
the presence of many very small precincts,
cise boundaries,

in that area

In Lawrence County
the lack of pre-

and suspicions of shifting precincts led to

the inclusion of only the mining centers of Lead and Deadwood
in the analysis.
Clay County in the southeast was chosen because of its
large population of Scandinavians.

Deuel County in the north

provided a second large Scandinavian settlement
to offering a German community.

in addition

McCook County in the corn

belt was one of the most German counties with a stable population in the decade and proved a Scandinavian group as well.
Bon Ho~.rr.e along the Missouri in the southeastern quarter of
the state contained precincts of Czechs, Russian-Germans,
Germans.

Campbell County represented

and

the Russjan-German

counties of the north central portion of the state and contained a Scandinavian

settlement in several precincts.

Law-

rence County was the center of the Black HilJs mining region
with its wide range of ethnic groups.
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The technique selected was Spearman's rank-difference
correlation,

a method that produces a coefficient of corre-

lation based on the degree of relationship between the ranks
of two variables.

If the rank of one variable increases at

the ~ame time the rank of the second variable does, the relationship between the two variables is positive.

This is

expressed by a coefficient that ranges from O.O to +1.0, the
latter figure indicating a perfect match in the changes of
rank.

If the rank of one variable decreases as that of the

other increases,
as high as -1.0.

the relationship is negative and can range
Simple to compute, the Spearman correlation

offers the additional advantage of reducing the distortions
in the data caused by changes in the ethnic composition of
the county.

The 1900 Federal census was used to determine

the ethnic base of each precinct in the study.

Although the

exact percentage of ethnic voeters within small districts
over the course of a decade may have changed through in- and
outmigration or through differing rates at which young men of
various groups enter the p~ten~ial voting population,

the rank

of a group is less likely to change. 1
The correlation coefficients that are p~esented in the
pages to follow are generally those correlations that produced a positive correlation with the group in question.

'When

negative coefficients appear strong enough to reveal something
about a group's behavior, this will be noted.

For the first

three elections of the decade coefficients were computed for
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all three major parties.

With the fusion of the Populists

and Democrats in 1896, only two parties of note appeared on
the ballot and only two correlations were computed.

The two

variables involved in each computation were the proportion of
adult males--defined

as men aged twenty-one or older--of the

ethnic group in question in each precinct of the county and
the proportion of votes for a particular party in those pre. t s. 2
cine

Clay Coun.ll
Clay County, located along the Missouri River in the
second tier of counties west from the Iowa border, was one
of the first counties in South Dakota to be settled.

Among

the earliest settlers into the area in the summer of 1859
were a number of Norwegians who took up residence in the

.

vicinity of what would today be Meckling.

J

These first Norwegians set the tone for future settlement.

Scandinavians from Norway, Sweden and Denmark filled

the county during the coming decades.

By 1900 over seventeen

percent of the county's population had been born in Scandinavia and over forty-five percent of the adult males of Clay
County were of Scandinavian stock.4
The Swedes, the most numerous of the Scandinavian peoples in the county, were concentrated in the Dalesburg settlement in the eastern townships of Glenwood and Gariield.5
Danes were scattered throughout the county, but had their

The
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greatest numbers in the northern two-thirds of Clay.

These

people were a spillover from the large Swan Lake settlement
in Turner County to the north.6

The highest proportions of

Norwegians in Clay County were located in the townships west
of the Vermillion River.7
The next largest foreign stock group in Clay County
were the Irish, who composed nearly eight percent of the
adult males of the county.

They made up over thirty percent

of the potential voters in Star township in the northwest
corner of the county, and nearly fifteen percent of the
voters of Bethel township in 1900.8
The county's native stock population had its greatest
concentration in the southern townships of Fairview and Vermillion and in the city of Vermillion.

Only in this area

did the proportion of native stock adult males exceed the
county average of J0.8 percent.

The natives of Fairview

township shared their region with a community of FrenchCanadians that had its locus in Union County to the east.9
During the latter part of the nineteenth century Scandinavians, particularly Norwegians and Swedes, showed a
strong attachment to the Republican party.

rv:any of the

Scandinavians had opposed slavery and had fought for the Union or had benefitted from the Homestead Act.

This Republi-

can loyalty remained firm until the last part

of the century

when other fa~tors intervened.

The 1820s had been marked

heavy emigration from the Scandinavian countries, which

by

20)

brought to America many who had no old ties to the GOP.

The

wave of agrarian radicalism of the 1890s appealed to many
Scandinavians in the Great Plains, a large proportion of whom
were farmers adversely affected by agricultural conditions.10
Scandinavians also had a tradition of reform-mindedness
that could affect their voting behavior.

These northern Eur-

opeans were predominantly Protestants with a pietistic orientation.

Such pietists saw the key to salvation in a personal

conversion experience and proper moral behavior.

Willing to

use government as a tool to enforce morality, pietists were
drawn to the Republican party, which advocated a positive
state that would intervene to direct the course of society.
Hence, pietists supported prohibition as a means of imposing
their own moral codes on others.
The religious viewpoint opposing pietism was ritualism.
Comprised largely of Roman Catholics and German Lutherans,
ritualists stressed the importance of form and proper belief.
The path to salvation was orthodoxy rather than conversion
and morality was the affair of the church rather than of the
state.

Thus ritualists were drawn to the Democratic party

with its philosophy of the negative state that governed
little as possible.

as

To pietistic Scandinavians the Democratic

party was an anathema that drew only a small fraction of their
votes.

The Populist part~'· however, with its insistence on

a variety of moral, social, political,

and economic changes

that appealed to the plight and the reformist bent of many

204
Scandinavians,

was often greeted warmly. 11

During the 1880s Clay County was strongly Republican,
with some precincts, particularly ones inhabited by Scandinavians, being virtually solid for the GOP.

For example, in

the 1889 gubernatorial race the Republican candidate overwhelmed his Democratic opponent 1J11 to 249.

In the Swedish

townships of Garfield and Glenwood the Democrat garnered a
12
. N orway t owns h 1p o nl y six.
'
t o t a 1 o f th ree voes,
t
an d in
0

The advent of agrarian radicalism into the political
arena, however, substantially altered voting patterns among
the county's Scandinavians.

The Republican majority of 1889

was reduced to a plurality in 1890 as former centers of Republican strength cast large numbers of votes for the new
Independent party.

This situation continued in 1892, although

in 1894 the Republicans were able to gain a near majority. Th~t
year, however,

four county offices and the legislative seats

went to the Qe~ocrats and Populists, who had fused on the
county level.

Republicans regained firm control of the

county and legislative offices in the final elections of the
decade, although Andrew Lee, a Vermillion businessman,

carried

the county for the fusionists in the gubernatorial contests of
1896 and 1898.lJ
The course of the Populist party among Clay's Scandinavians may be seen in Figure 1, which graphs the Spearman correlations for the county from 1890 to 1900.14

During the first

three elections of the 1890s, the Scandinavians showed a strong
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FIGURE 1. Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential Scandinavian voters according to the 1900
Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Populist and fusion candidate5 for governor in Clay County,
South Dakota, 1890-1900.1
affinity for the Populist party, with coeff5cients ranging
from +0.6485 to +0.68JO.

At the same time, correlations with

both the Democrats and Republicans were negative.
The election of 1896, however, abruptly ended this relationship with the Populists, with the coefficient droppine; to
-0.0035.

Two reasons may be noted for this sudden change.
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Scandinavians were strongly anti-Democratic and, though evidently willing to cooperate on a county level, many were not
agreeable to statewide fusion with the Democrats.

Further-

more, 1896 marked the inauguration of a new era in South Dakota politics, during which the state's political parties
would seek the support of major ethnic groups by nominating
gubernatorial candidates of immigrant origins.

That year

both the Republicans and the fusionists put forward Norwegians
at the head of the state ticket.

This choice among two of

their own ethnic origin probably contributed to the division
among Scandinavian voters that destroyed the former attachment to the Populists.15
For 1898, when only the fusionists offered a Scandinavian
candidate for govern6r, the correlation between the percentage
to fusionist votes rises to +0,3257,

While this figure in-

dicates some interest for the fusionists among the Scandinavians, the relationship was far weaker than it had been in
1894.

The relative strength of a correlation is indicated

by the square of the coefficient.

Hence the 1894 correlation

of +0.68JO reveals a relationship between the Scandinavians
and Populists over four times greater than the 1898 coefficient.

It seems that Lee's presence on the ticket was an im-

portant drawing point for Scandinavians.
parties again

For 1900, when both

ran Norwegian gubernatorial candidates, the

correlation drops to nearly zero.
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One of the characteristics of the Spearman correlation
is that the coefficient is reduced by the presence of another
group in the county who show similar voting behavior.

In Clay

County, Fairview township--with less than thirteen percent of
its adult male population Scandinavian--was consistently one
of the most Populist precincts.

The township's French-Canad-

ian and native-stock farmers evidently backed the agrarian
party strongly.17

In contrast, Star township, where poten-

tial Irish voters outnumbered Scandinavian ones, was the banner Democratic precinct in 1890 and 1894 and was the second
highest precinct for that party in 1896.
Deuel County
Deuel County, located along the eastern edge of the
state's wheat belt, borders on Minnesota in east cental South
Dakota.

A large influx of Norwegian immigrants in the 1870s

and 1880s, many of them from Iowa and Minnesota, gave rise to
a dense concentration of that element in the southeastern
townships of the county.

In the 1900 census Deuel County

registered the highest percentage of Norwegian-born residents
in the state.

That year Scandinavians comprised over ninety

percent of the voting population of Blom and Scandinavia townships and over eighty percent of Norden township.

The small

town of Toronto was virtually pure Nordic with only two adult
males who were not of Scandinavian stock.

The few Danes in

the county were spread along the eastern border and most
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likely were attracted to the area because of the Danish set.
18
tlements at Canby and Tyler, Minnesota.
In less populated areas of northern and western Deuel
County, Germans predominated in 1900, constituting over
sixty percent of the adult males in Rome, Altamont,
Hidewood townships.
Dutch community.

and

Havana township contained a small

Goodwin and Portland townships contained

numbers of Irish settlers.19
Prior to the advent of the Populist party the county
appears to have been solidly Republican.

In the 1889 gub-

ernatorial election Republican Arthur C. Mellette soundly
defeated his opponent with ninety percent of the votes
cast.

In 1890 Henry Loucks, a resident of Deuel County,

cut Mellette's 1889 strength by more than half and won the
county by a plurality.

During the remainder of the 1890s

the Populists or fusionists managed to take the county
twice more--in 1892 and in 1898.20
Figure 2 presents coefficients of correlation between
the proportion of Scandinavian adult males and the proportion
of Republican votes case in the elections from 1892 through
1900.21

The percentage of Republican votes was selectec be-

cause that is the only variable that provided a positive correlation with potential Scandinavian voters.
obtained are generally low, though consistent,
+0.175J in 1892 to +0.2002 in 1898.
to +0.489J.

The coefficients
ranging from

The 1900 result jump~d

In 1892, a year that the Populists won the count~
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FIGURE 2. Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential Scandinavian voters according to the 1900
Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Republican candidates for governor in Deuel County, South Dakota,
18)2-1900.
the correlation with the Populist vote exceeded the Republican vote correlation,+0.2357

to +0.1753,

In 1894 the cor-

relation of the Populist vote with potential Scandinavian
voters was nearly zero, and, as in Clay Ccunty, dropped considerably when the Populists fused with the Democrats in 1896.
Although the degree of negative correlation diminished slightly
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in 1898 when only the Fusionist offered a Scandinavian candidate for governor,

the reform party continued to be less at-

tractive to Deuel County Scandinavians than was the Republican party.
This shunning of the Populist and fUsionist parties by
the Deuel Scandinavians may be due to differences
affiliation.

in church

In Clay County, where there was strong support

for the Populists among Scandinavians,

diverse churches

among that North Eurorean group abounded.

Although some of

the earliest churches in southern Clay County had been members of the conservative Lutheran Norwegian Synod, the area
was often served by lay preachers of a more evangelical

cast.

Norwegians of Prairie Center township organized a congregation affiliated with the pietistic Eielson Synod.
lion contained a Swedish Methodist church.

Vermil-

The Swedes of

the Dalesburg settlement were served by Baptist,

Mission

Covenant,

The Danes

and Augustana Lutheran Synod churchs.

formed a Baptist congregation at Lodi and an Inner Mission
church at Irene in Clay County.

The Danish settlement

just

to the north of Clay County--to which some of the county's
Danes must have been oriented--contained
Baptist,

Lutheran,

and Seventh-Day Adventist congregations.

~ethodist,
Such groups

tended more toward pietism than did the Scandinavian Lutherans
and would have been more attracted to Populist reforms and
zeal.22
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In contrast, the Scandinavians of Deuel County seem to
have congregated in Norwegian Synod churches.

At least

six such bodies existed around the 1880s and 1890s, served
by a single pastor for a time.

A minority of more pietistic

Lutherans also existed in the county.

Churchgoers at Toronto

were served by a Haugean Lutheran church and a congregation
of "strongly Haugean" Norwegian Augustana Synod was located
near Astoria.

In Deuel County these groups maintained their

loyalty to the Republican party, although other studies have
suggested that these bodies were likely to show some affinity
for the Democrats at some point during the Populist era.23
The strength of support among Germans for the Democrats
and later the fusionistsis shown in Figure

J.

In the 1892

and 1894 elections, German adult males showed a moderate
affinity for the Democratic party, possibly because Germans
still associated the Republicans and Populists with cultural
issues.

The former had supported constitutional prohibition

and many leaders in the latter had been fervent advocates of
suffrage and prohibiton,
tural values.

issues that threatened German cul-

The election of 1896 produced the lowest cor-

relation of the series, possibly because some Germans found
the moralism of 1illiam Jennings Bryan, his free silver policy, or fusion with the Populists a difficult pill to swallow. 24 The last two elections of the decade, however, brought
a resurgence of support for the fusionists.
coefficient reaches +0.7650.

For 1900 the

This trend may be due to German

FIGURE 3, Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential German voters according to the 1900 Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Democratic
and fusionist candidates for governor in Deuel County, South
Dakota, 1692-1900.
reaction to the imperialism of the McKinley administration,
an issue that was present in the platforms of all three of
the elements making up the fusion party.25
The correlation coefficients themselves, however, do not
tell the full story.

Deuel's German precincts were not homo-

geneous in their political preferences.

Several precincts
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gave the Republicans solid majorities in a number of elections,
while other precincts avoided the GOP consistently.

Hence

Rome township, with sixty percent of its adult males German,
gave Republican majorities for every election except 1898 when
it offered the fusionists over seventy percent of its ballots.
With even more regularity,

Hidewood township, with nearly 62

percent German males, provided the Populists and fusionists
with substantial majorities.

Although information on the

exact denominations present in the German precincts is not
available,

the 1906 census of religious bodies reveals that

there were no Roman Catholic parishes in the county.

While

there were over 1,500 Scandinavian Lutherans in Deuel County,
there were less than 100 other Lutherans.

No other denomina-

tion had enough strength to dominate the county; Deuel's Germans must have been divided among a number of diverse Protestant religious groups.

This would account for the divisions

in political preferences among the Germans and would explain
why some Germans sought a haven in the Republican party.26
~cCook County
McCook County,

situated in the southeastern portion of

the state, was first settled in the 1870s.

By 1900 the larg-

est foreign-born group in the county were the Germans,whose
greatest concentration was in the southwestern two-thirds of
McCook.

With nearly nine percent of its population German-

born, McCook ranked third among the state's counties for that
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ethnic group in 1900.

Its populatlon, however, was more stable

than that of the two counties with higher proportions of Germans, thus making it the best choice for a German county.
few Russian-Germans were· sprinkled in the southern

A

half of

the county.27
McCook's Germans were considerably more homogeneous than
those of Deuel County in religious faith.

The large Roman

Catholic parish at Salem was a German congregation.

Catholics

in the vincinity of Canistota and Spencer were evidently mostly
German.

In Bridgewater German and Irish Catholics established

a church, and an Irish Catholic church at Montrose served the
remaining members of that faith who worshipped in the county.
German Lutheran congregations were organized in Canistota,
Bridgewater,

Spencer, and in Pearl township.

A small group

of German Lutherans worshipped at Salem but had no formal
organization until after 1900.

German Baptist churches ser-

ving the county's residents existed for a time at Bridgewater,
several miles south of Canistota, and north of Salem.
small German Reformed church st0od in Salem.

A

The Russian-Ger-

mans of the southwestern corner of the county were Mennon't
1

es. 28
A Swedish settlement dominated the north central town-

ships of Sun Prairie and Brookfield and extended into Ramsey
township along the county's eastern border.
of Scandinavian
section.

Another pocket

settlement was in the county's southeastern

Like the Dalesburg community of Clay County, the
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Sun Prairie settlement Swedes were divided among Baptist,
Lutheran, and Mission Covenant congregations.

A Norwegian

Lutheran church existed near Bridgewater.29
Two areas of Irish settlement existed in McCook.

One of

these was strung along the east fork of the Vermillion River
that cuts through the eastern range of townships in the county.
The other community was in Jefferson township in the southwestern region of McCook.JO
'fli th

ov er- thirty percent of its adult males of German

stock and another ten percent of Irish stock, McCook County
had a substantial proportion of its voters who were prone to
stand with the Democrats.

In 1890 the Democratic candidate

captured a plurality in the county.

In 1892 and 1894, al-

though the Republicans won the tickets, the voters of McCook
gave the Democrats sizeable proportions of their votes.

In

all of the fusion contests of the last half of the decade,
the reform coalition bested the Republicans by a wider ~argin
than was done in the state as a whole.
The Spearman correlation coefficients between the percentage of potential German voters and the Democratic and
fusionist voting totals in the various precincts are depicted
ir. Figure 4.

That combination of variables was the only one

that produced positive correlations throughout the Populist
era.

During the first three gubernatorial contests of the

decade, the coefficients ranged from +O.J924 to +0.5418. This
was the period of the strongest relationship between Germans
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FIGUR2 4. Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential German voters according to the 1900 Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Jemocratic
and fusionist candidates for governor in OCcCook County, South
Dakota, 1890-1900.
and the Democracy.

It was also the period during which South

Dakota "wets" struggled in vain against constitutional prohibition, suggesting that a German ethnocultural consciousness expressed itself as a political action in defense of cultural norms.

The strength of the relationship declined after

1892, possibly as Germans joined the general movement away
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from Cleveland's Democrats and as some German farmers swelled
the ranks of the Populists.
strength continued

Correlations with nemocratic

to decline until 1900.

McCook County's Scandinavians

at first showed no clear

preference for the Populist party, as is shown in Figure

5.
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FIGURZ 5. Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential Scandinavian voters according to. the 1900
Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Populist
and fusionist candidates for governor in McCook County, South
Dakota, 1890-1900.
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In 1892 and 1894 the coefficient rises to a moderate +0.3478
and +0.2767 respectively.

The figure derived would have been

higher had not Ramsey township, ranking third in percentage
of Sc and Lnav l ars but having a small community of Britons, been
the banner Populist county in 1894.

The Scandinavians in the

county gave the reform coalition strong support for the remainder of the decade.

The coefficients for the last three

elections of the Populist era are not high, however.
Scandinavians may have voted for fusion candidates,
nicity alone cannot explain the relationship.

The
but eth-

The presence

of two Scandinavian candidates on the ballot in 1896 and 1900
may have reduced the tendency to vote as an ethnic group in
a distinctive fashion.
with Scandinavians,

As was the case with other counties

the coefficient for 1898--when only the

fusionists nominated a Norwegian for governor--rose slightly.
Bon Hom.~e County
Bon Homme County, also in southeastern South Dakota,
lies on the Missouri River in the fourth tier of counties
from the state's eastern border.

The county began experienc-

ing strong immigration during the 1870s, pa.rticularly of
groups from central Europe.

By 1900 the largest foreign-born

group in Bon Homme were the Germans from Russia, who were
closely followed by Czechs.

Indeed, the county is more noted

for its Czech population and Tabor, the center of settlement
for that group, styles itself South Dakota's Czech capital
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in much the same manner Wilbur does in Nebraska.
the Russian-Germans

Although

had a higher percentage of total popula-

tion in 1900, they and the Czechs each comprised nineteen
percent of the adult male population that year.Jl
Russian-Germans

formed the dominant ethnic group among

potential voters in seven of Bon Homme's sixteen townships,
although in one of these--Bon Homme township--all

of the Ger-

mans from Russia were members of a Hutterite colony and presumably eschewed political involvement.

The area of greatest

concentration was in the four northern townships and in Franklin of the second tier from the north.

The final Russian-

German precinct was Hancock township in the southwestern corner.

This ethnic element was apparently all or nearly all

Protestant

in religious preference and was scattered among a

number of denominations.
a settlement

In the north, around Scotland,

in

of Protestant Black Sea Germans called Odessa,

these immigrants were served by Lutheran churches of the Iowa
and Missouri Synods and by German 8ongregational

churches.

Located in the center of Bon Hom.~e. the county seat of Tyndall had a Missouri Lutheran and two Baptist churches that
Russian-Germans

attended.

also in the area.

German Congregationalists

The Danzig settlement

of Black Sea Germans

located around Avon had a Baptist congregation,
Synod Lutheran church,

were

a Missouri

and two Mennonite organizations.

The

Mennonites were Prussians who had settled in Russia and in
areas of Poland for some time before

emigrating to the United
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States.32
The Czechs were concentrated throughout the eastern
third of the county, with Tabor township being over eighty
percent Czech.

Virtually all of the Bohemian immigrants to

this country were either Roman Catholics or freethinkers. Although the exact distribution within Bon Homme county is not
available,

Catholics seem to have held a slight majority.

Tabor Czechs were more Catholic than those around Tyndall or
Scotland and that place had a Catholic Sokol, a gymnastics
society.

Tyndall and Scotland at one time supported lodges

of the ~estern Bohemian Fraternal Association,

the social

organization that fulfilled many of the roles of the church
for freethinkers.

Tabor also had such a lodge, indicating

the presence of freethinkers there as well.JJ
The Germans, comprising about fourteen percent of the
potential voting population in 1900, were to be found throughout the county, but had their highest density in the three
northern townships in the western range of the county.
data are available concerning church affiliations,

No

although

the townships with the highest concentrations of Germans
would have been served by the churches of Avon, which was a
strongly German community.

These included Missouri Lutheran

and Baptist congregations.
Other groups of interest in the county ir.clude Irish
and Dutch.

Irish formed approximately twenty percent of the

males of voting age in Albion and Runn i ng Water townships and
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no doubt contributed to the high proportion of Catholics in
the county.

Of 5,000 Bon Homme churchmembers reported in the

1906 census of religious bodies, Catholics number J,000.

The

townships of the southwestern corner had Dutch settlers, reflecting the presence of a large Dutch community in the adjacent county.J4
Because of a major preclnct change that took place between 1892 and 1894, the first two elections of the decade
were omitted from statistical analysis.

Nevertheless, the

results of those contests are of some interest.

In 1890, the

Democrats managed to win the county with a plurality, although the Republicans consistently won Bon Homme with a
majority of all votes cast the remainder of the decade.
was the case in Nebraska,

As

certain cultural and religious

groups strongly opposed moralistic legislation that struck
at group

mores.

Prohibition was just such an issue.

In

1889 the Republicans had endorsed constitutional prohibition
and in 1890 the GOP candidate for governor supported it.
Democratic plurality of 1890 rray be seen as a reaction to
Republican identification with the reform.35
As can be seen in Figure 6, the Czechs of Bon Hor.lr.le
County were strongly interested in the Populist and fusion
parties.

The highest correlation coefficient occurs with

the 1894 election, but it never dropped below the +0.4647
mark for the rest of the Populist era.

The fact that the

Czech community in Bon Homme was divided between Catholics

The
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FIGURE 6. Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential Czech voters according to the 1900 Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Populist
and fusion candidate~ for governor in Bon Ho~~e County,
So~th Dakota, 1994-1900.
and freethinkers seems to have had no difference in how
Czechs reacted to the reform party.

Tabor township contained

both elements, yet it constantly gave the opponents of Republicanism approximately eighty percent of its vote or better.
This willingness to vote without apparent regard to church or
nonchurch orientation accords with Bruce M. Garver's conclu-
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sions about Czech voting behavior, although the relationship
with the Populist party seems stronger than he suggests.J6
The Russian-Germans of the county registered positive
correlations with the Republicans through the last foti' elections of the Populist decade (Figure 7),

There were a few,
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FIGURE 7. Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential Russian-German voters according to the
1900 Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for
Republican candidates for governor in Bon Homme County,
South Dakota, 1894-1900.
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if any Russian-German Catholics remaining in Bon Homme by the
1890s.

Those that resided in the county at the time were

generally members of the various pietistic churches that dotted the countryside.

This loyalty to the Republican party is

in line with voting patterns among Protestant Russian-Germans
in Nebraska and with what other historians have concluded
about this group's behavior.· Studies of the Mennonites have
noted a predisposition to the Republican party, although that
could change given the right pressures.J7
The correlation of the percentage of potential German
voters in the various precincts with the precentage of Republican votes also reveals a positive relationship (Figure 8).
This, too, is probably related to German membership in Protestant denominations that place stress on proper behavior,
although more data on the exact affiliations would be necessary fJr a stronger inference.
Campbell County
Campbell County in north central South Dakota on the
eastern bank of the Missouri was one of the counties heavily
settled by Germans from Russia in the 1880s.

Mound City, the

county seat was platted in 1884 and by that year Protestant
Black Sea Russian-Germans were taking up land in the county.
By 1900 Russian-Germans born abroad formed nearly thirty percent of the county's population and that ethnic group accounting for forty-five percent of Campbell's potential voters.JS

225

+1.0

~.
+O.
+O.
+0.2

o.o
-0.2

-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1.0
1 90

1 9

1 92

1 9o

1 9

1900

FIGURE 8. Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential German voters according to the 1900 Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Republican
candidates for governor in Bon Ho~~e County, South :akota,
1894-l~OO.

The Russian-Germans

were concentrated along the eastern

ranges of the county where adult males of the group formed
over ninety percent of the voting population of three precincts.

The proportion of Germans from Russia drops off in

the center of the county to thirty to thirty-five percent of
the adult males.

Few

lived in the ranges of townships washed
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by the Missouri.

The greatest part of these Russian-Germans

were members of Protestant bodies, although a Catholic congregation in Herreid, a town founded in 1901, is partly
Russian-German.

Protestant denominations known to have op-

erated among the Germans from Russia
include Iowa Synod Lutherans,

in Campbell County

Congregationalists,

Baptists,

and Reformed.39
Scandinavians,

principally Norwegians,

ethnic group in the western townships,

were the largest

forming over seventy

percent of the potential voting population in the southwestern corner of the county.

The composition of the northwest-

ern corner was more mixed, but a change in voting precincts
between 1890 and 1892 forced that portion of the county
to be omitted from the statistical analysis.

The Scandi-

navians appear to have been served by a Lutheran church or
churches or Norwegian ties, but whether it was a member of
the conservative Norwegian Synod or one of the more evangelical bodies is not known.40
Two other ethnic groups are of some interest.

The

C9n-

tral portion of the county had a number of Germans, primarily
found in the area around Mound City.
religious orientation is unknown,

Although their precise

they may have been numbered

a~ong the 241 Roman Catholics recorded in the 1906 census
of religious bodies.

In Fremont township in the north cen-

tral portion of the county, a small Dutch community predominated, forming over fifty-five percent of the potential voters
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in one precinct in 1900.
Dutch Reformed church.
Politically,

These settlers were served by a

41

the voters of Campbell County favored the

Republican party over any competitor throughout the Populist
era, giving the GOP a clear majority in every election.
Russian-German

The

townships provided the banner Republican pre-

cinct every time,

In 1900, for example, the voters of pre-

cinct seven, with a least ninety-two percent of its voters
of Russian-German origin, gave the Republicans over ninetyeight percent of their ballots.
Figure 9 show$ the course of the relationship between
the percentage of potential German-Russian

voters and the

percentage of votes cast for the Republican party during the
1890s.

Probably associating the Republican party with the

detested constitutional clause for prohibition, Russian-Germans split their strength in 1890, thus producing no clear
correlation with the GOP.

i'fuile two of the three dominantly

Russian-German precincts voted with the Republicans,

one

deviated sutstar.tially by turning to the Independent party.
For the election of 1892, however, the correlation leaps to
+0.5714.

That was to be the lowest coefficient for the re-

mainder of the decade; the peak year came in 1898 when the
figure reached +0.8095.

A slight dip in 1896 may indicate

that some Germans from Russia heeded Bryan's siren call to
silver, for Republican majorities in the important RussianGerman precincts were reduced that year. The decline in the
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FIGURE 9, Coefficients ~f correlation between percentages of potential Russian-Ger~an vot8rs according to the
1~02 Federal census anj the cercenta~Es ~f votes cast fer
R~publican governor in Campb~ll Couniy, South Dakota, 18901900.

correlation in 1900 may indicate that the neighbors of RussianGer~ans were swinging further toward the GOP as the Populist
era came to a close.

That year the Republicans received

record majorities in some of the Russian-German precincts.
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One political scientist has looked at the voting behavior of some Russian-German counties in South Dakota and coneluded that that ethnic group was strongly Republican.

This

ignores the fact that not all Russian-German counties have
acted in the same fashion.

Edmunds County to the southeast

of Campbell had large sections settled by Black Sea Catholics
and, though the Republicans generally captured the county in
the 1890s, percentages of the vote cast for Democrats were
consistently high.42
Scandinavians in Campbell County reacted to the politics
of the Populist years in much the same manner of the Scandinavians of McCook County (Figure 10).

Although the Spearman

correlation coefficient showing the relationship between the
percentages of Populist votes and potential Scandinavian
voters was negative in 1890, by 1892, a very high direct
relationship existed.

FJr 1894 the coefficient climbs to

a remarkable +0.9027.

The electio11 of 1896, with its two

Scandinavian candidates on the ballot and fusion with the
Demccrats,

led to a sli~ht dip.

When only the fusionists

offered a Scandinavian choice for governor in 1898, the correlation with the reform party climbed, but dropped again
when the Republicans nominated a Scandinavian from the adjoining county of McPherson for governor in 1900.
A graph of the coefficients of correlation between the
percentages of German adult males and the percentages of votes
cast for the Democratic and Populist parties reveals an in-
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FIGURE 10. Coefficients of correlation of potential
Scandinavian voters according to the 1900 Federal census
and percentages of votes cast for Populist and fusionist
candidates for governor in Campbell County, South Dakota,
1890-1900.
teresting pattern (Figure 11).

In 1890, when only the Demo-

crats could not be associated with prohibiton, a traditionally
sensitive cultural issue among Germans, the Germans of Campbell reacted negatively to the Democratic party.

In 1892

the correlation with the Populists is very high, though the
Germans turned their loyalties to the Democrats to a consid-
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erable degree in 1894.

The continuing support for the

fusionists during the rest of the decade reflects a general
German support for the reform coalition, although the coefficients are higher in Campbell County than elsewhere. The
causes of this pattern may lie in local circumstances, which
cannot be determined because the local papers for the 1890s

2J2

are not extant.

More complete data on the denominations

among which the Germans were spread in the county might also
shed light on the behavior of this group.
The Dutch of Fremont township favored the opponents

of

Republicanism during the first two contests of the decade,
giving the Populists a majority in 1890 and the Democrats a
plurality in 1892.

The last £our elections, though, saw

solid Republican majorities ranging from sixty to seventytwo percent despite fusionist expressions of sympathy for
the Boers in 1900.

This Republican tendency among Protestant

Hollanders is similar to findings elsewhere.4J
Lawrence County
The last of the six counties included in the statistical
analysis is Lawrence of the Black Hills.

Horne of Deadwood

and Lead, this county was the scene of large-scale hard rock
mining by the 1890s and from its rugged hills came great
quantities of precious metals, primarily gold.

The lure of

gold and high wages brought throusands to western South Dakota from home and abroad, making Lawrence's mining centers
among the most cosmopolitan communities of the state.
Lawrence's 1900 population was scattered among dozens
of small camps and towns, many of which contained only a few
voters.

As lodes played out in one area and rich strikes

were made elsewhere, people and precincts shifted, making a
countywide study inappropriate.

The lack of some voting data

'

2JJ
for the entire period and the problem of unstable precincts-or of shifting names that make precinct identification impossible--have forced some changes in the way with which
Lawrence is treated.

Only the towns of Deadwood and Lead are

included in the analysis and the election of 1900 is omitted
from the study because returns for Lead could not be located
for that year.
Deadwood, a city with as colorful a history as can be
found in the Black Hills, had a population of nearly J,500
in 1900.

Of the males of voting age in the city, men of na-

tive stock comprised nearly half.

Germans contributed over

twelve percent and the Irish over ten percent of the remainder.

The various s6andinavian groups added about eight per-

cent and the British, the most numerous foreign-born group in
the Hills, contributed nearly ten percent.

Deadwood's China-

town contained slightly ever four percent of the adult males
in the city.
Lead, home of the great Homestake ~ining Company, was
proportionately far more foreign-stock than was Deadwood.
Of the adult male population in 1900 only a quarter were born
in America of A~ierican born parents.

Of the remainder, the

British were the largest group withrineteen percent of the
population.

Sc~ndinavians and Irish both contributed about

ten percent, Ge1·mans added seven percent, and Finns comprised
eight percent.

~ine percent of the adult males listed Austria

as their birthplace or their parents', but close inspection
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of surnames reveals that these men, mostly miners, were Slavic.
Italians added another five percent.44
The county as a whole favored the Republican party
through the 1890s,giving that organization a majority or
plurality in all bt.tthe election of 1896, when its opponents
first attempted fusion on a state level.

Of the two cities,

Lead consistently gave the GOP a majority, while Deadwood
voters split their votes enough so as to give the Republicans
pluralities before fusion and a minority in 1896.
Correlation coefficients produced when the relationships
between the proportion of ethnic voters and the percentage of
votes for a party are analyzed should be used with care in
counties such as LaWrence.

The mining camps were character-

ized by high rates of geographic mobility that could dramatically alter the composition of the various precincts.

This

may be particularly true during the adverse economic conditions during the 1890s.
through the period.

Nor were population levels stable

Deadwood increased by fifty percent dur-

ing the decade, but Lead grew four hundred percent in the ten
year time span.45

It is entirely likely that the newcomers

did not mirror the ethnic mix of the earlier residents and
that the proportions of the various ethnic groups in 1900 was
not the same as it had been in 1890, particularly on the ward
level.

Spearman rank correlations produce the clearest co-

efficients when there are no other groups present whose behavior is similar to that of the group under study.

In the
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Lawrence county mining centers a large number of groups did
exist, often in similar strength, and may well have distorted
the coefficients obtained.
The correlations produced by the analysis of the major
cultural groups are marked by wild swings from one half of
the graph to the other in the space of one or two elections.
For example, the correlations between potential Scandinavian
voters and Populists in 1892 were nearly zero.
was nearly perfect +0.9524.

In 1894 it

The comparison of trends among

several groups reveals some similarities

(Figure 12).

The

British and Finns reacted very much alike during the first
half of the decade, with high negative correlations in 1890
continuing in 1892 (though less strongly for the Finns) and
suddenly shifting to high positive correlations for 1894.
The Scandinavians,

with the exception of having virtuallly no

correlation at all in the first two elections,

behaved in

the same fashion as the first two groups in 1894.

The Irish

showed a moderate correlation with the Populists in 1890,
something unexpected because of the proclivity of that group
to the Democ~acy and to opposit:on to prohibition.

Although

this figure dipped in 1892, it returned to a moderate level
in 1894.

That year marked a shift in voting patterns in the

mining cities.
centrated,

Lead, where the British and Finns were con-

had given the Republicans a comfortable 60.1 per-

cent majority in 1892 but furnished the GOP a majority by
only one vote in 1894.

'

Democratic strength there was cut

by
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of votes cast for Populist and fusionist ca~jidates for
governor in Lead and Deadwood, Lawrence County, South Dakota,

1890-1'392.
nearly two-thirds at the same time as Lead tripled

its ?op-

ulist vote.
In Deadwood the shift toward the Populists was also apparent, but the extra votes came from the Derr.ocra.ts.

There

the Republicans were able to in~rease their plurality by
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three percent.

Voters in Ward 1--eighteen percent Scandina-

vian--turned from both of the old parties to give the Populists a majority.

The miners of Dakota. not immune to the

worsening economic conditions following the Panic of 189J,
expressed their discontent in the voting place.

Although

local miners could not realistically expect the free coinage of silver to provide full employment in Lawrence again-for little silver was mined in the state--the depression did
dry up eastern capital that was vital to the economy of the
region.46

In eastern states where third parties were rela-

tively weak and offered little hope of being able to change
the economic climate, dissatisfied Democrats turned to the
Republicans.

In South Dakota. where the Populists had re-

placed the Democrats as the second most powerful party, voters
saw the third party alternative as a viable choice.47
same was not the case in 1896.
British, Scandinavians,

The

The correlations for the

and the Finns dropped nearly to the

1892 level, although the Irish figure remained close to the
1894 correlation.

This rr.ay be due to the fact that the rr.:sh

were far more evenly scattered than the other groups, with
percentages in the eight wards in the study ranging from 7,7
to lJ.8 percent compared to the ranges of 10.4, 11.9, and 10.0
percent for the British, Scandinavians,

and Finns respectively.

Thus the changes in Irish voting behavior were less likely
to affect correlations to the same degree.

2J8
This does not, however,

explain the voting behavior of

natives and Germans in Lawrence County.
tween the percentages
Democratic

Correlations be-

of adult males of those two groups and

and fusion votes are depicted in Figure 1J.

Ger-

mans and natives reacted differently from the other groups

+0.8
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FIGURE lJ. Coefficients of correlation between percentages of potential native stock and German voters according
to the 1900 ~ederal census and percentages of votes cast for
Democratic and fusion candidates £or governor, Lead and Deadwood, Lawrence County, South Dakota, 1890-1898.
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examined during the first half of the decade.

For 1890 both

groups have a positive correlation with the Populist party,
too, as both of these groups expressed dissatisfaction with
the Republicans.

The relationship weakened somewhat in 1892,

but took a dramatic upturn in 1894--precisely the time when
other groups in the county were repudiating the Democrats.
The cause of this shift is unknown, but may lie with local
factors in Deadwood.

That was the strong-hold for both

natives and Germans in the study and there the Democrats
managed to hold on to more of their voters than was the case
in Lead.

Though lower than 1894, the correlations between

these groups and the fusion party in 1896 remained strong.
In 1898 the figures dropped again as natives and Germans cast
their ballots less as natives and Germans than as members of
some other group.
Quantitative methods allow historians to study political behavior to a degree not heretofore possible.

Such tech-

niques allow historians to approach the basic unit of political action--the individual voter--as closely as the available
sources of data will allow--the voting precinct.

No longer

are we tied to the records left by the elite members of society.

rhe application of statistical methods to South Da-

kota politics during the 1890s reveals certain patterns of
behavior among the state's immigrant groups that would not
otherwise be easily discernable.
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The state's Scandinavians--Nozwegians, Swedes, and Danes
--entered the Populist era with long loyalties to the Republican party.

By the 1890s, though, recent immigration had

brought many new Scandinavian voters to the Great Plains, men
who did not have ties to the GOP.

Agricultural distress and

the Independents' reformist nature made the third party acceptable to most of the Scandinavians and they gave strong
support to the new groups until the Populists fused with the
Democrats.

In 1896 this fusion with a group for whom the

Scandinavians had few sympathies and the presence of two
Scandinavians at the head of the state tickEt ended or diminished a cl.ear relationship between the Populists and the
Scandinavians.

In 1898, with only the fusionists runnine a

Scandinavian candidate for governor, members of this ethnic
group were more likely to vote as Scandinavians for the reform coalition.
gubernatorial

By 1900, when both parties fielded Norwegian

candidates,

the correlation vanished.

This

scenario holds true for three out of the four counties with
Scandinavians studied.

In Deuel County the 3candinavians

re~ained loyal to the Republican party, probably because
that county had a much higher percentage of conservative Norwegian Synod Lutherans who were less oriented toward the
evangelical and pietistic behavior that made Populism appealing.
In two of the four agricultural counties containing German elements that ethnic group gawe general support to the
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Democratic party, the party of personal liberty and the negative state that would allow the group to defend its cultural
values from natives who sought to reform American society.
This was true particularly in McCook County where most of the
Germans were Catholic or Lutheran.

In other counties where

the proportion of Catholics and Lutherans was not so high-where more pietistic denomi.nat Lons like the Congregationalists, Methodists,

and Baptists held sway among German im-

migrants--the group gave support to the Populists,

or more

often, to the Republicans.
Protestant Russian-Germans,

temporarily distrustful of

the Republican party in 1890 when they associated the GOP
with prohibition,

showed their true colors by strong support

for that party for the rest of the decade.

Catholic Germans

from Russia appear to have been much more prone to voting
the Democratic ticket than their Protestant neighbors were.
South Dakota's Czechs, apparently hesitant about the
Populists early in the decade, turned wholeheartedly to that
party in 1894.

For the remainder of the decade the Czechs

of Bon Homme County gave consistent support to the reform
coalition,

despite divisions in the community between Catho-

lics and freethinkers.
In Lawrence County, the mining center of the Black Hills,
British, Finns, Scandinavians,
support--sometimes

and Irish all showed increased

dramatic support for the Populist party in

1894--reflecting their dissatisfac'tion with contemporary
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economic conditions and with the old parties.

By 1896 this

support was on the wane and although the correlations increased for some groups in 1898, the overall trend was downward after the 1894 peak.

These four groups tended to con-

centrate in Lead; natives and Germans, located in Deadwood,
reacted in a completely different manner.

This may indicate

that the true source of Populist voting strength in the Black
Hills mining camps might not have been based on ethnic origins
but on occupation in a certain industry or residence in a
particular town that fell on hard times during the Panic of
1893.

If this is the case, and only further research would

disclose this, the high correlations with ethnicity are coincidental.
~thnicity can serve as a general in1icator of political
behavior among South Dakota's immigrants during the 1890s
but does not provide quite the precision one might hope.
state's foreign stock groups were not homogeneous;

The

they were

divided among themselves by a basic difference in religio~s
orie~tation.

Some Rotestant groups exhibited a pietistic

background that led them to translate their religious attitudes into political action,
and other reforms.

often in support of prohibition

Among these were numbered most Scandina-

vians, although the conservative Norwegian Synod Lutherans
apparently stayed solidly behind the GOP while more evangelical Lutherans turned to Populism.

Other Protestant im.T.i-

grant groups with pietistic leanirlgs--peoples like the Russian-
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Germans, Dutch, and some Germans--showed loyalty to the GOP
after first expressing dissatisfaction with the prohibitionist portion of the party that had brought on a cultural reform that the ethnic groups found neither necessary nor desirable.

With the exception of the Czechs, most Catholics,

with a heritage that stressed orthodoxy and belief rather
than conversion and behavior, took up the cause of the Democratic party and its philosophy of the negative state and
personal liberty as a means of defending cultural values
against assault from those who felt differently.

The battle

between pietists and ritualists waxed and waned during the
1890s as various issues and events touched on cultural
nerves.

Behind that battle, the basic orientations of the

diverse groups in the ~ate helped determine the course of
South Dakota politics.
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CONCLUSION
During the late 1870s and through the 1880s Dakota
Territory experienced a phenomenal rate of growth.

During

the Great Dakota Boom, as this period is known, a fl6od of
settlement poured over the fertile prairies.

The drought,

depression, and grasshoppers of the early 1870s had vanished.
Blessed with abundant rainfall during the 1880s, Dakota appeared to be a new Canaan, beckoning landseekers to take
advantage of all the bounty the '.fost offered.

With the aid

of borrowed money and with the promise of easy markets via
new railroads racing across the territory, tens of thousands
of farmers flocked to Dakota, their hopes and dreams inflated
with stories of rich soil and huge harvests.
Nature, however, had played a cruel trick.

The heavy

rainfall of the 1880s was an anomaly, particularly in the
areas of the territory that were found in the Great Plair.s.
Drought, returning again in its periodic cycle, whithered
the fields upon which agrarians had placed so much hope. Nor
was man innoce~t of blame for the hardships on the Plains.
Railroads and elevators that farmers needed in order to dispose of their harvests became ravenous corporations that
gobbled up the slender margin of profit left after crops were
sold in markets glutted with the produce of vast new farmlands
the world over.

Bankers from whom farmers had borrowed heav-

ily to begin operations became wolves at the door, threatening

'

foreclosure when payments could not be made.
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Faced with such adversity, Dakota farmers resorted to
the organization of a Territorial Farmers' Alliance, an
agricultural order that might give them the power to strike
back with a unified voice.
lenge on two fronts.

The Alliance took up the chal-

It started a variety of cooperative

ventures that would cut the middleman out of the marketing
procedure,

thereby hoping to.increase farm profits.

Recog-

nizing that some agrarian goals could be met only within the
political process, the Alliance began to act as a pressure
group to force the old parties to heed the demands of hardpressed farmers.

Initially this lobbying was bi-partisan:

it sought to force both the Democrats and the Republicans to
offer remedies for deteriorating agricultural conditions.
The results of these tactics were not encouragi~g.

T~e

cooperative enterprises met problems from the traditional
mechanism of business.

Leaders in the old parties were re-

luctant to yield their power to new interests and were rr;ore
concerned with promoting economic growth than in providing
relief
ital.

that might damage Dakota's image and drive away capEven when the farm order managed to elect a majority

of Alliance candidates to the territorial legislature,

~ore

experienced politicians succeeded in preventing significant
reforms.
Barred from what they considered to be economic justice
through the existing parties, Alliance leaders chose to launch
their organization on a new ventu~e--the Independent party.
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Acting at the same time as discontented elements in other
states, the South Dakota Farmers' Alliance took the promising
path of a third party as a means of circumventing the old
political order.

With a platform that called for wide-rang-

ing reforms and candidates acceptable to farmers, the new
party entered the realm of partisan politics in 1890s.

Al-

though Republican strength proved too great for the Independents to capture the state's executive machinery that year,
the reformers took enough legislative seats to control the
legislature when acting in coopention with the Democrats.
With this strength, the Independents managed to elect one of
their own to the U.S. Senate in 1891.
This proved to be the only major victory of the first
half of the decade for the Populists, as the me~bers of the
new party soon came to be called.

The Republicans gradually

lured back many of their former adherents throu~h ha~c ca~paigning and concessions to the farm vote in their party's
platform and candidates.

By 1894 the Republicans had re-

established themselves as the majority party.

Yet the Fcp-

ulists were also growing, their ranks swelled by defecting
Democrats.

As cultural issues like prohibition and woman

suffrage--reforms that many of the early Populists had been
linked

to--began to r~cede from partisanship,

the economic

goals of the third party attracted some groups that had traditionally supported the Democratic party.
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By the mid-nineties,

the outlook appeared brighter for

the Populists in South Dakota.

A growing sentiment for the

free coinage of silver followed the Panic of 1893.

Caught

up in this were major elements in the Republican party, including Senator Richard F. Pettigrew,
the party in the state.

a long-time leader of

When the national Republican con-

vention refused to adopt a silver plank, Pettigrew joined
other silverites in walking out.
organization

When the state Republican

would not take up the cry for silver, Petti-

grew's camp abandoned their old party.

These Silver Repub-

licans, together with the handful of Democrats left after
the 1894 repudiation of Cleveland's Democracy,

joined the

Populists in a reform coalition.
This fusion of forces did not come without some friction.
Many of the early Populists could not abide with the dilution
of principles that accompanied corr.bination with old enemies.
For them, silver was just one of a variety of reforms that
had to be achieved, not the common element upon which to base
a tri-partisan campaign.

Some ethnic groups found that their

distaste for Democrats overcame their dissatisfaction with
the Republicans and so filtered back to the GOP.
:fuatever its weaknesses,

the reform coalition was able

to win a victory at the polls in November.

Electing the

governor, a number of other executive posjtions,
ority of the legislature,

and a maj-

the anti-Republican forces were

given the opportunity to carry ou1 their reform program.

The
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coalition, though it could unite against a common foe, was
not strong enough to achieve any major changes.

As legisla-

tors, the reformers were too disorganized, too divided, and
too intent upon their own interests.

Indeed, the Republicans

in the 1897 session succeeded in re-electing J arnes H. Kyle,
a fact that moved the senator into Republican circles.
These same deficiencies characterized the reform party
as a whole.

The coalition began to crumble as leaders who

had thrown their power behind it in 1896 turned to the Republicans.

Other scrambled for power within the coalition.

It became more difficult to hold together diverse groups who
were old political enemies.

Republican officeholders threw

up barriers to the Populist governor and to his plans.

By

1898 the reform groups were losing their momentum and in
that year the only reformer returned to major office was
Governor Andrew Lee.
By 1900 the Populist era was over.

Overwhelming ~epub-

lican majorities swept from power all fusionists except a few
!egislators.

Aided by returning farm prosperity,

the in-

ability of the reform coalition to make lastir.g refor~s, and
the outbreak of a war that captured ~he electorat~·s attention, the Renublicans were able to beat back the Populist
challenge.
The decade of the 1890s brought some: changes.

'l'he Pop-

ulist protest had engendered some minor reforms on the part
of the Republican party.

Fierce competition for votes had
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